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ABSTRACT 
 
DANA FALKENBERG:  Practical Reason, Character and Morality 
(Under the direction of Thomas E. Hill, Jr.) 
 
 In this work, I investigate a class of cases which pose a challenge to Kant's moral 
theory.  These are cases of practical necessities in which agents judge not that they ought 
or ought not to act in a given manner, but that they must or can't.  It looks like Kant needs 
to understand these cases as either ones in which agents feel compelled because they 
recognize they are morally required to act in a given way, or as cases in which agents are 
compelled in a way that removes their powers as agents.  However, I argue neither of 
these understandings will do.  Instead these cases show the ways in which the deep 
commitments that constitute our characters can compel us to act without removing our 
powers as agents.  Bernard Williams thought cases of practical necessities challenged the 
ways in which Kant thought moral requirements were unique, as well as Kant's 
contention that it is always unconditionally rational and good for us to do as morality 
requires of us.   
 I argue Kant did think that all practical necessities were moral necessities.  But, 
Kant's conception of moral requirements is different from Williams'.  As a result, many 
cases of practical necessities can be understood as moral in Kant's sense and so do not 
pose a problem for his theory.  However, not all cases of practical necessities can 
plausibly be understood as moral even in Kant's sense.  It then seems that the deep 
commitments which give rise to practical necessities must be regarded by Kantians as 
iv 
 
merely discretionary, and therefore ones it is possible as well as unqualifiedly good and 
rational for us to give up when they conflict with what ordinarily would be morally 
required.  I argue we should, and a Kantian can, deny this.  In addition to moral 
necessities, these cases also reveal our autonomy as agents and so are entitled to a special 
form of respect. 
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Introduction 
 
[I]f it were possible for us to have sure deep insight into a human being’s cast of mind, as shown 
by inner as well as outer actions, that we would know every incentive to action, even the smallest, 
as well as all the external occasions affecting them, we could calculate a human being’s conduct 
for the future with as much certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse and could nevertheless maintain 
that the human being’s conduct is free.1
 
  
[T]here is a different area, of practical necessity, concerned with what are the possible lines of 
action and possible projects for me, granted that I have the ideals and character I indeed have.2
  
 
  
 If we know a person well, if we have insight into her character, we are likely to be 
able to predict with some accuracy how she would act in a given set of circumstances.  
This is not just on account of the regularities of the behavior of human beings in general, 
or on account of general psychological laws, but on account of specific features of that 
person – what she happens to care about, regard as important, or value and how this 
simply, for her, absolutely rules out or makes necessary certain courses of action.  For 
instance, we might know of our friend who is devoted to his family, that he would drop 
everything and rush to the hospital if he were to find out his child had been in a serious 
accident – he would immediately judge he must go to the hospital.  He can’t do anything 
else.  We might recognize that our diehard vegan friend would consider it beyond the 
pale to saunter up to the local barbeque joint and dive into a plate of pork, or for our 
devotedly monogamous friend to have a one-night stand with a stranger.  If we suggested 
                                                            
1 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason in Practical Philosophy, Mary J. Gregor, trans. 
and ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5:99. 
 
2 Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press, 1985), p. 223 n16. 
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such activities to our friends, they would likely respond with a firm, “No way.  That is 
out of the question.”   
 We might also recognize the way the first-person experience of these kinds of 
cases as well.  Sometimes in the course of our deliberating about what it is that we should 
do, we conclude not just that it would best for us to take a certain course of action, but 
that it is the only one we can take.  It is what we must do.  We can’t do any other.  We 
feel bound to perform the action.  For instance, in the event of an unfortunate boating 
accident, I might see that my spouse is drowning and immediately judge that I must save 
him.  I can’t do anything else.  Such a conclusion need not reveal that I take myself to be 
morally bound to save my spouse.  Instead, it simply reveals what I, in the circumstances, 
care most about.  Any further considerations would be beside the deliberative point, 
period.3
 The experience of reaching a conclusion of this kind – I must, or she could never 
— certainly appears to be unlike concluding simply that I should or she shouldn’t.  Not 
only is it a more forceful kind of conclusion, it is also one that is falsified under different 
conditions.  If I conclude that I must perform a given action, in the sense of must in 
question, and I somehow fail to perform that action, I have shown that my conclusion 
was false.  I thought I had to do it, that I could do no other.  I was mistaken.  This need 
not falsify the judgment that it was what I should do.
     
4
                                                            
3 This is the case used by Bernard Williams in his famous “one thought too many objection” to 
Kantian ethics in “Persons, Character and Morality,” Moral Luck (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), pp. 17-19. 
 
 
4 Bernard Williams makes these points in, “Moral Incapacity,” Making Sense of Humanity (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 53. 
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 Some philosophers, most notably Bernard Williams, have argued that that this 
phenomenon helps to reveal the relations that hold between practical reason, character 
and action, and furthermore that once these relations are better understood, we will see 
how certain moral theories – most especially Kant’s -- depend upon untenable views of 
the nature of practical reason and rational agency.  Contrary to Kant, Williams argued 
that the “musts” and the “can’ts” we encounter in our deliberations and the peculiar 
ability they have to constrain us and compel us to act in certain ways, are grounded in our 
individual characters -- what we care about most in the world and take to be most 
important -- rather than our recognition that an action is required by an objective, 
universal moral law.  Because our own individual characters are the sources of these 
constraints on our deliberations and actions, the experience we have of practical 
necessities does not reveal that it is always possible and overridingly rational to do as 
morality requires of us, as Kant thought.  In fact, this experience reveals that that what it 
is possible and rational for an individual to do intentionally is independent of and has the 
potential to conflict with what is morally required of her. 
   There are two basic strategies which a Kantian might employ in order to dismiss 
this worry.  First, she might insist that the “musts” and “can’ts” in question are always 
moral.  She might insist they are simply indirect ways of expressing the judgment that 
one morally ought to perform the action in question. Secondly, she might insist that if one 
truly is motivationally compelled to perform the action in question, then this compulsion 
is of a sort that removes one’s powers as an agent.  Agency, it might be thought, requires 
the ability to choose whether to perform an action or not. Because these people could not 
choose what to do in the circumstances, and instead were compelled to act as they did, 
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they were not truly agents. Nor was the behavior an action. As such, neither the person 
nor the behavior is a proper object of moral assessment.     
 However, in chapter 1, I argue that neither of these ways of quickly dismissing 
these cases obviously works.  First, while some judgments that one “must” or “can’t” act 
in a given manner do express only that one thinks one morally “should” or “should not” 
perform the act in question and nothing further, it is far from clear that all of them are of 
this nature.  Some of these cases are not ones in which it is obvious that a person is 
responding to what she perceives to be a moral requirement.  Furthermore, there is a 
sense in which agents are motivationally compelled to perform the action in question – so 
far as the conditions of the world permit, it is not simply what they judge they should do. 
It is what they will do. 
 Secondly, even though they agents feel compelled to perform the actions in 
question, they are not compelled in a way that removes their powers as agents, nor the 
appropriateness of holding them responsible for their actions.  The actions in question 
reflect their deepest commitments – especially their deepest concerns and loves.  The 
actions also reflect the agents’ evaluative judgments.  The agents have reasons on account 
of which they take their actions to be justified in the circumstances.  
 In chapter 2, I first discuss Williams’ use of practical necessities in his critique of 
Kant in more detail.  I then discuss Williams’ criticism that Kant misunderstood the 
experience of practical necessities to be one that was strictly moral in nature.  First, I 
think it is accurate to assert that Kant thought all of these kinds of cases were moral in 
nature.  However, because Kant’s conception of the nature of moral requirements differs 
in fundamental ways from Williams’ own conception (which is, it seems, a very common 
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contemporary understanding of the nature of morality), it is not as implausible to regard 
many cases of practical necessities to be cases of moral necessitation as it might at first 
seem.  Furthermore, Kant’s distinction between imperfect and perfect duties allows for 
Kant to account for many of the cases that Williams’ found to be problematic.  
Nevertheless, though these considerations blunt the force of Williams’ criticism, Kant’s 
distinction between perfect and imperfect duties cannot account for all the cases which 
seem to show that it is not clearly overridingly rational for agents to do as morality 
requires of them. 
 In chapter 3, I investigate Williams’ claims as to why it was that Kant thought we 
have overriding reason to do as morality requires of us.  Williams argues these mistaken 
views are the consequence of Kant’s views of agency.  Kant mistakenly thought it was 
necessarily rational for us to do as morality requires because Kant took our deepest 
commitments to be only those we have as rational agents and nothing more.  Kant 
thought this was the case, according to Williams, because he conflated the theoretical and 
practical standpoints of reason.  While the theoretical standpoint is detached from our 
desires in the quest to find true beliefs, beliefs which must harmonize with all other true 
beliefs, the practical standpoint is not detached from one’s desires, nor is it committed to 
reaching a harmonious consensus with all others. 
 However, contrary to Williams’ criticisms, the starting point for Kant’s argument 
for why it is that we have overriding reason to do as we are morally required to do is not 
an abstract conception of the agent.  Instead it is his analytic investigation of the common 
sense idea we have of “duty.”  This analysis reveals that we take the kind of reason we 
have to do our duties to be one that is not conditioned by whether or not doing our duty 
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promotes our welfare or interests – that is, we take duty to be unconditionally rationally 
necessary.  But, it also seems that while we understand our duties to be unconditionally 
rationally necessary, Kant might have been mistaken to think that these are the only 
actions we judge to be unconditionally rationally necessary in this way.  Those that are 
necessary on account of our characters, might be as well.  However, I argue that there is 
room within Kant’s framework to account for unconditional rational necessities that need 
not be understood as moral necessities.  Furthermore, in the event that these 
unconditional rational requirements conflict with what, in ordinary circumstances, would 
otherwise be one’s duty, it seems sensible to think that such commitments can at times 
provide legitimate grounds for permitting agents to refrain from acting in ways that might 
otherwise be morally required of them – not, as Williams thinks, that the moral 
requirements still apply, but it is not rational to follow them.  A good moral theory should 
be able to account why and how our individual characters can sometimes make a 
difference to what it is we morally ought to do.  There are good Kantian grounds for 
concluding that sometimes a proper moral respect for agency requires us to treat acting in 
accordance with our deepest commitments differently than our ability to freely set and 
pursue our merely discretionary ends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Practical Necessity and Agency 
  
I.)  Introduction 
 
 It is a common phenomenon in the works of Jane Austen, and as always in life 
itself, when a heroine is presented with an offer of marriage which she simply cannot 
accept. In Pride and Prejudice, Mr. Collins extends an offer to Elizabeth Bennet, a 
woman resolved on never marrying in the absence of affection. While Mr. Collins stands 
to inherit the estate of Elizabeth's father, he is "not a sensible man."1 Elizabeth neither 
likes nor respects him. She responds, "Accept my thanks for the compliment you are 
paying me. I am very sensible of the honour of your proposals, but it is impossible for me 
to do otherwise than decline them."2 When Mr. Darcy proposes a few chapters later, soon 
after Elizabeth has discovered he was instrumental in separating Mr. Bingley from her 
sister Jane, Elizabeth says, "In such cases as this, it is, I believe, the established mode to 
express a sense of obligation for the sentiments avowed, however unequally they may be 
returned. . .  But I cannot."3
 Perhaps we should not find ourselves surprised at the forthrightness of such a 
headstrong heroine. But even the timid Fanny Price responds to the proposals of the 
 
                                                            
1 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1956), p. 52. 
 
2 Ibid., p. 81.  
 
3 Ibid., p. 143. 
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fickle and flirtatious Mr. Crawford in similar terms.  "No, no, no. . . . Do not distress me. 
I can hear no more of this. . . . I do not want, I cannot bear, I must not listen to such -- 
No, no, don't think of me."4 The next day, her wealthy uncle and benefactor responds 
quite harshly to the news of her refusal. He does not understand how a man who would 
have been a good match for his own daughters -- daughters who are in every way the 
social superiors of his penniless niece -- could possibly be rejected by Fanny without 
even first consulting him.  He accuses Fanny of being stubborn, willful and ungrateful. 
Fanny sobs and replies, "I am very sorry. . . .   I am very sorry indeed . . . If it were 
possible for me to do otherwise."5
 My goal in this chapter is make convincing the claim made by Bernard Williams, 
Peter Winch and Harry Frankfurt that the phenomenon exhibited in these cases -- the 
phenomenon in which one recognizes one can't act in a certain manner in the 
circumstances and so must do something else -- has implications for morality that may 
initially be overlooked or dismissed out of hand.
   
6
                                                            
4 Austen, Mansfield Park (New York: Bantam Books, 1983), p. 244. 
 It is tempting to dismiss the possibility 
 
5 Ibid., pp. 257-58. 
 
6 These kinds of cases were first brought to the attention of philosophers by Peter Winch in "The 
Universalizability of Moral Judgments," and "Moral Integrity," both in Ethics and Action 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972). They were later explored by Bernard Williams in 
"Practical Necessity," in Moral Luck (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), "Moral 
Incapacity," and "How Free Does the Will Need to Be?" in Making Sense of Humanity (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), especially chapter 10. Harry Frankfurt has also explored 
cases like this in "Rationality and the Unthinkable," in The Importance of What We Care About 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), "The Necessity of Ideals," and "Autonomy 
Necessity and Love," both in Necessity, Volition, and Love (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), The Reasons of Love (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), and Taking 
Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).  For an 
argument that Frankfurt and Williams are discussing the same phenomena see Jeffrey Seidman's 
"Caring and Incapacity," Philosophical Studies 147 (2010), pp. 301-22.  For other accounts of 
why it is these phenomena have traditionally been overlooked by other philosophers see Lars 
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that this phenomenon has implications for our understanding of morality in one of two 
ways.  First, it might be tempting to take conclusions of this kind to be indirect ways of 
expressing he normative judgments that one morally or rationally ought or ought not to 
do something rather than as statements that report a fact that a person recognizes about 
herself -- that she simply cannot do something and so must do something else; she is 
motivationally compelled to act in a given way.   
 It might also be tempting to dismiss this phenomenon in a second sort of way. If it 
is true that these people can't act in a certain way, and if the action is one that would be 
morally required of agents, then it might be thought that what follows is simply that these 
people are not truly agents in the circumstances. Agency, it might be thought, requires the 
ability to choose whether to perform an action or not. Because these people could not 
choose what to do in the circumstances, and instead were compelled to act as they did, 
they were not truly agents. Nor was the behavior an action. As such, neither the person 
nor the behavior is a proper object of moral assessment.     
 In this chapter, I hope to show that both of these ways of dismissing these 
phenomena -- phenomena which, following Bernard Williams, I will call "practical 
necessities and incapacities"7
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Hertzberg, "On Moral Necessity," in Value and Understanding, Raimond Gaita, ed.  (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), pp. 102-17, and Raimond Gaita, "Modalities," chapter 7 in his Good and Evil: 
An Absolute Conception, 2nd Ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 96-113. 
 -- are misguided. Instead, a more adequate characterization 
lies in between. These are cases in which one does recognize a fact about what one can 
do in the circumstances, all else equal, and not just what one should do. But, at the same 
time this is not simply a fact about oneself that removes one's powers as an agent. 
 
7 Although Williams calls them "practical necessities" and "moral incapacities." I call them both 
practical in order to highlight their relation to one another, as well as to emphasize that they need 
not be moral in the narrow sense of moral that Williams uses (i.e. “the morality system”).  
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 This chapter has the following structure. First, I will illustrate how these two ways 
of setting aside these phenomena have their roots in a traditional, Kantian practical 
framework. I will argue that this framework fails to make good sense of these cases. 
Next, I will turn to the accounts of practical necessities given by Harry Frankfurt and 
Bernard Williams. While they rightly argue that the source of these necessities is an 
agent's "character" (i.e. the desires with which an agent is identified or the desires that are 
internal to her), their accounts suggest a picture that is inadequately distinguished from 
the kinds of necessities and incapacities that remove one's powers as an agent. Both 
occasionally imply that there are desires that an agent "can't help but have;" there are 
some that are "essential" to her and that "must be satisfied." I argue there is a better way 
of understanding cases of practical necessity that does not require us to postulate or even 
hint that we as agents have an "essential nature."  Lastly, I will argue that the more 
complex view of agency suggested by these cases gives us reason to question whether it 
is always possible and overridingly rational for fully functioning, morally responsible 
agents to do as morality requires of them.  I leave it as a further project to work out a 
response to this challenge and an analysis of its adequacy.8
 
 
II.)  The Traditional View of Practical Necessity:  Kant 
 
 I will take Kant's practical and moral theory as a key representative of what I will 
call "the traditional view of practical necessity." Of course, Kant's own views contain 
many nuances that will not be explored in detail here.9
                                                            
8 I do this in chapters 2 and 3. 
 Nevertheless, I think the spirit of 
 
9 I explore these details in chapters 2 and 3. 
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what I say is faithful to the overarching themes in Kant, and faithful to the many views of 
moral responsibility that are the modern-day heirs of Kant.  
 According to the traditional view of practical necessity, and on a common, if 
possibly mistaken, reading of Kant, there are two distinct forms of human motivation: 
moral duty and inclination. Acting from the motive of duty expresses one's full 
autonomy.  Duty is the only motive that is truly internal to a person and that is a 
reflection of her rational powers of self-determination. All other motives are external and 
sensuous in origin. Because we are finite and dependent beings, we have needs and 
desires that may tempt us into doing what is not fully rational. Acting on these other, 
external motives expresses our heteronomy, our finite, dependent nature. When our freely 
chosen actions are prompted by these motives they reveal our spontaneity, but not our 
full autonomy.10
 Assume for the moment that in the examples of Fanny and Elizabeth, the women 
are asserting the truth when they say they cannot marry these men and must refuse. On 
the traditional view, if our actions are motivationally necessitated, they could only be 
necessitated in one of two ways, with only the first being consistent with our moral 
responsibility. First, our actions can be morally necessitated. This is the only form of 
"practical necessitation" -- the only form of necessitation that is consistent with acting as 
a fully functioning, autonomous agent. All other forms of necessitation are 
 
                                                            
10 An example of Kant distinguishing between these two rational capacities -- the capacity to 
choose which incentive to act upon (spontaneity), and the capacity to act out of respect for the 
moral law (autonomy) occurs on pp. 19-20 of Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, 
Theodore M. Green and Hoyt H. Hudson, trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1960). 
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"pathological."11 In an ideal case of moral or practical necessity, the recognition that an 
action is morally required gives an agent immediate, compelling motivation to perform 
the action. This recognition robs all merely sensuous motives of their force -- it excludes 
them as possible ground for action.  It also provides its own sufficient positive incentive 
of respect for the moral law.12
 If we wish to be charitable, we might see some reason for this understanding of 
the scenario. Most readers are inclined to view their refusals favorably and think they 
reflect well on the kind of people Fanny and Elizabeth are. Their refusals show they are 
above the materialistic concerns that consume so many of the characters in Austen's 
novels. Their refusals also take courage both because they may never get another offer, 
and because they know they must face the severe disapproval of a mother in the case of 
Elizabeth, and a guardian in the case of Fanny. 
 If Fanny and Elizabeth truly were necessitated to act as 
they did, perhaps this was because they judged that it would be morally wrong to marry 
the men in question and their judgment deprived them of any desire they had to do so.  
 But, even if we regard their refusals favorably or unfavorably, it does not seem as 
though it is the case that they are morally required to reject or to accept these men, nor do 
they take themselves to be under any such requirement.13
                                                            
11 A clear example of Kant making this distinction between practical and pathological 
necessitation is his Lectures on Ethics, Louis Infield, trans. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1963), p. 
14. 
  It is true that the men do not 
 
12 In an ideal case, the rational force of a consideration would match its psychological force.  It is 
true that for most human beings, as imperfectly rational beings, rational and psychological force 
are only imperfectly related.  See the Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Reason, Mary J. 
Gregor, trans. and ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5:71-5:89 for a detailed 
description of this process.  I discuss it in more detail in chapter 2, section IV.   
 
13 At least on a widely-held conception of moral requirements (which may not be Kant’s own 
view or the most plausible Kantian conception of moral requirements).  These matters will be 
discussed in more detail in chapters 2 and 3. 
13 
 
meet their personal standards, but these are standards they are not morally required to 
have but instead are matters largely of taste. While Elizabeth is shocked and appalled to 
discover her friend Charlotte Lucas is engaged to Mr. Collins (two days after his offer to 
her), Charlotte reminds her that her own standards and expectations regarding marriage 
are different from Elizabeth's, nor does she have any obligation to adopt Elizabeth's 
standards for herself. "I am not romantic you know. I never was. I ask only a comfortable 
home."14
 If their inability to accept the offers is not a moral inability that rests on 
judgments of what any person morally ought to do in the circumstances, it seems on a 
traditional framework, we are left with understanding these cases as ones in which 
Elizabeth and Fanny are simply overcome by feelings or inclinations -- cases of what 
Kant would have called "pathological necessitation."  If they really could not marry these 
men, then this inability must be akin to being pushed about by a strong wind, or being 
overcome by an uncontrollable urge. But, if this is true and they were so necessitated -- 
they couldn't act otherwise, they had no choice but to act as they did -- then they were 
necessitated in a way that removes their agency. It wasn't they who made them act as they 
did.  It simply happened to them. If this is the case and they were simply passive 
bystanders to the overwhelming force of their feelings and desires, then it is not 
appropriate to judge Fanny or Elizabeth at all.   
 
 But in the cases of Fanny and Elizabeth, this seems like the wrong conclusion. 
First, as already noted, it seems appropriate to hold them accountable.  One common way 
of justifying the appropriateness of these reactions is by making the distinction between 
                                                            
14 Pride and Prejudice, p. 95.  
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desires that are "internal" and "external" to an agent.15
 However, to say this is merely to push the question back -- why is it that the agent 
is identified with some desires, but not others (and who is this agent)? I will explore this 
question in more detail in the discussions of Frankfurt and Williams' accounts below. 
Nevertheless, the basic distinction is fairly intuitive and easy enough to grasp. For 
instance, it seems clear that Elizabeth Bennet does not refuse Mr. Collins because she has 
an uncontrollable aversion to marriage or sex that compromises her ability to act in the 
circumstances.  Many of us have had these experiences, such as being frozen in fear, or 
being unable to control an urge to sneeze at an inopportune moment. Elizabeth Bennet's 
experience is not like this. She does exactly what she has a will to do.  The fact that she 
does not think highly of Mr. Collins, for her in these circumstances, entirely rules out the 
prospect of marrying him.  The considerations in favor of marrying him -- such as her 
father's estate -- are barred from engaging her motivations.  All of her motivations are on 
the side of refusal.   
 In the case of Fanny and 
Elizabeth, their overwhelming desires not to marry these men in the circumstances were 
internal to them.  They are identified with these desires in a way that they would not be 
identified with an overwhelming desire to scratch an itch.  
 Of course there is an obvious option left for one who holds the traditional view.  
She might simply refuse to grant our assumption that these phenomena are as they appear 
to be and really are a kind of necessity – that the agent recognizes there is really only one 
thing in the circumstances that she intentionally can do. She might simply insist that 
                                                            
15 See, for example, Harry Frankfurt's "Identification and Externality," and "The Importance of 
What We Care About," both in The Importance of What We Care About, and Agneizska 
Jaworska's "Caring and Internality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007), pp. 
529-69. 
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Fanny and Elizabeth are either insincere or mistaken when they claim that they can't 
marry these men, or perhaps just exaggerating for the sake of rhetorical flourish -- they 
do not really mean that they can't marry these men, but that for prudential reasons they 
shouldn't; the “can’t” in question is purely normative and not at all descriptive and 
predicative.  If Fanny or Elizabeth insist that they mean something not equivalent to 
“shouldn’t,” they must be pretending or are deceiving themselves -- just as many people 
do when they wish to remove themselves from praise or blame, or when they would like 
to believe what it is easiest for them to believe, or when they wish to escape the pressures 
of others insisting that they should. For example, while Fanny insists to her uncle that it is 
not possible for her to marry Henry Crawford, perhaps all she means to express is that 
she desperately does not want to and, given her feelings, it would be highly imprudent of 
her to agree to such a marriage.   
 It is true that uses of “can’t” and “must” often can be ambiguous between their 
purely normative sense and the sense of “can’t” and “must” at issue.  It is also true that 
many cases of practical necessities also might be ambiguous.  I cannot --nor do I wish to -
- give a clear formula for distinguishing between genuine cases of practical necessities 
and incapacities and others. All I wish to do is to carve out a different way of 
understanding cases of this nature, one that does take them to be what they appear to be 
and that makes good sense of them. Once we see this possibility, it is unclear to me why 
we should insist that such cases are never as they appear, and that they always fit one of 
these other descriptions instead. The real question, then is not whether this or that case is 
a genuine case of practical necessity, but rather whether or not we can understand these 
cases on their own terms, as cases in which agents recognize that they can't act in certain 
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ways, and not simply that they shouldn’t, but nevertheless do not lose any of their powers 
as agents. 
 As a first step in understanding how such cases can be understood on their own 
terms, and not simply as cases in which one judges merely that she “should” or “ought” 
to perform one out of the many options available, we should first notice that even though 
there are cases in which we use the terms "can't" and "must" interchangeably with 
“should not” or “ought not” and “should” or “ought, there are important ways in which 
they can be distinguished. Not only are the judgments that one "can't" or "must" do 
something more forceful than the judgments that one "ought" or "ought not" to do 
something, they are also falsified under different circumstances. It is fully compatible 
with the truth of the judgment that I am rationally or morally required to φ that I 
nevertheless fail to φ.16 I might sincerely judge that I rationally ought to lose weight, 
form the intention to lose weight and devise myself a diet plan. I might try to strengthen 
my resolve by repeating to myself "I must stick to my diet!" and then fail to carry out this 
plan when the server brings the dessert tray. Nevertheless, it can remain true that I ought 
to diet as I enjoy my chocolate cake. However, if I sincerely conclude that I must φ, that I 
am incapable of doing otherwise (the sense of must that is at issue in cases of practical 
necessities), but nevertheless fail to φ, I have shown my conclusion was indeed 
mistaken.17
                                                            
16 This distinction is discussed by Williams in "Practical Necessity" and "Moral Incapacity."   
 This would be the case if, after Fanny insists that it isn't possible for her to 
marry Mr. Crawford and without any relevant change in circumstances, she decides to 
give it a shot. She thought she couldn't marry him. She was mistaken about this belief.  
 
17 Also see Williams, "Moral Incapacity," p. 53, and Gary Watson, "Volitional Necessities," in 
The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, 
eds. (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 2002), pp. 129-59. 
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 As a second step in understanding how it might be true that an agent can't perform 
a certain action and that this inability does not remove her powers as an agent, I will 
discuss two proposed accounts of practical necessities and incapacities:  Harry Frankfurt's 
and Bernard Williams'. Both accounts rightly distinguish practical necessities from 
"pathological" necessities in terms of whether or not the agent is necessitated to act by a 
desire with which she is identified. But, both accounts threaten to make the agent a 
passive bystander to these necessities.  I will argue that although Frankfurt rightly 
emphasizes that what we can't help but care about and love is also a reflection of our 
characters in addition to our choices, it isn't clear that actions necessitated by our caring 
and love reflect our full agency unless they also reflect our evaluative judgments. 
Williams rightly takes an agent's deliberations and evaluations, as well as her cares to be 
central to understanding these necessities as full reflections of her agency. However, he 
also occasionally suggests that these deliberations and evaluations are inevitable, given 
necessary features of that agent's character. This seems, once again, to make the agent a 
passive bystander with respect to these necessities and incapacities, rather than an active 
participant in them. I will then argue that there is a way of understanding Williams' 
account that does not have these implications.  While an agent's endorsements and 
deliberations are constrained by her character, they are nevertheless not inevitable given 
her character. This gives us reason to think that this form of necessitation does not 
compromise one's agency, but is in fact an expression of it. 
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III.)  Frankfurt:  Practical Necessity as Volitional Necessity  
 Harry Frankfurt views practical necessities as a form of volitional necessity.  On 
this account, what we can will is constrained by the things that we love and care about. 
Unlike our mere desires, we are identified with the things that we care about and love. 
What does it mean to be identified with a desire, on Frankfurt's view?  First, it is 
important to note that Frankfurt's account of account of identification has evolved over 
the years.18 I aim, in this brief summary, to highlight the relevant points in their most 
current form. Unlike our mere desires, which seem to occur within us without being fully 
ours, we own the desires with which we are identified. We accept them as our own, and 
take responsibility for them. This acceptance can take the form of a "welcoming 
approval" or a "weary resignation."19 When we are moved by the desires with which we 
are identified, we act autonomously.20
 The most important of the desires with which we are identified are our cares.  The 
deepest of our cares are the things we love. These are the things we devote ourselves to 
and around which we structure our lives.
    
21  What we love is not directly up to us in more 
than one way. First, we do not freely decide what to love on the basis of the value of the 
object of our love. Rather, the things we love acquire their value because we love them.22
                                                            
18 In particular, in earlier works, Frankfurt discusses identification with a desire in terms of 
"endorsement" rather than "acceptance" of that desire. Many discussions of Frankfurt's work do 
not take into account his change of view. 
 
 
19 Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right, pp. 7-8. 
 
20 The Reasons of Love, pp. 16, 20n. 
 
21 "The Importance of What We Care About," p. 84.  The Reasons of Love, p. 23. 
 
22 The Reasons of Love, pp. 38-39, and 67. 
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Secondly, we cannot decide whether or not to love something arbitrarily, as a brute feat 
of will.  
 Instead of being under the control of our wills, the things we love provide the 
constraints within which we can will anything. This is one's "volitional essence" or 
practical identity.   
 
 The essence of a person is a matter of the contingent volitional necessities  
 by which the will of the person is as a matter of fact constrained. These  
 constraints cannot be determined by conceptual or logical analysis. They  
 are substantive rather than merely formal. They pertain to the purposes,  
 the preferences, and the other personal characteristics that the individual  
 cannot help having and that effectively determine the activities of his will.  
 In other words, they are specified for any given person by what he loves.  
 Our essential natures as individuals are constituted, accordingly, by what  
 we cannot help caring about. The necessities of love, and their relative  
 order or intensity, define our volitional boundaries. They mark our  
 volitional limits, and thus they delineate our shapes as persons.23
 
 
According to Frankfurt, sometimes what we love is essential to us in such a way that it is 
impossible for us to will to forbear from a certain course of action; to do so would be 
"unthinkable;"24
 
 one must act as one does.   
 Someone who is bound by volitional necessity is unable to form a  
 determined and effective intention -- regardless of what motives and  
 reasons he may have for doing so -- to perform (or refrain from  
 performing) the action that is at issue. If he undertakes to perform it, he  
 discovers that he simply cannot bring himself to carry the attempt all the  
 way through.25
 
  
                                                            
23 "Autonomy, Necessity, and Love," p. 138.  Also see "On the Necessity of Ideals," p. 114. 
 
24  The Reasons of Love, p. 86. 
 
25  Ibid., p. 46. 
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 Frankfurt  uses the following examples in order to illustrate how the things we 
care about and love constrain what we can will, making certain actions necessary for us 
and others impossible or "unthinkable". In one, a mother is tempted to abandon her child 
but when it becomes time to do it, she finds she is unable; her will is constrained and 
bound by that which she loves. She isn't bound by a moral duty to keep her child. Her 
own love makes impossible for her what might be possible for others.26  In the case of 
Lord Fawn in the Eustace Diamonds, although he judges it best to interview an 
"uncultivated" man about the possible infidelity of his fiancée, he is ultimately unable to 
carry out this course of action; "he is unwilling for his will to be shaped in that way."27
 What Frankfurt rightly emphasizes is that our cares and loves have an authority in 
our deliberations and motivations which our mere desires lack.  When we act in 
accordance with the things we deeply care about or love we "express who we are" in a 
manner distinct from acting on a mere desire.  He is also correct that we cannot begin to 
understand cases of practical necessities without recognizing the centrality to them of our 
deepest cares and loves.  If an agent can’t perform a particular action in the circumstances 
(in the sense of “can’t” in question) it is because in these circumstances to do so would be 
incompatible with something she loves or cares deeply about.  However, if we are to 
meaningfully distinguish practical necessities and incapacities which do not compromise 
one's full-blooded agency from forms necessitation and incapacitation which do, it seems 
something more must underlie practical necessitation than simply its being an expression 
of what, as a matter of fact, one cannot help but care about, regardless of the reasons or 
 
                                                            
26 "The Importance of What We Care About," pp. 90-91. 
 
27 "Rationality and the Unthinkable," p. 183. 
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motivations one has to resist. That is, something more must underlie practical 
necessitation than its being an expression of one’s "volitional essence." 
 Imagine a mother with an adult, openly gay son.28 The mother is thoroughly 
convinced that her son is living a sinful, shameful life and believes it would be best for 
her to cut off all contact with him, that to associate with such sinners is to tacitly approve 
of the ways in which they live their lives. Nevertheless, she cannot bring herself to follow 
through. As Frankfurt would say, she cannot form an effective intention to cut off 
contact, whatever reasons or motivations she may have for doing so.  Her will resists 
being formed in this way.29
 Notice that it is simply a fact about the mother that she will give in and pick up 
the phone when her son calls. It is a fact about her that her will resists being shaped in 
  When he calls and she sees his name on the caller ID, she 
relents and answers. She can't help but notice his birthday is coming up, and always 
breaks down and buys him a card. He simply means too much to her to cut off contact 
with him. But, she does not think well of this inability. She thinks that if she were 
stronger, more determined, more committed to the values of her religion she would be 
able to resist. She thinks she is in need of God's forgiveness for her weakness. But, over 
time, she wearies of her motivational struggle. She gives up and accepts that she will 
continue to have contact with her son, that her love for him is unavoidably a part of 
herself.  
                                                            
28 This example makes use of the discussion of the relevant of caring and endorsement to our 
conception of agency by Gary Watson in his "Volitional Necessities."  Watson uses a different 
example in order to show that Frankfurt and Williams ultimately have different conceptions of 
practical necessitation, and argues that Frankfurt's conception reveals less about agency than 
Williams' and more about identity.  In contrast to Watson, I think both conceptions reveal 
important, but distinct, features of agency. 
 
29 The Reasons of Love, p. 46.  
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certain ways -- she cannot “form a determined and effective intention” to cut her son out 
of her life, no matter what she judges she should do, nor however hard she tries. She can 
either accept this fact, or continue to resist it.  Either way, the outcome is inevitable. It is 
not clear to me how simply accepting that one inevitably will act in a certain way, 
regardless of the reasons one believes one has to do otherwise is enough to distinguish 
this form of necessitation from other forms of behavior that we might justifiably think 
compromise our agency in certain respects.   
 In order to make this clear, we need to distinguish between two often overlapping 
yet distinct aspects of our agency.  There are at least two ways in which an action might 
reflect our agency and we might think that "full-blooded agency" requires both.30  First, 
an action might reflect our identity as agents -- that which we care about most deeply, 
even though we may not be aware that we do so care, nor think that we have reason to 
care.  Most of Frankfurt's examples of volitional necessities are of this variety.31
                                                            
30 This discussion is greatly indebted to David Shoemaker's "Attributibility, Answerability, and 
Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility," Ethics 121 (April 2011), pp. 
602-32. 
  Such 
actions are ones that can properly be attributed to us as agents.  They express who we 
"really are" -- that which we care about most deeply which can move us in the absence of 
or even contrary to our evaluative judgments.  The mother's inability to resist picking up 
the phone when her son calls reveals the depth of her love for him.  It is no accident that 
she is unable to resist.  She is not overwhelmed by an "alien force" which renders her 
movements a mere behavior rather than something that she does. We might also judge 
that it reflects well on her character, the kind of person that she is.  
 
31 Indeed they must be, on Frankfurt’s view, because our caring is the source of the reasons we 
have, according to Frankfurt. 
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 However, even actions which can properly be attributed to us as agents because 
they reflect what we care about most deeply need not reflect our evaluative judgments.  
They can move us in the absence of or even contrary to our evaluative judgments.  The 
mother’s evaluative judgments lead her to believe she would not be justified in picking 
up the phone.  She does not believe she has a reason that would justify her in doing so.  In 
fact, she thinks she has reasons which justify resisting picking up the phone.  But, she is 
moved in spite of these reasons – she is unable to resist.  If she were asked why she 
picked up the phone, she will find herself unable to justify her action, though she might 
be able to explain it.  She might respond, "I know that I shouldn't, but I couldn't help 
myself.  I love him too much."  Her actions are properly her own.  They reflect who she 
most deeply is, but not her judgments of what she takes her reasons to be. So, although 
the actions might be properly attributed to her, she is not fully answerable for them -- 
whether she is right or wrong, she does not take her conduct to be justifiable.  Her 
conduct does not reflect her evaluative judgments. 
 To be clear, I think it is true that the examples cited by Frankfurt are not forms of 
pathological necessitation -- they do express one's agency, though not one's full powers 
as an agent.  Cases of pathological necessitation like an overwhelming urge to sneeze 
might be thought not to lack both of the elements; not only does sneezing not reflect 
one’s evaluative judgments, but the behavior is also not a reflection of the agent's deepest 
cares -- what she, as a matter of fact, takes to be significant or important.   
 Cases like those of Frankfurt’s volitional necessities bring up a host of interesting 
questions and have important implications for our understanding of morality.32
                                                            
32 In particular, we might think that the agency that is expressed when we our actions reflect that 
which we care about deeply or love can help us make sense of the ground and the nature of the 
  However, 
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there are grounds for thinking that that some of one's powers of an agent are 
compromised in these cases, and that there is a better candidate for understanding how it 
is we might be necessitated to act in certain ways without losing any of our powers as 
agents.  These are the necessities that arise on account of what we most deeply care about 
and which also reflect our evaluative judgments. These pose the deepest challenge to a 
Kantian conception of agency and morality.  
 
IV.)  Williams:  Practical Necessity as Deliberative Necessity 
 
 Bernard Williams' account of practical necessities is an improvement over 
Frankfurt's because it makes use of the agent's evaluations and deliberations in 
distinguishing between pathological and practical necessities.33
 In order to understand William's account of practical necessities and incapacities, 
it will help to begin with his view of the first-person practical perspective which Williams 
takes to be constituted by one's character. According to Williams, the first-person, 
practical perspective is necessarily personal, and interested -- it is only because I care 
about things, value things and desire things that I have any reason to do one thing rather 
than another, or to deliberate about what I shall do. Given what I care about or love, as 
 Nevertheless, at times he 
too seems to suggest there is an essential core to an agent's character that can make 
certain evaluations and actions inevitable. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
obligations we have to "marginal agents" such as children, those with Alzheimer's, and any other 
creature with the capacity to care who lack other forms of agency, such as the ability to make 
evaluative judgments.  See Jaworska, "Caring and Internality."   
 
33 There are many challenges in presenting a brief, unified summary of Williams' views on 
practical necessities. His views on these matters pop up briefly in many forms and are scattered 
throughout his works.  What follows is an attempt to unify his many comments into a cohesive 
narrative.  
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well as what I value and take to be important, I will take notice of certain features of my 
environment rather than others, and I will deliberate, reflect, and act in certain ways 
rather than others; "to think in one way rather than another is . . . to be a certain kind of 
person, and it is not possible to combine all kinds of reflection with all kinds of 
disposition."34
 
  Furthermore, not only will I deliberate in a certain way given my 
character, the actions I am capable of intentionally performing depend on my 
deliberations and character. What I can do intentionally depends on which options I can 
see as open to me given the character that I have.  
 Other people, and indeed I myself, can have an 'external' idea of different  
 ideals and projects I might have had, for instance if I had been brought up 
 differently: there are few reasons for, and many reasons against, saying  
 that if I had been brought up differently, it would not have been me. This  
 is the area of metaphysical necessity. But there is a different area, of  
 practical necessity, concerned with what are possible lines of action and  
 possible projects for me, granted I have the ideals and character I indeed  
 have.35
 
 
 Williams argues that the experience of practical necessities helps to reveal these 
basic facts about the first-person practical perspective. He takes as a feature of our 
experience that sometimes when we deliberate about what to do we recognize that we are 
incapable of acting in certain ways. Sometimes this reveals "merely psychological" 
(pathological) limitations, such as when I recognize that I can't walk across a high, 
swinging bridge because, in imagining whether to perform the action, I can see that I 
                                                            
34 "Utilitarianism and Moral Self-Indulgence," in Moral Luck, pp. 51-52.  Notice that the fact that 
our characters (our deep cares and concerns) structure our deliberations and evaluations in this 
manner helps to explain why it is that the two different agential capacities discussed above, the 
capacity for acting in ways that express one's character or identity as an agent, and the capacity to 
act in ways that reflect one's reason-based evaluations, often coincide. 
 
35 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 223 n16.  
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would be too scared.36
 Williams distinguishes between these cases in the following way. In the case of 
practical incapacities, the person is incapable of performing the action on the basis of 
evaluative considerations that, in the course of her deliberation, she takes to be decisive, 
rather than psychological facts about herself.
 Sometimes it reveals the limitations of our characters (practical 
necessities and incapacities) rather than merely psychological limitations. How are we to 
distinguish the two? 
37 For instance, a man might deliberate about 
whether to gossip about his wife with reporters and conclude that he cannot; to do so 
would be "disloyal." The disloyalty of the action is for him, in these circumstances, 
absolutely decisive.  A soldier might deliberate about whether to shoot a naked enemy 
soldier while on sniper duty and conclude that he cannot; to do so would be 
“dishonorable.”38  This consideration is for him, in these circumstances, totally decisive. 
The experience we have of practical incapacities, unlike merely psychological 
incapacities, is not that we unavoidably are moved regardless of our evaluations and 
deliberations, but we unavoidably are moved on account of our evaluations and 
deliberations. We both "decide" and "discover" we cannot or must act in a certain way.39
                                                            
36 "Moral Incapacity," p. 54. 
 
We as individuals discover that we cannot act in a certain way because of what we value, 
endorse, or find important. 
 
37 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
 
38 This case is a modified version of one of Michael Waltzer’s cases in Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd 
Ed.  (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
 
39 Ibid., p. 62. 
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 It might look like these conclusions are purely normative and that they express 
only what the agent thinks he ought to do, either because it is what it is most reasonable 
or because it is what is morally required. But Williams argues that the modality expressed 
is not only a normative modality – it does not express only what the agent judges he 
should do, but may not.  The conclusion expresses the agent's intentions -- it is what he 
will do, assuming nothing interferes with him carrying out the action.  
 
 His conclusion does, then, have implications about the way the world will  
 be, but the modality that occurs in them is still essentially deliberative,  
 in the sense that the statement expresses the agent's intentions, and does not 
 merely report an antecedent fact about the agent. If it did report an  
 antecedent fact, then, the agent's acceptance of it, if it did not express an 
 unintelligible form of  fatalism, would have to represent his recognition of a 
 limitation on his powers.40
 
 
 Because one's deliberations and evaluations as well as one's cares are necessary 
for the inability, Williams does have better grounds than Frankfurt for the claim that 
these incapacities and necessities do not compromise one's full agency: given my 
character, not only am I unavoidably moved or unable, but I am unavoidably moved 
because I see certain facts, circumstances, etc. as decisive considerations for me to act or 
refrain from acting. For instance, the mother might deliberate about whether or not she 
should answer the phone when her son calls, and recognize not just that she unavoidably 
will.  Instead, she concludes that she will pick up the phone because, no matter how many 
times she rehearses the considerations in favor of cutting off contact with her son they do 
not move her.  And they do not move her because there is one consideration that is, for 
her, decisive: it would be a betrayal and a rotten thing to do to her child.  The action is 
                                                            
40 "How Free Does the Will Need to Be?" pp. 17-18. 
28 
 
not only attributable to her; she is also answerable for it.  She takes her action, in these 
circumstances, to be justified.   
 Notice that in these cases, even if a person takes her action to be justified in the 
circumstances, this need not entail that she takes her action to be what, overall, is morally 
best.41
 However, we are still left with an important issue. If we accept the view that there 
is no deliberative or evaluative stance for a person outside of the stance provided by her 
character, and that given her character she will unavoidably see things in a certain way 
and unavoidably be moved by how she sees and evaluates them, it seems that she still is 
passive with respect to how she is moved unless she is also able to reflect upon and 
evaluate her character as well. But Williams occasionally suggests that there are features 
of an individual's character that are essential features of her deliberations -- they must be 
assumed, or taken for granted, because without these essential reference points (such as 
one's essential desires or commitments) held constant, the agent would be left with no 
grounds for making any judgment whatsoever. Because they are necessary features of her 
evaluations, it seems that these cannot themselves ever be reflected upon or evaluated by 
  In the case of the mother, she might recognize that what she takes to be the moral 
considerations (what is demanded by her religious principles) all tell in favor of cutting 
off contact, and only personal considerations (her deep desires that are independent of 
and prior to moral commitments) of her love and loyalty are in favor of keeping in 
contact.  She need not take herself to be morally bound to love her son in this way.  
Nevertheless, she might think overall she has all-things-considered reason to continue her 
relationship.  While less than morally ideal, betraying her son is more than she could 
bear.   
                                                            
41 Thanks to Susan Wolf for pressing me to be clear on this point. 
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her -- the perspective needed in order for her to evaluate them is, necessarily, one that is 
unavailable to her. As an analogy, imagine that I need a specific, one-of-a-kind pair of 
glasses in order to be able to see anything clearly and I live in a world without mirrors, 
cameras, or other reflective and recording materials. So long as I am wearing my glasses, 
I can see everything I wish to see as well as can be. However, I can't ever clearly see the 
glasses themselves (or myself). The only way for them to be seen is if I take them off.  
But, once they are off, everything is a blur. 
 Williams also occasionally suggests that such necessary features of a particular 
agent's character also give rise to the most interesting cases of practical necessities and 
incapacities. In "Practical Necessity" he distinguishes a practical necessity from another 
kind of "boring" deliberative conclusion that one "must" perform a given action in the 
following way.  
 
 Those are the [the boring] cases in which a set of objectives or constraints  
 is merely taken for granted, and relative to them, a particular course of  
 action is very clearly singled out. . . . The most important point, however,  
 is that it is enough for the boring answer that the set of objectives or  
 constraints which determines the outcome should merely be accepted or  
 taken for granted by the agent as something which, so far as this  
 deliberation is concerned, he does not intend to change. But in the serious  
 cases of practical necessity, in which must makes its real point, that is not  
 so. In the serious cases, the notion of necessity is applied to those  
 constraints and objectives themselves.42
 
   
 Williams makes a similar distinction in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.  He 
distinguishes between a conclusion that one "must" do something in order to attain what 
one merely happens to desire, and the conclusion that one "must" do something in order 
to satisfy a desire that is "essential" to the agent.  
                                                            
42 p. 126.   
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 Sometimes, of course, 'must' in a practical conclusion is merely relative  
 and means only that some course of action is needed for an end that is not  
 at all a matter of 'must'. . . . We are not concerned with this, but with a  
 'must' that is unconditional and goes all the way down.   . . . I distinguished  
 a 'must' that is  unconditional from one that is conditional on a desire that  
 the agent merely happens to have; but a conclusion of a practical necessity  
 could itself be the expression of a desire, if the desire were not one that the  
 agent merely happened to have, but was essential to the agent and had to be 
 satisfied.43
 
  
 We might then begin to worry that, in the end, Williams' account is not 
significantly different from Frankfurt's. Although what we can intentionally do is 
constrained by our deliberations and not just by features essential to our wills, how we 
will deliberate is, in the most interesting cases of practical necessity, determined by our 
"essential desires". It seems that both accounts of practical necessity require there to be 
an "essence" to our characters to which we are ultimately held hostage.  This seems 
undesirable for two reasons.  First, it seems empirically false that individuals are unable 
to question their deep commitments, such as whether we should love a child or spouse, or 
whether their projects or ideals are worthwhile.  Second, even if it were true that people 
couldn't, this seems like a lamentable result.  Sometimes, it seems, individuals (or the 
world as a whole) would be better off if they were able and willing question and evaluate 
their commitments. 
 However, I hope to show that Williams' account of practical necessities does not 
require him to hold that we have "essential desires" which necessarily constrain our 
deliberations, even though he occasionally suggests such a picture. I will argue that 
practical necessities need only be necessary given one's character (one's practical, 
deliberative standpoint) as it now is and that one cannot change at will. They need not be 
                                                            
43 pp. 188-89, original emphasis. 
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necessary on account of essential features of one's character such as unconditional 
commitments or essential desires that cannot be questioned or evaluated, period. This 
gives us better grounds for thinking that these incapacities do not compromise one's 
agency. 
 
V.) Necessity and Deliberative Constraints  
 In order to see that practical necessities do not require agents to have essential 
features of their characters, it will help to clarify in what way we might think that the 
constraints of a particular person's deliberations are necessary for that person. I will 
illustrate using a relatively trivial example, yet the point generalizes to more serious 
cases.   
 First, deliberative constraints might be necessary at a particular point of time, or 
in the course of this particular deliberation.  For instance, at this given moment, as I 
deliberate about how to spend my day, there is much that is held fixed and, indeed, much 
must be held fixed in order for the deliberations of a finite agent like me to ever come to 
a conclusion. There is no question that I will write today. The only question is what in 
fact I will work on -- will I begin writing a new section, or go back and revise an earlier 
one? The constraints within which I deliberate right now might reveal something about 
my general attitude toward prioritizing work over pleasure, but need not. It might simply 
be the case that my cable and internet are out and so there is not much else for me to do at 
the moment. 
 In order for the constraints within which I deliberate to reveal something 
interesting about me or my character, it seems not only must they be necessary or held 
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fixed at this time, or in the course of this particular deliberation but they must be 
necessary across some span of time, or some possible set of deliberations. If I hold 
constant that I will work today even though my cable and internet are fully functioning 
and allow for the possibility of endless hours of mindless amusement, this begins to 
reveal something about my commitments or my character. But, what could it mean to say 
that these constraints are necessary? 
 Does it mean that I cannot question these constraints? There are two ways we 
might mean that someone "cannot" question the constraints of her deliberation. It might 
just not occur to me that there are other options besides writing today. I might be 
incredibly unreflective, unimaginative, or a creature of unthinking habits.44
 So, it must be the case that if it were suggested to me that I take the day off, and 
these constraints of deliberation are necessary in the way intended, I would immediately 
reject this suggestion -- "I can't; I have to work." But, this too might not reveal anything 
particularly interesting about my character or my commitments. If you pushed back and 
responded, "Of course you can! You deserve, you need, a day off!"  and I still respond, 
without thinking, "I can't. I must work," and that is all I have to say because I, somehow 
or other, cannot bring myself to question my commitment to working, this begins to look 
something like a real necessity, but not yet one that is obviously different from one that is 
merely pathological or one that should be regarded as morally interesting in any unique 
 If you 
suggested to me that perhaps I should take the day off and go swimming, and I jump at 
the opportunity, it doesn't seem like these constraints could be necessary in a way that 
could give rise to a practical necessity.   
                                                            
44 This too would suggest something about my character -- but it wouldn't reveal anything about 
the particular attitudes in question -- the attitudes towards work and pleasure.  Thanks to Susan 
Wolf for pointing this out. 
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way. If I am unable to question my commitment to working (or, my ideals regarding 
marriage, or love for my children) and it is only because of this inability to question my 
commitment that I (necessarily) must act, then it seems I am just being narrow-minded, 
stubborn or (irrationally) compulsive. This seems even more the case if my commitment 
is destructive to my own well-being (perhaps I haven't taken a day off for months, I've 
neglected to visit my family, etc.) or that of others (perhaps I can't question my 
conviction that men are the intellectual and physical superiors of women; I can't question 
my commitment to following the orders of my superiors, no matter what they are). 
 Instead, what seems distinctive about practical necessities and incapacities is that 
if the agent were to question her commitment, she would nevertheless not change it. 
Again, there may be two ways reasons for this. One is that however it is she regards the 
commitment she simply cannot change it, even if she does not approve of her 
commitment or see it as worth having-- perhaps because it is central to her emotional life. 
This may tell us a great deal about the kind of person she is. But in such a scenario, it still 
seems that some of her powers as an agent are compromised.  She is helpless with respect 
to such a commitment.  She simply cannot do anything about it. 
 The other route in which an agent is willing to question her commitment but 
nevertheless does not change it is if she does not think it would be good to do so. There 
are two scenarios in which this might be the case. In the first, the agent doesn't think it is 
good to have such a commitment or think that it is worth sustaining, but she doesn't 
disapprove of it, either. For example, given that I've made it a point to work every day 
and I can't see a good reason why today should be any different from every other day, I 
might as well continue the status quo. This need not show any attitude on my part that 
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singles out this commitment in any important respect. That is, I might be equally 
indifferent with respect to any of my options and so can't see any value in doing anything 
else.  Such might be the attitude of many chronically depressed people who go on living 
without enjoying it or seeing any point in doing so.  
 In the second scenario, not only can I see no good reason to change my 
commitment, I can see no good reason because I think my commitment is one that is 
worth continuing, worth having. Yes, it has become my habit to thoughtlessly get up 
every morning, sit in front of my computer with a cup of coffee and write, if my schedule 
allows.45
 Of course, there is a sense in which I could distance myself from my commitment 
if I saw good reason to do so in light of other deeper commitments, even though I cannot 
simply choose to give it up at will.  Even if I can only have reason to change my deepest 
commitments on the basis of other deep commitments and so can only modify them 
 No, I will not take today off to go for a swim --it would not be good to do so -- I 
need to finish my paper.  I will not be able to enjoy doing anything else unless it is 
finished.  In this scenario, the only options which are capable of moving me are those that 
are consistent with what I care about most and I see as being worthy of my care.  
Furthermore, I do not see myself as having good reason to do otherwise.  This means that 
I will not be moved to change these commitments in these circumstances -- and not 
because I am stubborn, blind or unthinking.  What makes practical necessities and 
incapacities distinct is not just that the commitments and ideals that rule out a given 
course of action are not in fact subjected to re-evaluation, but that even if they were one 
would find no adequate grounds for failing to endorse them in the circumstances in 
question. 
                                                            
45 In fact it might be a consciously cultivated habit. 
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gradually over time, they are still capable of being changed.  It does not appear that any 
are absolutely necessary to me.  In fact, I think this is what we should conclude if we are 
to maintain that such necessities do not compromise any of one's powers as an agent.  For 
instance, if a commitment to my work began to repeatedly46 interfere with my family 
commitments, I might, come to see my commitment to my work not as "dedicated" but as 
"obsessive," when viewed from the perspective of these other commitments.  Once I 
come to see this (and I can't simply choose to see it this way) I may then be able to, with 
effort, change how it is that I think about things and deliberate. But even though we 
might think this is a real possibility, it is irrelevant to what a person can possibly do now 
in this set of circumstances.47
  
   
VI.)  The Basic Challenge to Morality 
 
 The goal in this chapter was to explain how we might understand cases in which 
people conclude that the “can’t” act in a given manner and so “must” do something else 
can be understood on their own terms as a unique kind of case.  
 Unlike a conclusion that one morally or otherwise "ought" to or "ought not" act in 
a certain way, the conclusion that one "must" or "can't" do something might reveal a fact 
about oneself and what one will do, other conditions in the world permitting.  Williams 
                                                            
46 The "repeatedly" is important.  If there are simply occasional clashes between our deep 
commitments on account of bad luck we might not have good reason to change gradually over 
time but only to hope that such rare clashes will never happen again. 
 
47 Michael Bratman also argues that the anchors that structure our deliberations are stable, rather 
than fixed or necessary. See his "Anchors for Deliberation," in Intentionality, Deliberation, 
Autonomy, Christoph Lumer and Sandro Nannini, eds. (Burlington: Ashgate, 2007) and "A 
Thoughtful and Reasonable Stability," in Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting it Right, Debra 
Satz, ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).  Also see Jeffrey Seidman, "Caring and 
the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation," Journal of Ethics and Social 
Philosophy 3(1) (2008).  
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and Frankfurt are right to think that the source of these facts about what one can or 
cannot do ultimately rests in a person's character -- the deep desires, cares, projects, and 
commitments with which that person is identified.  Furthermore, Williams does well to 
draw attention to the ways in which our deep desires, cares, projects and commitments, 
our characters, structure our deliberations.  Given my character, I am disposed to take 
notice of certain features of my situation rather than others.  I am disposed to seriously 
consider only some of the infinite possibilities for action, rather than others.  I am also 
disposed to give certain considerations rather than others priority in my deliberations and 
even to take some of them as absolutely decisive.  Furthermore, the actions I am capable 
of intentionally performing is dependent upon these deliberations.  We have also seen 
that there is a way of understanding how what it is possible for a given person to do 
intentionally does not require us to understand ourselves to have "essential desires" which 
they "cannot help but have" that do not allow them to act in certain ways.  The result is 
that we need not think that these kinds of necessities and incapacities interfere with our 
powers as agents.  They seem to be compatible with our acting as full-blooded, morally 
responsible agents in these circumstances.   
 However, if what it is possible and rational for fully-functioning, morally 
responsible agents to do intentionally in a given set of circumstances depends on their 
individual characters and commitments in this way, we might begin to worry that it isn’t 
the case that it is always possible and overridingly rational for fully functioning agents to 
do as morality requires of them, as Kant thought.  It does not seem to be the case that 
what an agent perceives to be moral required in the circumstances is always among her 
live options, nor is it always given priority in her deliberations.  For example, the soldier 
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discussed in section IV above might sincerely judge that he morally ought to shoot the 
naked enemy soldier.  He might think that naked or not, the man in his sights is an enemy 
solder.  He has a duty to his superiors to faithfully carry out the task assigned to him.  
Furthermore, he might sincerely judge his country to be engaged in a just war.  
Nevertheless he just can’t bring himself to pull the trigger, even though that is what he 
sincerely judges to be morally required.  This is not simply because he has an 
uncontrollable aversion, but because he can’t escape the sense that it would be 
dishonorable and no amount of reiterating the moral argument in favor of shooting can 
shake how he sees this consideration as – for him -- decisive.   
 This worry will be discussed in the chapters that follow.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Practical Necessities and Moral Requirements 
 
I.)  Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that we have good reason to admit there are 
possible cases in which a person might recognize that as a matter of fact, given what she 
cares most deeply about and which considerations she, in these circumstances takes to be 
absolutely decisive,  she simply "can't" or "must" act in a certain manner.  I also argued 
that cases like these do not remove her powers as an agent, nor remove her moral 
responsibility for her actions, even though she may have no real live (practical) 
alternative.  It is now time to investigate the implications these phenomena have for 
morality.  In particular, these phenomena seem to suggest that what it is possible for an 
agent to do (in the sense of "practically possible" discussed in the last chapter) and what 
it is overridingly rational for her to do cannot be determined independently of the 
personal features that constitute her character.  If this is the case, we have reason to 
question whether it is always possible and whether it is overridingly rational for fully 
functioning agents to do as morality requires of them in all possible circumstances.  Of 
course these were some of the major theses of Kant’s moral theory. 
 One philosopher who thought these phenomena had important implications for the 
tenability of Kant's moral theory was Bernard Williams.  A central theme in Williams' 
critique of Kant's ethics is that Kant distorted the experience of practical necessity, the 
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"central experience of ethical life."1
 I will begin this chapter by briefly summarizing Williams' critique of Kant's ethics 
and the ways in which it makes use of the phenomenon of practical necessity in some 
detail. I will focus, in particular, on the criticism that the demands of morality do not 
necessarily rationally override our personal projects and commitments and the related 
criticism that Kant's ethics demands too much from agents, largely as a result of Kant's 
flawed conception of human agency.  I will then separate the three main challenges in 
this critique, the analysis of which will structure the present and the following chapter.   
  Kant, according to Williams, explained our 
experience of practical necessity in terms of a confrontation with a Fact of Reason, which 
revealed that objective, universal, impartial moral requirements were not simply 
phantoms of the brain, and that reason could discover the fact of what it is we ought to do 
-- what is morally and practically necessary.  Rather than recognizing a Fact of Reason 
that holds for all rational beings, Williams argues that what is discovered in these 
experiences is a fact about the particular person in question-- a fact about the boundaries 
and limitations of her character.  This phenomenon, rather than revealing the objective 
basis of morality, instead reveals how one's individual character provides the source of 
one's practical reasons for action as well as limits what it is possible for her to do. 
 There are a number of reasons for focusing on Williams' use of practical 
necessities in his critique of Kantian ethics.  First, the role of this phenomenon in 
Williams' critique of Kant and Kantian ethics has, to my knowledge at least, never been 
discussed in any detail and is interesting in its own right.  Second, I focus on Williams' 
criticisms of the historic Kant rather than on contemporary Kantians because Williams 
                                                            
1  "Ethics and the Fabric of the World," in Making Sense of Humanity (New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 171. 
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himself aims his criticisms at Kant and they have been very influential in how some read 
and understand Kant's works.  Nevertheless, Williams occasionally misrepresents or 
oversimplifies Kant's own positions, and it is well worth making clear in which ways he 
does so. If we are to find fault with Kant we should find fault with Kant and not a 
caricature of Kant.  Third, once it is clarified how and in which ways Williams 
oversimplifies or misrepresents Kant's own positions, it will be much easier to see how 
and in which ways this phenomenon does present a challenge to Kant's ethics and to see 
what a successful Kantian response might look like.   
 After summarizing Williams' critique, this chapter will focus on Williams' 
criticism that Kant misunderstood the source of practical necessities and as a result 
mischaracterized them as a strictly moral experience -- the experience we have when we 
recognize that it is our duty to perform a given action and as a result feel compelled to 
perform it. Williams argues that this experience does not result because agents recognize 
they are morally obliged to perform the action.  Instead this experience reveals their own 
personal commitments.  As a result, instead of showing that it is always possible and 
rational for us to do as morality requires of us, the experience of practical necessities 
reveals that it is not. 
 In response to Williams, I will argue that because Kant's conception of moral duty 
differs markedly from Williams' conception of moral obligation, it is not as implausible 
to regard many cases of practical necessities as moral experiences as it may at first seem.  
Furthermore, Kant’s distinction between imperfect and perfect duties allows for Kant to 
account for many of the cases which Williams’ found to be problematic.  Nevertheless, 
though this blunts the force of Williams' criticism, there are still instances of practical 
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necessities -- necessities of character – for which Kant’s distinction between perfect and 
imperfect duties cannot account.  Such cases still may potentially conflict with moral 
requirements, even as Kant understood them. They give us reason to question whether it 
is always unconditionally good and rational for people to follow moral requirements.  
These cases will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
 
II.)  A Brief Overview of the Role of Practical Necessities in Williams' Critique of Kant 
 I will begin with a brief overview of the role of practical necessities in Williams' 
critique of Kant's ethics.  Before I get started, it is worth noting that Williams' views on 
and critique of the Kant's (and Kantian) ethics span across many works and a number of 
decades.  They also make few references to Kant's own texts and arguments.  This can 
make interpreting and unifying his critique a bit of a challenge.  What follows is a 
summary of Williams' views and a drawing forth of important and occasionally 
underemphasized themes.  I hope this account is faithful to his overarching intent, but 
even if not, I believe these criticisms are worthy of investigation in their own right. 
 Williams draws attention to the phenomenon of practical necessity, what he at one 
time calls "the central experience of ethical life"2  as part of his criticism that many major 
moral theories neglect the importance the relation between  an agent's character and her 
actions -- in his language, the way in which actions "flow from one's character."3
                                                            
2  Ibid., p. 176. 
  
Practical necessities represent the "flowiest" of these actions -- those in which agents are 
 
3 See especially "Persons, Character, and Morality," in Moral Luck  (New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1981); "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in Utilitarianism: For and Against  (New 
York:  Cambridge University Press, 1973). 
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literally necessitated to perform a course of action on account of their projects, 
commitments, or convictions.  It seems what Williams has in mind when he claims that 
actions "flow from one's character" involves the following.  First, a given person will care 
about, value, and desire certain things.  Given what she cares about, values, and desires, 
she is disposed to take notice of certain features of her environment rather than others.  
Furthermore, the ways in which she deliberates and reflects are also structured by the 
things she cares about, values, or desires and notices.4
 For example, a highly sympathetic person is one who is disposed to notice when 
others are in distress.  The distress of others is a salient feature of her environment -- one 
that she cares about and takes to be important.  Given that she finds it as important as she 
does, it will structure her deliberations in various ways.  She might, for instance, never 
deliberate about whether to help a given person in distress -- she will not weigh the pros 
of helping against the cons, but instead only how best to help that person.  For her, in 
these circumstances, standing idly by is not something she intentionally can do.  It is not, 
for her in these circumstances, a live possibility.  Williams describes the practical sense 
of possibility in question in the following way: 
  Actions radically incompatible 
with her projects or commitments often will not enter into her deliberations at all.  If they 
do they will not for a moment be seriously entertained as options.  That is, she will not 
weight the benefits of such actions against their cons.  The fact that they are incompatible 
with what one cares about or values excludes them from serious consideration. Lastly, 
what she deliberately or intentionally does is a product of these very deliberations.  As a 
result, what it is possible for her to do intentionally is a product of her character.   
                                                            
4 Jeffrey Seidman has a detailed account of this process in his "Caring and the Boundary-Driven 
Structure of Practical Deliberation," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3(1) (2008).  
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 It is important here to distinguish two different ideas.  Other people,  
 and indeed I myself, can have an 'external' idea of different ideals and  
 projects that I might have had, for instance if I had been brought up  
 differently:  there are few reasons for, and many reasons against, saying  
 that if I had been brought up differently, it would not have been me.  
 This is the area of metaphysical necessity.  But there is a different area,  
 of practical necessity, concerned with what are possible lines of action  
 and possible projects for me, granted that I have the ideals and character  
 I indeed have.  This is the level at which we must resist the Kantian idea  
 that the truly ethical subject is one for whom nothing is necessary except  
 agency itself.5
 
  
 According to Williams, sometimes an individual's character will structure her 
deliberations in such a way that she is left with only one action that she can do -- the 
action is necessary for her in these circumstances.  She is incapable of intentionally doing 
anything else.  For instance, the highly sympathetic person described above might be 
walking along the street and see an unaccompanied small child stumble in front of an 
oncoming car.  Like most of us who are reasonably sensitive to the needs of others, the 
fact that the child's life is in danger stands out to her -- she notices it, it startles her.  But, 
unlike others whose fear for their own lives might leave them horrified and frozen in 
place, her fear might be nothing to her.  We can imagine that if she were to deliberate 
(and likely she would not need to consciously do so), her fear would not be at all relevant 
to determining what it is she should do.  The only relevant feature of the situation for her 
might be, "This child needs my help."  She recognizes she simply must do something, she 
can't just stand there.  As a result, she rushes into the street, waves for the car to stop, and 
scoops the child up.   
                                                            
5 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 223 
n16. 
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 What is important about cases like these, is that while there is a sense in which 
our highly sympathetic person is compelled to act as she did in helping the child, that 
there was for her in these circumstances no other practical option available for her, what 
constrains her is her character itself.  These constraints help to reveal what it is for a 
person to have a character. 
 
 We are subject to the model that what one can do sets the limits to  
 deliberation, and that character is revealed by what one chooses within  
 those limits, among the things that one can do.  But character . . . is  
 equally revealed in the location of those limits, and in the very fact that  
 one can determine, sometimes through deliberation itself, that one cannot  
 do certain things, and must do others.  Incapacities can not only set limits  
 to character and provide conditions of it, but can also partly constitute its 
 substance.6
 
  
Because the only constraint involved is the constraint of one's character, this is a kind of 
necessity that does not remove one's powers as an agent. Nor does being necessitated to 
act in these ways remove the appropriateness of praise or blame.  These are "musts" 
grounded in one's character.  They are grounded in our deep cares and express our 
evaluations.7
 There are two important consequences that follow from the grounding of practical 
necessities in one's particular character.  First, because practical necessities are grounded 
in the particular character of an agent, what it is necessary for her to do in a given set of 
circumstances cannot be reduced to what it is necessary for her to do simply as a rational 
and moral agent, nor does it imply that it is what others must do in similar circumstances.  
    
                                                            
6 "Practical Necessity," in Moral Luck, p. 130. 
 
7 Ibid., p. 127; "Persons, Character and Morality," pp. 11-13.  I describe this in more detail in 
chapter 1. 
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Most importantly, the conclusion that one must perform a particular action does not 
signify that one is morally obliged, or that it is one's moral duty, to perform that action.  
One class of cases in which it seems clear that practical necessities and moral obligations 
come apart are cases of heroic actions.  In these cases, agents sacrifice or endanger their 
lives for the sake of the lives of others.  This seems to go beyond what we are morally 
required to do.  When discussing these cases Williams states: 
 
 Yet practical necessity, even when it is grounded in ethical reasons, does  
 not necessarily signal an obligation.  The course of action the agent 'must'  
 take may not be associated with others' expectations, or with blame for  
 failure.  The ethically outstanding or possibly heroic actions I mentioned  
 before, in being more than obligations, are not obligatory, and we cannot  
 usually be asked to do them or be blamed for not doing them. But the  
 agent who does such a thing may feel that he must do it, that there is no 
 alternative for him, while at the same time recognizing that it would not be  
 a demand on others, because he is different from others; but the difference  
 will then typically turn out to consist in the fact that he is someone who has  
 this very conviction.8
 
 
 Second, because practical necessities are grounded in one’s character rather than 
in moral obligations, they have the potential to conflict with moral obligations.  For 
instance, in the case of the heroic actions mentioned in the quote above, a person might 
judge she “must” help a person with no moral claim to her help and in so doing fail to 
fulfill a promise made to another.  Furthermore, such conflicts reveal that we may be 
rationally justified in failing to do as we morally ought.  Kant was therefore mistaken 
when he thought it was necessarily rational for us to do as morality requires of us.  On 
                                                            
8 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, pp. 188-89.  Peter Winch also makes use of moral 
modalities and the idea that what it is morally possible for a person to do varies from one person 
to another in a way that a universal, impartial notion of moral obligation fails to account for in his 
"The Universalizability of Moral Judgments," and "Integrity," both in Ethics and Action (London:  
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972). 
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Williams' reading of Kant, Kant was only able to conclude that the demands of morality 
are unconditionally rationally necessary because of the manner in which he views the 
ethical subject abstracted from the desires, commitments, and projects that constitute her 
character and yet who is still capable of action.  Williams thinks Kant's idea of practical 
necessity,  
 
  . . . is given a particularly radical interpretation, under which the only  
 necessary practical conclusions are those absolutely unconditioned by  
 any desire.  For Kant, there could be a practical conclusion that was  
 radically unconditioned in this way, because of his picture of the rational  
 self free from causality, and because there were reasons for action which  
 depended merely on rational agency and not on anything (such as desire)  
 that the agent might not have had.9
 
 
On this view, from the first-person perspective, what I morally ought to do is what I must 
do, even if I don't want to do it.  From the third-person perspective moral judgment and 
blame apply to people even if they don't want to be in the morality system.10  The moral 
ought issues in a 'must' because it applies to us independently of and rationally overrides 
any of the desires -- or personal11 projects and commitments -- we have as individuals.12
 But this picture, on Williams' view, seems to get things backwards. The 
motivations that we have to be moral, to participate in a system of moral relations with 
   
                                                            
9 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 189. 
 
10 Ibid., p. 178. 
 
11 By "personal commitments and projects" I mean any of our cares and concerns that are not 
driven by a prior concern for morality.  This way of characterizing our personal commitments is 
borrowed from Thomas Hill's "Personal Values and Setting Oneself Ends," in Human Welfare 
and Moral Worth (New York Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 244-74. 
 
12 Williams' reading of Kant here is extremely contentious.  These complicated matters will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter.   
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others, are not best understood in abstraction from our characters and their concerns and 
commitments and projects.  It is only because we care for these things and structure our 
lives around them that we have reason to participate in an impartial system of moral 
obligations. Without these commitments, I need not have any compelling reason to 
concern myself with the impartial demands of morality -- I would have no compelling 
reason to concern myself with anything.13  For many--hopefully all--of us, moral 
concerns make up an important part of these commitments, and influence those 
commitments that we do have.  But, they are only a part and not the whole.14
 Rather than understanding the 'ought' of moral obligation as what the agent must 
do, Williams argues that we should instead consider moral obligations as one kind of 
ethical consideration among others, and a consideration that need not always necessarily 
trump all other considerations.
  
15
                                                            
13 "Persons, Character and Morality," p. 18. 
  In other words, according to Williams, we must 
recognize what is a matter of common sense -- what is ordinarily called an obligation 
does not necessarily need to win in a conflict of moral considerations and not every 
failure to carry out an obligation warrants moral blame. For instance, if I have made a 
promise, I have an obligation to carry out the promise. Nevertheless, it might be justified 
to break the promise, but not because there is another, more stringent obligation that wins 
out. Someone may break a promise to meet a friend in order to run into a burning 
orphanage to save children.  When asked why she did it, she might respond that she 
simply judged that she "had to" do it -- that it was what she "must" do. But, once again, 
this "must" or "had to" reveals neither that she was under a more stringent moral 
 
14 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 184. 
 
15 Ibid., p. 182. 
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obligation, nor that she wasn't really under an obligation to carry out her promise. She is 
a morally praiseworthy obligation-breaker.   
 What then is the proper way of understanding moral obligations as one kind of 
ethical consideration among others, according to Williams? First, what we find to be 
important is given priority in our deliberations. While ethical considerations are 
important and are part of what makes our lives worth living, we can still see other things 
as important, too.  They too are part of what makes like worth living. Some ethical 
considerations should be given high priority in our deliberations, namely those that are 
grounded in what people should be able to rely on from one another. "Considerations that 
are given deliberative priority in order to secure reliability constitute obligations."16  In 
the case of some, but by no means all, deliberations in which obligations figure, an 
individual might reach the conclusion that she "must" act in response to the demands of 
an obligation.  But, this has no essential relation to its being an obligation (and everything 
to do with the individual).  Instead, the judgment that we "must" act in a certain way is 
simply the product of a consideration (whether ethical or not) having highest deliberative 
priority and of its having the greatest importance (at least to the agent).17   Furthermore, 
while ethical considerations should be given priority in our deliberations, there is no clear 
recipe for how they should be prioritized. This is what we should expect in matters of 
practical deliberation. Practical deliberation, unlike theoretical deliberation, is essentially 
personal and has no constitutive aim.18
                                                            
16 Ibid., p. 185. 
  The considerations that enter into one's head, 
 
17 Ibid., pp. 186-87. 
 
18 Ibid., pp. 66-69. 
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how they are considered, weighted and so on is all dependent on the desires, 
commitments, projects -- the character -- of the agent in question.  Because of this, we are 
not committed to reaching agreement, or establishing a harmony among us rational 
practical deliberators.  Even when if I act rationally while taking moral considerations 
into account, it will not necessarily follow that no one will have just cause for complaint.      
 There are at least three separate charges against Kant made by Williams in this 
critique. First, according to Williams, Kant mistakenly thought all practical necessities 
were moral necessities.  Second, because he mistakenly thought all instances in which 
agents are practically necessitated are cases in which agents were also morally required to 
act in this way, Kant failed to recognize how cases of practical necessity actually reveal 
that it may not always be unconditionally rational for us to do as morality requires of 
us.19
 
  Third, Kant neglected the ways in which theoretical and practical reason differ.  
Unlike those engaged in theoretical reasoning, rational, practical deliberators are not 
committed to harmonizing their actions with one another.  This chapter will discuss the 
first criticism. Chapter 3 will discuss the second and third. 
                                                            
19 The other possibility is that moral requirements might not require the same things of everyone. 
In fact, I think this is what some cases of practical necessities help to illustrate – if it is true that 
an agent has all-things-considered reason to perform a particular action, it cannot be morally 
required that she do otherwise.  Because what we have all-things-considered reason to do varies 
from individual to individual, so does what is morally required of us. These matters will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 3.  This does not seem to be the conclusion that Williams’ 
draws from these cases, however.  Instead Williams draws the conclusion that once we properly 
understand moral requirements, we will recognize we do not always have overriding reason to 
follow them.  Nevertheless they are still moral requirements – we might still be liable to blame 
from others for failing to fulfill them, even when we do what it is all-things-considered rational 
for us to do. This is discussed in section V below. 
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III.) Williams' First Criticism: Kant Mistakenly thought all Practical Necessities were 
Moral Necessities 
 
 The first important charges in this critique are that, Williams thinks Kant: 1.) 
recognized the phenomenon of practical necessities, and 2.) misunderstood this 
phenomenon by taking it to be a strictly moral kind of experience -- the recognition that 
one is morally obliged to act in a certain manner.20
 These points of Williams' critique invite us to face the following questions:  What 
conceptions of moral obligation are Williams and Kant using and how might they differ 
from one another?  Second, given one's conception of moral obligation, is it necessarily 
rational to be moral?  The first will be answered in this chapter; the second will be 
answered in the following. 
 
 Williams presents the first charge most clearly in chapter 10 of Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy.    
 
 I have already mentioned Kant's description of morality as categorical.  
 When he claimed that the fundamental principle of morality was a  
 Categorical Imperative, Kant was not interested in any purely logical  
 distinction between forms of what are literally imperatives.  He was  
 concerned with the recognition of a must that is unconditional and goes  
 all the way down, but he construed this unconditional practical necessity  
 as being peculiar to morality.  He thought it was unconditional in the  
 sense that it did not depend on desire at all: a course of action presented  
 to us with this kind of necessity was one we had reason to take whatever  
 we might happen to want, and it was only moral reasons that could  
 transcend desire in that way.  As I have introduced it, however, practical 
 necessity need not be independent of desire in so strong a sense.  I  
 distinguished a "must" that is unconditional from one that is conditional  
 on a desire that the agent merely happens to have; but a conclusion of  
 practical necessity could itself be the expression of a desire, if the desire  
 were not one that the agent merely happened to have, but was essential  
 to the agent and had to be satisfied.  The difference between this  
                                                            
20  Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, pp. 188-90. 
51 
 
 conception of practical necessity and Kant's is not of course merely a  
 matter of definition or of logical analysis.  Kant's idea of practical  
 necessity is basically this more familiar one, but it is given a  
 particularly radical interpretation, under which the only necessary  
 practical conclusions are those absolutely unconditioned by any desire.   
 For Kant there could be a practical conclusion that was radically  
 unconditioned in this way, because of his picture of the rational self as  
 free from causality, and because there were reasons for action which  
 depended merely on rational agency and not on anything (such as a  
 desire) that the agent might not have had.21
 
  
 These criticism that Kant misunderstood the experience we have of practical 
necessities is repeated in "Ethics and the Fabric of the World".   
 
 In acknowledging the categorical demand of obligation or recognising  
 a moral requirement (the kind of thing expressed in saying, for moral  
 reasons, 'I must'), one does not experience it as an application of the  
 demands of practical reason, but as something more immediate than  
 that, something presented to one by the situation.  That is one reason  
 why Kant identified an empirical psychological surrogate of one's  
 rational relations to morality, in the emotional phenomenon of the  
 sense of reverence for the Law.  That feeling does, on Kant's theory,  
 represent objectivity, but it also misrepresents it, by making it seem  
 something different from what it is.22
 
 
 Williams also diagnoses the mistakes of "The Morality System" (the chief 
representative of which he takes to be Kant23
 
) in the following manner: 
 Many philosophical mistakes are woven into morality. It misunderstands  
 obligations, not seeing how they form just one type of ethical  
 consideration. It misunderstands practical necessity, thinking it peculiar  
 to the ethical. It misunderstands ethical practical necessity, thinking it  
 peculiar to obligations. Beyond all this, morality makes people think that,  
                                                            
21 p. 189. Also see 213 n16, and Shame and Necessity, pp. 74-77. 
 
22 pp. 175-76.  He reports similar concerns in "Practical Necessity." 
 
23 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 174. 
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 without its very special obligation, there is only inclination; without its  
 utter voluntariness, there is only force; without its ultimately pure justice,  
 there is not justice. Its philosophical errors are only the most abstract  
 expressions of a deeply rooted and still powerful misconception of life.24
 
    
 Of course, there seem to be many instances of practical necessities that are not 
rooted in what agents take themselves to be morally obligated to do.  In the case of heroic 
or supererogatory actions, it might be the case that an agent judges she "must" help in the 
circumstances, but we do not think it would be morally wrong for her to fail to help and 
therefore blameworthy.  Nor, as in cases like Elizabeth Bennet's refusal of Mr. Collins 
discussed in the previous chapter, is it the case that such agents judge that they must act 
in a given way because it is what anyone ought to do in the circumstances.  Their 
judgments, unlike judgments that one is morally obliged to do, carry no implications for 
what others ought to do. 
 
IV.)  The Ways in which Williams' Criticism is Fair 
 I will begin with the ways in which Williams' representation of Kant is fair, and 
then move on to discuss the ways in which it misrepresents or misunderstands Kant's own 
position. Williams is correct that Kant: 1.) thought the common experience of duty 
revealed there was a Categorical Imperative which applies to all agents regardless of their 
inclinations, and 2.) that this practical necessity was strictly moral.   
 First, Kant does make reference to the common experience of feeling 
necessitated, or as he often says, "bound" or "obliged" to act. Arguably it is this common 
experience that provides the starting point of his practical philosophy.  At the very least, 
                                                            
24  Ibid., p. 196. 
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it is the starting point of his argument in the Groundwork.  Section I of the Groundwork 
contains an account of this sort of experience in its analysis of the common conception of 
duty:  "duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law."25
   
  The action is necessary 
because the need to act does not depend on one's mere desires or inclinations, "but 
outweighs it [one's inclination] or at least excludes it altogether from calculations in 
making a choice".  While different than Williams' own conception of practical necessity, 
there is an important common ground between their accounts.  The experience of 
practical necessity is one in which what ordinarily might be a reason for us to act, for 
instance a mere desire for something or even our own self-preservation, is outweighed or 
even excluded from consideration.  Kant thinks that the only way in which this could be 
possible is if there are incentives that have their source not in mere desires but in reason 
itself -- we have a special, rational feeling, "respect for the moral law" that originates in 
reason rather than in sensibility, but still nevertheless affects our sensibility in a profound 
way.  Section III of the Groundwork returns to this experience. 
 So it is that the human being claims for himself a will which lets nothing  
 be put to his account that belongs merely to his desires and inclinations,  
 and on the contrary thinks as possible by means of it -- indeed as necessary 
  -- actions that can be done only by disregarding all desires and sensible  
 incitements.  The causality of such actions lies in him as intelligence and in  
 the laws of effects and actions in accordance with principles of an  
 intelligible world, of which he knows nothing more than that in it reason  
 alone, and indeed pure reason independent of sensibility, gives the law, and,  
 in addition, that since it is there, as intelligence only, that he is his proper  
 self (as a human being he is only the appearance of himself), those laws  
 apply to him immediately and categorically, so that what inclinations and 
 impulses (hence the whole nature of the world of sense) incite him to  
 cannot infringe upon the laws of his volition as intelligence; indeed, he does  
 not hold himself accountable for the former or ascribe them to his proper self,  
                                                            
25  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, Mary J. Gregor, trans. and 
ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4:400.  Hereafter Groundwork. 
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 that is, to his will, though he does ascribe to it the indulgence he would show 
 them if he allowed them to influence his maxims to the detriment of the 
 rational laws of his will.26
 
 
 Kant makes his most concerted effort to describe this experience and how it is 
possible in the chapter "On the incentives of pure reason" in the Critique of Practical 
Reason.  In this chapter, Kant sets himself the task of showing a priori how the moral law 
can serve as an incentive for the human will.27
 It does this in two ways -- one "negative" and one "positive".  First in its negative 
function, our recognition that an action is morally required (ideally) does two things.  
First it restricts self-love to its proper place.
   
28
                                                            
26 Groundwork,  4:448. 
 Considerations about what would 
contribute to our own happiness or well-being often can provide perfectly good reasons 
for action. However, the recognition that an act is morally required renders irrelevant 
considerations about whether or not the performance of that action will promote one's 
own happiness.  If I have promised to help a friend move on Saturday, for instance, the 
fact that I would enjoy going to the movies more is irrelevant to determining what it is 
that I should do.  Notice the similarity with Williams' conception of practical necessities -
- for both, what ordinarily would be a consideration in favor of an action is excluded as 
being irrelevant to determining what it is that one should do.  
 
27 5:72 in Practical Philosophy.  Kant also discusses the effects of the moral law on our minds -- 
which makes the concepts of moral obligation and duty apply only to finite (sensible) rational 
beings, while the moral law applies to all rational beings -- in The Metaphysics of Morals, in 
Practical Philosophy, 6:399-403.  What allows the moral law to affect our sensibilities are our 
predispositions to moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and self-respect.  Also see 
On the Common Saying, in Practical Philosophy, 8:283.   
 
28 Kant asserts that all non-moral incentives – all of our sensible inclinations – are either ones of 
self-love or self-conceit in this chapter, esp. 5:73. 
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 Secondly, in its negative function, not only does the moral law restrict self-love, it 
also "humiliates" or "strikes down" self-conceit. Self-love, a desire for one's own 
happiness, is itself not morally pernicious, but the desire for it must be restricted when it 
is opposed to what we are morally required to do. In other circumstances, considerations 
about one's own happiness or well-being can provide good reasons for us to act.  Self-
conceit, in contrast to self-love, is always morally pernicious. Self-conceit is our 
tendency to ignore our moral duties altogether and to make self-love the "supreme or 
unconditional practical principle," as if we were over and above the claims of morality.29  
Kant especially seems to have in mind our tendency to resist showing respect for the 
moral law in our treatment of and attitudes towards other human beings (all of whom 
have the moral law within them), particularly the most humble, needy, and lowly among 
us.  It is always pernicious to harbor the attitude that one can simply decide to show basic 
respect for others as one wishes, like a “proud volunteer,” rather than as something owed 
to them as fellow human beings.30  Such attitudes strike at the self-respect of the lowly, 
and inflate the sense of self-worth and entitlement of the fortunate.  Kant thinks that 
human beings have a tendency to judge ourselves to be well-off or worthy of respect only 
in terms of whether we are better off than and respected by others.31
                                                            
29 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:74.  I discuss these matters in more detail in chapter 3.   
  Feeling ourselves to 
be bound by the moral law reminds us that judging ourselves to have worth only in terms 
of how we are viewed by other human beings is an improper way of valuing ourselves 
because,  
 
30 Ibid., esp. 5:77, 5:82-83.  
  
31 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, trans. 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 22.  Hereafter Religion. 
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 all claims to esteem for oneself that precede accord with the moral law are  
 null and quite unwarranted because certainty of a disposition in accord  
 with this law is the first condition of any worth of a person.32
 
   
 At the same time, the humiliation of our self-conceit and the restriction of self-
love to its proper place is experienced as a sort of positive incentive that is able to 
determine the will itself -- without requiring the mediation of the agent's "pathological" 
desires. By humiliating self-conceit and restricting self-love to its proper bounds, the 
moral law is also the ground of a positive feeling of respect. That is, it reveals to the 
agent her own autonomy, which is a source of unconditional worth, and the ground of 
moral value.  It reveals to the agent rational grounds for self-respect; no matter what she 
has done up until now, it is still possible for her now to do as she ought. Being confronted 
by the moral law, the "Fact of Reason" frees us from our pathological desires and 
inclinations and the ways in which we value ourselves that are dependent upon them.  At 
the same time it reveals to us our own autonomy and therefore real source of our worth.  
 
 [T]his humiliation takes place only relatively to the purity of the law;  
 accordingly, the lowering of pretensions to moral self-esteem -- that is, 
 humiliation on the sensible side -- is an elevation of the moral -- that is,  
 practical -- esteem for the law itself on the intellectual side."33
 
   
 In all of this there is a clear parallel with Williams' own account of the experience 
of practical necessity.  Like Williams, Kant took it to be the case that practical 
                                                            
32 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:73. 
 
33 Ibid., 5:79. Also see 5:87 where Kant clarifies that the source of our inner worth is our 
autonomy, which he also calls our "personality" and "the humanity in our person" - -our capacity 
to be subject to pure practical laws given by our own reason, and Religion, pp. 21-23; 44-45. 
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necessitation does not interfere with free (self-directed) agency, but rather is an 
expression of it; if a person "gives up his plan immediately, though reluctantly, at the 
thought that by carrying it out he would omit one of his duties . . . he proves his freedom 
in the highest degree by being unable to resist the call of duty."34
 But what grounds this exclusion is decidedly distinct.  For Kant, practical 
necessities are grounded in our rational, moral nature -- our "proper self."
   Furthermore, practical 
necessities, on Kant's view and on Williams are the result of a kind of exclusion.  When 
one is in the grip of a practical necessity, certain considerations which ordinarily might 
count in favor of an action do not, in these circumstances, count at all.   
35
 We will return to the debate between their two distinct views on what our 
"deepest natures" are in the next chapter -- it is at the heart of the disagreement between 
them. For now, it is worth exploring whether practical necessities are a distinctly moral 
  They are the 
result of recognizing that a proper respect for this nature requires us to act in a given way 
and that any considerations to the contrary are not relevant to determining what it is that 
we should do. For Kant, we "feel" necessitated to act in various ways on account of our 
rational and moral nature -- as a rational person you have no other rational choice than 
but to do it.  It is against our rational and moral nature not to do it.  For Williams, what 
grounds these necessities is also our "deepest nature" -- which usually may include a 
concern for moral requirements, but many other personal concerns in addition.  For 
Williams, but not for Kant, practical necessities need not reveal that we take ourselves to 
be under a moral requirement.   
                                                            
34 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:382n; Lectures on Ethics, Louis Infield, trans. (Indianapolis, IN:  
Hackett Publishing Company, 1963), p. 28. 
 
35 Groundwork, 4:461. 
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phenomenon as Kant took them to be.  In order to do this, it is necessary to first get clear 
on what we mean by "moral".  I will argue that Kant and Williams use distinct 
conceptions of morality and so it is easy to exaggerate the extent of their disagreement 
with respect to practical necessities.  Kant's strict conception of the moral -- ethical duties 
as opposed to juridical duties -- is something that is internal to the agent -- it is not 
necessarily restricted to a conception of the proper relations that ought to hold between 
human beings.36
 This conception of moral duty can seem alien in contemporary debates, and is in 
contrast to what appears to be Williams' uses of moral obligation. Following Marcia 
Baron, I will call this the "legalistic conception" of moral obligation. 
 Moral duties are self-imposed standards to which we hold ourselves 
accountable; they are primarily what we demand of ourselves, and only derivatively what 
others can demand of us. Because of this, there is room for a Kantian agent to recognize 
an action as falling under the scope of a moral duty (namely, an imperfect duty) and to 
hold it be necessary for her to perform the action on moral grounds, while nevertheless 
we might recognize that she is not morally obliged (in Williams' sense) to do it.   
37
 
 
V.)  Williams' Legalistic Conception of Moral Obligation 
 Those who espouse a legalistic conception of moral obligation often think of 
moral obligations as socially enforced norms of conduct.  While John Stuart Mill did not 
                                                            
36 Although, while not restricted only to a discussion of the proper relations that should hold 
among human beings, Kant does think this is one of the fundamental areas of ethics and dedicates 
the Doctrine of Right to developing a theory of it. 
 
37 Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), esp. pp. 
64-71; "Virtue Ethics in Relation to Kantian Ethics," Perfecting Virtue, Jost and Wuerth, eds.  
(New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2011).  The following discussion is greatly indebted to 
Baron.   
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have a legalistic conception of moral obligation, certain passages of chapter 5 in his 
Utilitarianism are illustrative of the basic tenor of the legalistic conception of moral 
obligation.38
 
   
 We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person ought  
 to be punished in some way for doing it -- if not by law, by the opinion of  
 his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own  
 conscience. This seems to be the real turning point of the distinction  
 between morality and simple expediency. It is part of the notion of duty in  
 every one of its forms that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfill it.  
 Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt.  
 Unless we think that it may be exacted from him, we do not call it his duty. 
 Reasons of prudence, or the interest of other people, may militate against  
 actually exacting it, but the person himself, it is clearly understood, would 
  not be entitled to complain. There are other things, on the contrary, which  
 we wish that people should do, which we like or admire them for doing,  
 perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are  
 not bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame them,  
 that is, we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment. How we  
 come by these ideas of deserving and not deserving punishment will appear, 
 perhaps, in the sequel; but I think there is no doubt that this distinction lies  
 at the bottom of the notions of right and wrong; that we call any conduct  
 wrong, or employ, instead, some other term of dislike or disparagement, 
 according as we think that the person ought, or ought not, to be punished  
 for it; and we say it would be right to do so and so, or merely that it would  
 be desirable or laudable, according as we would wish to see the person  
 whom it concerns compelled, or only persuaded and exhorted, to act in that 
 matter.39
  
 
Some of the key characteristics of the legalistic conception of moral obligation can be 
seen in Mill's influential discussion in which blame, in particular blame on the part of 
other people, plays a central role. First, we are obliged to act in a certain way if and only 
if we can be compelled to do so -- most particularly if we can be compelled by others.  
                                                            
38 Mill discusses the special, powerful feeling of moral obligation, which turns an “ought” or 
“should” into a “must.” Utilitarianism, 2nd Ed. (Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett Publishing Company, 
2001), p. 54. 
 
39 Ibid.,  p. 45. 
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Second, failure to act as we ought leaves us liable to blame from others and ourselves. 
Furthermore, we might add to Mill’s discussion that we are most especially liable to 
blame because there is an assignable person who has been wronged by our action, a 
person whose rights have been violated or whose legitimate expectations have not been 
fulfilled. Actions and attitudes that have no effect on people other than oneself, especially 
those that do not harm, wrong or violate the rights of anyone besides oneself, are not 
matters of moral obligation or duty. 
 These features might be understood to be the result of a common assumption 
about the function of moral codes in a society.  It might be thought that the reason for a 
society to have a moral code of any kind is for that society to promote harmony between 
its members and maintain minimal standards of decency. That is, the function of a moral 
code is to bring about the reliable, stable ways for human beings to interact with one 
another, which provides the basic groundwork for other human goods.  Individuals might 
be thought to have reason to restrict their freedom to live as they like in various ways as 
the legitimate price of being members of a society that is reasonably stable.  They are 
compensated in restricting their own freedom in that the freedom of others is likewise 
restricted.  They are protected from certain kinds of wrongs or harms so long as they are 
willing to refrain from harming others in return.  When members of that society fail to 
live in accordance with these obligations they may legitimately be blamed, censured or 
punished in various ways -- either through laws, or social opprobrium.  So long as all in a 
society cooperate and live according to the rules, they all benefit in the long run.   
 As Marcia Baron summarizes, somewhat disparagingly, those who hold the 
legalistic conception "see the source of morality to be external to us, moral requirements 
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to be a burden, and the experience of being subject to moral requirements to be that of 
having something more or less onerous demanded of one in the name of society."40 She 
adds further that those who hold the legalistic conception of obligation or duty typically 
see duty in the following ways: (a) duties most often entail corresponding rights, or at 
least require there to be an assignable person who will be wronged by the performance or 
lack of performance of the action in question, (b) moral constraint is seen as burdensome 
in roughly the way that legal constraint is, and (c) a 'morality of duty' is seen as 
something that interferes with individuals' lives and that should be prevented from 
interfering more than is absolutely necessary.41
 Such an understanding of moral obligation is often taken for granted by many 
contemporary moral philosophers.  In particular, it is the conception of moral obligation 
used by many virtue ethicists.
   
42
 There are two important conceptions of moral obligation that Williams uses, both 
of which have the essential features of the legalistic conception.  First, there is the special 
  Bernard Williams is no exception.   
                                                            
40 Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology, p. 64.   
 
41 Ibid., p. 68. Also see O'Nora O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue (New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 127. 
 
42 J.O. Urmson's "Saints and Heroes," in Essays in Modern Philosophy,  A.I. Meldon, ed.  
(University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 198-216, Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), the conception of obligation critiqued by Anscombe in 
"Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy 33(124) (1958), all offer examples of this narrower 
conception, which is often taken for granted in contemporary moral philosophy.  For a summary 
of the use of the legalistic conception of morality in virtue ethics see Kristen Monroe, "Morality 
and a Sense of Self:  The Importance of Identity and Categorization in Moral Action," American 
Journal of Political Science 45(3) (2001), p. 497.  In Towards Justice and Virtue, p. 140 Onora 
O'Neill also emphasizes how the emphasis on rights (what people can demand of other people) 
rather than duty (what agents should do) as the central moral notion is a relatively recent trend in 
moral philosophy.  The focus on duty rather than rights is far more prevalent in the history of 
philosophy and is found in Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hume and even Mill, all of whom did not see 
the demands of justice as in conflict with virtue or individual excellences, as many contemporary 
writers on virtue have objected.   
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conception of moral obligation found within the "morality system" whose chief 
representative Williams holds to be Kant.43
 According to Williams, adherents of "the morality system" have created an 
"intimidating structure" out of their special idea of moral obligation.
  Second, there is Williams' own conception of 
moral obligation, which is one kind of ethical consideration among others.  
44
 Williams argues that a moral obligation in the morality system is a special kind of 
categorical deliberative conclusion.
 This "intimidating 
structure" has made the concept of moral obligation the key moral concept. All other 
ethical concepts are either forced into the mold created by the concept of moral 
obligation, or are dismissed as not proper parts of moral life. The overuse of the concept 
of moral obligation to account for all features of ethical life, combined with the 
inescapability and categorical nature of moral obligations creates a system which 
threatens individuality and individual freedoms.   
45 It is an especially important kind of deliberative 
conclusion about what to do in the particular situation that is arrived at on the basis of 
moral reasons and which applies to the deliberator regardless of what the agent wants to 
do.46
                                                            
43  Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 174. 
 Several important features of this special conception of moral obligation can be 
explained by the fact that a moral obligation is a special form of deliberative conclusion.  
 
44  Ibid., p. 182.  
 
45 As will be apparent from what follows, the features of the special use of moral obligation in the 
morality system share many of the features of Williams' own conception of practical necessity. 
Both are special, especially forceful, deliberative conclusions "trump" one's mere desires.  But 
cases of practical necessity, unlike those of moral obligation as conceived in the Morality System, 
are not grounded in the expectations of others or in what one can be blamed for failing to perform 
(again, this shows the degree to which Williams' view of moral obligation in the Morality System 
is also legalistic). 
 
46 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, pp. 174-75. 
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First, obligations are actions it must be possible for the agent to perform.  Second, 
because what an agent ought to do must be within her power, moral obligations cannot 
conflict.47
 Moral obligations apply to people even when they do not want them to.  They are 
inescapable and categorical.  They are what agents "must" do even if they do not want to 
be in the system or be bound by the rules of the system. If an agent fails to perform an 
obligation, blame is the appropriate and characteristic reaction -- whether self-blame on 
the part of the agent or blame from others.
  That is, if two of the moral considerations that enter into my deliberation are 
incompatible, it cannot be my obligation to do both.  One (the real moral obligation, what 
one has most reason to do), must trump the other, which is not truly an obligation in this 
instance.      
48
 Williams does not take issue with the connection between blame and moral 
obligation and maintains this connection in his conception of moral obligations when 
they are properly understood, as will be discussed below.  Instead, he believes the 
problems for the morality system are rooted in its use of moral obligation as the central 
(perhaps sole) ethical concept and in the view that moral obligations are a special kind of 
deliberative conclusion.  Both of these features allow moral obligations to permeate 
human lives. First, because all ethically worthwhile actions must be accounted for in 
terms of the central concept of moral obligation, it tries to make as many of them as 
possible into moral obligations.
 So long as an agent faithfully performs her 
obligations, she is morally blameless. 
49
                                                            
47 Ibid., p. 176. 
 Heroic or otherwise exemplary actions that in common 
 
48 Ibid., pp. 174-77, 180. 
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sense terms are not morally required of agents and that agents would not be blamed for 
failing to perform, are in the morality system taken to be ways of fulfilling other, more 
general obligations, such as aiding others, displaying gratitude and so on (rather than 
seeing them for what they are -- actions that display that one has a good character which 
are not obligatory).   
 Second, moral obligations come to permeate (and strangle) human lives because 
adherents of the morality system sees moral obligations as an especially important kind 
of deliberative conclusion, especially a conclusion about what it is that one has most 
reason to do.  However, it sometimes appears that what we have most reason to do 
conflicts with what we have an obligation to do.  To use an example of Williams', I might 
break a promise to meet a friend because I had a rare opportunity to further a worthwhile 
cause.   
  
 But obligations have a moral stringency, which means that breaking them  
 attracts blame.  The only thing that can be counted on to cancel this, within  
 the economy of morality, is that the rival action should represent another  
 and more stringent obligation. Morality encourages the idea, only an  
 obligation can beat an obligation. . . .  You are not under an unqualified 
 obligation to pursue this cause, nor to do everything you possibly can for  
 causes you have adopted.  We are left with the limp suggestion that one is  
 under an obligation to assist some important cause on occasions that are  
 specially propitious for assisting it.  The pressure of the demand within the 
 morality system to find a general obligation to back a particular one --  
 what may be called the obligation-out, obligation-in principle.50
 
 
 This is where the trouble begins.  It becomes difficult to find room for morally 
indifferent actions once we admit that there are such general, open-ended obligations.  
"But if we have accepted general and indeterminate obligations to further various moral 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
49 Ibid., p. 179. 
 
50 Ibid., pp. 180-81, original emphasis. 
65 
 
objectives, as the last set of thoughts encourages us to do, they will be waiting to provide 
work for idle hands."51 In order for someone to be able to do what she wants to do, she 
will need to uncover a duty to herself, a "fraudulent item."52
 We can see the influence of the legalistic conception of obligation in Williams' 
understanding of the special conception of moral obligation inherent in the morality 
system and why it can come to have such pernicious consequences. Because unfulfilled 
moral obligations leave one rightfully liable to blame, especially to blame from others 
who have a claim on one's activities, and because moral obligations can be general in 
scope, it is difficult for the agent to find room to do what she wants to do without being 
subject to blame or censure.  She has reason to feel guilty for engaging in activities 
simply because she wants to do them and enjoys them -- duties to oneself are a last-ditch 
effort to avoid agents having just cause to reproach themselves for taking some time for 
themselves, to live even for a moment unfettered by the rightful demands of others, 
others one will be wronging by failing to do more. Duties to oneself are an attempt to 
loosen the shackles of the burdensome claims of others that impinge on our ability to live 
as we like. 
  
 Secondly, we can also see that Williams has a legalistic conception of obligation 
when he gives his account of what it would look like if obligations were removed from 
the place of honor they hold in the morality system.  As was discussed above, Williams 
thinks that we should remove moral obligations from their throne and instead take them 
to be one kind of consideration among others, and one that need not always trump when 
                                                            
51 Ibid., p. 181. 
 
52 Ibid., p. 182. 
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in conflict with other kinds of considerations.53
 
  Even though ethical considerations are 
important and often have priority in our deliberations, other considerations are important 
as well.  The ethical considerations that should be given the highest priority (though not 
necessarily a "trumping" authority) are those grounded in what people should be able to 
rely on from one another.  
 Considerations that are given deliberative priority in order to secure  
 reliability constitute obligations; corresponding to those obligations are  
 rights, possessed by people who benefit from the obligations.54
 
  
 In the case of some, but by no means all, deliberations in which obligations 
figure, an individual might reach the conclusion that she "must" act in response to the 
demands of an obligation.  But, this is not simply because it is an obligation, but instead 
depends on what she in these circumstances sees as having the highest deliberative 
priority and as having the greatest importance to her.55  In other cases, an agent might 
rightfully judge that she has an all-things-considered reason to fail to fulfill an obligation 
(such as keeping a promise) because the costs would be too high, or she is in a position to 
promote a worthy cause.  In these cases she might be liable to blame, in particular might 
be liable to blame from the person whose promise she was unable to keep.  She might 
then have an obligation to make amends.56
                                                            
53 Ibid. 
     
 
54 Ibid., p. 185. 
 
55 Ibid.,  pp. 186-87. 
 
56 Williams sees this as one of the redeeming features of his view.  He argues it makes better 
sense of why it seems the promisee is owed an apology or other amends, and why the promisor 
has reason to feel regret, if we simply admit that the promisor has failed to carry out a genuine 
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 Again, the features of a legalistic conception of moral obligation are easy enough 
to see. Moral obligations are what is owed to other people, especially those who have a 
corresponding right, and failure to fulfill them leaves one liable to blame even if one fails 
to fulfill them in response to another ethical consideration.  Furthermore, not only does 
Williams' account of moral obligations have these legalistic features, Williams also takes 
a legalistic tone in his view as to what reasons we have to act morally.  The reason we 
have to be moral, in particular, the reason we have to fulfill moral obligations (as is 
typical in a legalistic conception of moral obligation), is that we care about things other 
than morality.  That is, the reason we have to participate in a system that allows us to 
have reasonable expectations of what sorts of behaviors we are to expect from others is 
that it helps to protect the other things we care about -- our personal projects and 
commitments.  Moral obligations are necessary but burdensome restrictions to live as we 
like and because they are burdensome, they should be kept to their proper place.  Because 
our personal projects and commitments are what give us reason to participate in the 
system, it cannot be necessarily rational for us to abandon them when moral obligations 
require it of us.  
 
VI.)  Why it would be Problematic for Kant to have a Legalistic Conception of Duty  
 It should already be fairly clear why it would be bad if Kant's view of moral 
obligation were itself legalistic.  Because many of the moral duties in Kant's system are 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
moral obligation even though she did what she had all-things-considered reason to do.  "Moral 
Luck," in Moral Luck, pp. 20-39, also makes the point that acting as one has all-things-considered 
reason to do does not necessarily free one from being rightfully (morally) blamed and/or 
criticized by others; what we are morally obliged to do is not necessarily what we have all-things-
considered reason to do.  
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so broad, general and encompassing, if we were liable to blame from others or to self-
blame for failing to fulfill them it might seem that his moral theory demands too much of 
us as agents and does not allow us to live our own lives.  There are two ways in which it 
might do this, both of which are charges made by Williams.  First, it might demand too 
much of us on particular occasions.  On such occasions, we might think that the demands 
of morality require too much effort or sacrifice and that in such situations, it cannot 
necessarily be a rational demand to make on an agent.57  Second, moral obligations might 
permeate places in an individual's life that are not the proper objects of moral concern.  It 
need not be the case that morality requires too much of us on any particular instance, but 
rather that it invades aspects of our private lives that are not anyone else's business58 and 
perhaps requires us to conform to a narrow, rigid standard of what is morally required.  
We might think this puts intolerable limits on the diversity of ways in which we might 
think individuals are capable of expressing themselves in ethically admirable or morally 
acceptable ways or the variety of characters we think are morally admirable or 
acceptable. Second, others, not Williams, have though that a legalistic conception of duty 
demands too little of individuals -- it does not require them or inspire them to do more.  I 
will set this criticism aside as it is far less common and has been responded to in some 
detail elsewhere.59
                                                            
57 See "Persons, Character and Morality." 
  Thirdly, we might think that an emphasis on doing one's duty, or 
acting as one is morally obliged to act simply because one is so obliged, requires agents 
to care about the wrong thing -- their own moral purity or morality itself -- rather than 
 
58 This is the general theme in chapter 10 of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. 
 
59 See Marcia Baron's Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, chapter 2. 
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other, more morally admirable objects for their own sakes.60
 It might also appear that it is difficult to deny that Kant does have a legalistic 
conception of moral obligation given his use of language. Duty is described in terms of 
maxims that we legislate for ourselves as lawmakers in a kingdom of ends.  The 
Categorical Imperative is the supreme law of morality from which more specific laws can 
be derived.   
  It might appear that what 
matters in this system of morality is maintaining morally blameless conduct rather than 
anything more worthy.   
 Duty and what is owed are the only names that we must give to our relation  
 to the moral law.  We are indeed lawgiving members of a kingdom of morals  
 possible through freedom and represented to us by practical reason for our  
 respect; but we are at the same time subjects in it, not its sovereign, and to  
 fail to recognize our inferior position as creatures and to deny from self- 
 conceit the authority of the holy law is already to defect from it in spirit,  
 even though the letter of the law is fulfilled.61
 
 
 Secondly, not only does Kant use legalistic language in his discussion of our 
moral duties, he conceives of an important class of duties in legalistic terms.  These are 
our juridical duties, which Kant discusses in most detail in the Metaphysics of Morals’ 
Doctrine of Right. Juridical duties are concerned with the legality of our actions as 
opposed to the morality of our actions.  The morality of our actions concerns the motives 
out of which we act or the attitudes we express in our actions -- whether or not we act in 
conformity with the moral law out of respect for the moral law.  This is the subject matter 
of what we might call "ethics proper," our ethical duties, and will be discussed in detail in 
                                                            
60 Curiously, Bernard Williams does an admirable job of replying to such criticisms when 
directed at theories of virtue ethics, especially in "Utilitarianism and Moral Self-Indulgence," in 
Moral Luck, and chapter 3 of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, but occasionally gives in to the 
temptation to direct them at Kant and Kantian-based theories.   
 
61 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:82. 
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the following section.  The legality of our actions is determined entirely by whether or 
not the outward aspects of our actions are in conformity with the principle of right.62 The 
only concern when it comes to the legality of our actions is the outward use of our 
freedom, and the ways in which we may use or misuse our freedom in this respect. A 
misuse of our freedom violates the rights of another, and others can have the authority to 
coerce us into behaving in ways in which such infringements will not occur.  In particular 
we may be coerced by threat of punishment of those who are legally authorized to give 
it.63  Because failure to act in conformity with juridical duties is subject to legal penalty, 
juridical duties are largely determinate. Right determines what belongs to each with 
"mathematical exactitude".  "Such exactitude cannot be expected in the doctrine of virtue, 
which cannot refuse some room for exceptions."64
  
 
VII.)  Kant's Non-legalistic Conception of Moral Obligation65
 Nevertheless, Kant's conception of moral duty is, all things considered, 
importantly distinct from the legalistic conception of moral obligation employed by 
Williams and many other contemporaries. Kant's conception of moral duty, which 
encompasses both juridical duties and ethical duties, cannot be conceived simply as a 
conclusion of what one must do that is grounded in the expectations or rights of others.  It 
 
                                                            
62 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:229. 
 
63 Ibid., 6:230 
 
64 Ibid., 6:233. 
 
65 While I will use the terms "moral obligation" and "moral duty" more or less interchangeably in 
the course of this discussion, on the whole I find it is helpful to use the term "duty" rather than 
"obligation" when discussing Kant's moral theory in order to highlight that Kant's conception of 
duty and obligation is not the same as prevalent contemporary conceptions of moral obligation. 
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is also not necessarily something one would or should be blamed by others for failing to 
perform.   
 
 To every duty there corresponds a right in the sense of an authorization  
 to do something . . . but it is not the case that to every duty there correspond  
 rights of another to coerce someone.66
 
   
In contrast to juridical duties which have as their domain of concern the outward use of 
our freedom and whether or not it violates the rights of another (the legality of our 
actions, or whether or not our actions are in accord with duty), ethical duties are 
concerned with the inward use of our freedom -- the morality of our actions, in Kant's 
terms, or whether or not our actions are performed from duty. The inward use of our 
freedom concerns the ends we freely set for ourselves and the motives of our actions. No 
one can set an end for another, or force her to act from a given motive. The only 
constraint involved when it comes to ethics proper is self-constraint.67  Furthermore, it is 
this self-constraint that lies at the heart of Kant's conception of duty.  Even our juridical 
duties ought to be performed simply because the individual recognizes them to be 
morally required -- from duty -- and not because we may face legal penalties if we fail to 
comply.68
                                                            
66 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:383. 
   
 
67 Ibid., 6:394. Allen Wood also notes that much of the distaste for Kant often stems from 
confusing the self-constraint discussed by Kant with external constraint.  “Kant and Agent-
Oriented Ethics,” in Perfecting Virtue, p. 78. 
 
68 It is also worth noting that performing our juridical duties from duty need not be understood as 
an objectionable form of rule worship.  Performing our juridical duties is largely a matter of 
respecting the rights of other human beings out of respect for them as rational beings (beings who 
have reason – the moral law – within them) and not simply because it is legally required for us to 
do so (assuming we live in a just society).   
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 It might help to return to Kant's account of practical necessity -- the experience 
human beings have in which they feel bound or obliged to follow the moral law. This 
constraint is not imposed on an individual by the legitimate expectations of others who 
stand by ready to hold the agent accountable. It is imposed on the individual by herself -- 
by the individual's own lawgiving reason -- who holds herself accountable.  
 
 The consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law, yet as  
 combined with an unavoidable constraint put on all inclinations though  
 only by one's own reason, is respect for the law. . . . An action that is  
 objectively practical in accordance with this law, with the exclusion of  
 every determining ground of inclination, is called duty, which, because  
 of that exclusion, contains in its concept practical necessitation, that is, 
 determination to actions however reluctantly they may be done . . . .  
 however, since this constraint is exercised only by the lawgiving of his  
 own reason, it also contains something elevating, and the subjective effect  
 on feeling, inasmuch as pure practical reason is the sole cause of it, can  
 thus be called self-approbation.69
 
  
 There are two important points to be made here.  First is that unlike Williams' 
conception of the roots of moral obligation in the expectation of others, the roots of 
Kant's conception of moral duty, in its broadest form, concerns rational standards we 
ought to impose on ourselves -- both in our external relations with others and in the ends 
and attitudes we adopt.  So Williams' criticism that Kant's focus on "moral obligation" as 
the sole ethical concept neglects many other features of ethical life -- features beyond 
what one agent can rightfully demand of anther -- fails to appreciate the scope of Kant's 
conception of moral obligation.  Kant does have much to say about the ethical life beyond 
what one person might rightfully demand of one another.  Kant's primary moral concept 
is duty -- what we as individuals should demand of ourselves, and not rights -- what one 
                                                            
69 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:80.  Also see The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:417-18. 
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person can demand of another.70  Secondly, because Kant's conception of duty is 
independent of what others can rightfully demand of one, a failure to live up to one's 
ethical duties need not leave one liable to blame from others in the way that a failure to 
live up to our juridical duties could make us liable.  A failure to live up to our ethical 
duties shows that we are deficient in moral worth or lack virtue, which Kant conceives as 
strength of will.  It need not reveal that we are vicious (i.e. are not committed to good 
moral principles), or that we are doing what is morally wrong.71
 To expand on the first point, unlike juridical duties which are both strict and 
precise, ethical duties are largely open-ended and indeterminate.
  A failure to live up to 
our ethical duties, then, does not necessarily render one blameworthy in the eyes of others 
or even in the eyes of oneself.   
72
 
 Such open-ended and 
indeterminate duties are imperfect duties.  They concern the sorts of maxims or policies 
we should adopt, but need not require particular actions of us,  
 for if the law can prescribe only the maxim of actions, not actions  
 themselves, this is a sign that it leaves a playroom (latitudo) for free  
 choice in following (complying with) the law, that is that the law  
 cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how much one  
                                                            
70 This distinction is also emphasized in the works of Onora O'Neill, in particular Towards Justice 
and Virtue, chapter 5, and "Children's Rights and Children's Lives," in Constructions of Reason:  
Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 
187-205.   
 
71 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:384, 6:39.   
 
72 With, perhaps, the exception of perfect duties to ourselves which, as perfect duties require us to 
"always" preserve ourselves, rather than that we "sometimes" do so, as is the case with our 
imperfect duties.  See The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:419-44.  This way of making the distinction 
between perfect and imperfect duties follows Hill in "Imperfect Duty and Supererogation," 
Dignity and Practical Reason (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1992), and "Meeting Needs 
and Doing Favors," Human Welfare and Moral Worth, esp. p. 207. 
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 is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty.73
 
 
It is an imperfect, ethical duty to adopt the ends of promoting our own natural and moral 
perfection, and the happiness of others.  It is not a matter of our discretionary choice to 
adopt these ends.  A failure to adopt these ends is in violation of the Categorical 
Imperative.74  One cannot "always treat humanity at the same time as en end" unless one 
recognizes that the morally permissible, freely selected ends of others (one of which is 
the "unavoidable" or "natural" end of happiness -- although it is up to the individual to 
"decide" what she counts as belonging to her happiness75) as well as promoting our own 
natural and moral perfection are relevant factors in determining what it is that we should 
do.  A failure to recognize this and thereby a failure to be committed to taking our own 
perfections and the happiness of others as a "serious, major, continually relevant, life-
shaping"76 project is not to allow the value of our autonomy to have its "full effect"77
 Nevertheless, even if the happiness of others and our own perfection should be 
relevant in our deliberations about what we should do, there is no clear recipe as to what 
 on 
ourselves as something we should respect (and care about) and which should structure 
our deliberations in the manner customary of the things we care about.   
                                                            
73 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:390. 
 
74 Kant argues for this in The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:385; it parallels his argument for the 
derivation of the Formula of Humanity in the second section of the Groundwork, 4:428-29, with 
the difference that at that point in the Groundwork Kant has not yet established that it is 
legitimate to take ourselves as human beings to have the property of autonomy -- for the sake of 
practical purposes.  This is not argued until the third section.   
 
75 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:387-88. 
 
76 This phrasing comes from Hill's "Meeting Needs and Doing Favors," p. 206. 
 
77 Groundwork, 4:430.   
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role they should play in our deliberations.78  What we should do in any given set of 
circumstances requires the use of judgment.  Sometimes it may be the case that, in the 
circumstances at hand, there is only one way to fulfill our imperfect duties.  Neglecting to 
promote one's own perfection or the happiness of others would be incompatible with 
having adopted it as an end.  For instance, it might be the case that I could very easily 
help another in dire straits who is begging for my help.  If I, as I should, take her to 
matter at all, given that I have no good reason not to, I might rightly conclude that I must 
help.  On other occasions, it might be the case that I recognize the happiness of others 
and developing my own natural talents are relevant to determining what it is I should do, 
but there are any number of ways I might reflect this in my actions.  I am left room for 
considering what I would prefer to do and to freely choose from among the many 
permissible options for action.79
 It is also indeterminate how much we are to do for the sake of these ends.
   
80
                                                            
78 Although, it seems that generally, when such considerations conflict with what our perfect 
duties require, our perfect duties should trump.  This is not to say that our perfect duties might not 
have built-in, principled exceptions (i.e. that it might be permissible to fail to tell the truth in 
order to save a life, etc.).  See Hill, "Meeting Needs and Doing Favors," pp. 208-09. 
  
While the question of how much we are to do is very contentious among commentators, it 
is clear that given the conditions in which we human beings find ourselves, in which 
opportunities for developing our talents or helping others are numerous, we must at the 
 
79 It is also worth noting that there may be any number of ways of fulfilling our perfect duties as 
well.  We can fulfill a promise by doing as we said we would, convincing another to release us of 
it, etc.  Hill makes this point in "Meeting Needs and Doing Favors," p. 208. 
 
80 How much latitude Kant allows is a controversial matter.  See Baron, chapter 3, Thomas E. Hill 
Jr., "Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation," and "Meeting Needs and Doing Favors," Mary 
Gregor, Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant's Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in 
the "Metaphysik der Sitten" (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), H.J. Paton, The Categorical 
Imperative:  A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1971). 
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very least do something.  We must, for instance, develop at least some of our talents on 
some occasions when the opportunity to do so arises. We must also do something to 
promote the happiness of others (i.e. help them to achieve their morally permissible, 
freely selected ends) on some occasions when the opportunity arises.  A failure to do so 
at all reveals that one very likely -- given the conditions of the world in which such 
opportunities are numerous -- has not in fact adopted the happiness of others as an end.  
But, beyond at least doing something, it is controversial how much is required.  Kant 
occasionally suggests that even though our imperfect duties leave "playroom for free 
choice" in complying with these ends, the only latitude they allow is to "limit one maxim 
of duty by another (e.g., love of one's neighbor in general by love of one's parents)."81
 There is reason to think not when it comes to our duties to perfect our talents or 
our duties to promote the happiness of others.  When it comes to cultivating our talents, 
Kant says,  
  Is 
it the case that we must do as much as we can unless we are required to perform some 
other duty instead?   
 
 this duty is merely an ethical one, that is a duty of wide obligation. No  
 rational principle prescribes specifically how far one should go in  
 cultivating one's capacities (in enlarging or correcting one's capacity for 
 understanding, i.e., in acquiring knowledge or skill).  Then too, the  
 different situations in which human beings may find themselves make a  
 human being's choice of the occupation for which he should cultivate his  
 talents very much a matter for him to decide as he chooses.82
 
 
                                                            
81 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:390. 
 
82 Ibid., 6:392. 
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 While more controversial, it seems that Kant did not think we need do as much as 
we possibly can to promote the happiness of others, either.  While we must adopt the 
maxim of promoting the happiness of others,  
 
 a maxim of promoting others' happiness at the sacrifice of one's own  
 happiness, one's true needs, would conflict with itself if it were made a  
 universal law.  Hence this duty is only a wide one; the duty has in it a  
 latitude for doing more or less, and no specific limits can be assigned to  
 what should be done.83
 
 
Although it is unclear what Kant means by "true needs" and much rests on it, at the very 
least, he makes clear that how much to do and when to do it cannot be determined 
independently of the circumstances in question.  It is a matter of judgment.84
 In summary, it seems that many of our moral duties leave indeterminate exactly 
what an individual should do on their behalf.  Moreover, it also seems that Kant thought 
that exactly what morally should be done in such matters should be left largely to the 
individual, her own judgment, and her own conscience.  Such matters are not the proper 
objects of legal punishment.  Nor did Kant leave much room for the role of social 
pressures such as blame. This brings us to the second point mentioned above. Unlike Mill 
and Williams who see various kinds of social pressures (blame) as one important kind of 
incentive to act as we morally should that occupies the space in between what is 
rightfully subject to legal sanctions and what is properly left to the dictates of one's 
individual conscience, Kant makes little, if any, reference to this moderate moral ground.  
  
                                                            
83 Ibid., 6:393. 
 
84 The duty we have to promote our own moral perfection is a bit different, because this is not a 
separate moral task, but instead requires us to be committed to improving ourselves morally.  
This will be discussed in more detail in the next section.  For similar points, see Hill, "Meeting 
Needs and Doing Favors," pp. 209-11. 
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There are legal incentives to be moral and moral incentives, but no social pressures. Was 
this simply an oversight?   
 There is good reason to think not.  Kant is deeply suspicious of the attention we 
give to the moral shortcomings of others.  This suspicion runs throughout his ethical 
theory and arguably has roots in some of its major themes.  First, we might think that 
social pressures such as blame are antithetical to the spirit of enlightenment that runs 
throughout Kant's philosophy.  Kant thought enlightenment was an emerging from "self-
incurred minority" -- a lack of courage in using one's own understanding.85
 Second, it might stem from Kant's general distaste for moral hypocrisy.  He is 
suspicious that blaming others and focusing on their behavior rather than one's own is 
often a way of avoiding looking at one's own moral flaws and faults --  avoiding, in other 
words, on focusing on one of the primary moral tasks that each person has: her own 
moral improvement.  In fact, Kant often suggests that a focus on others rather than 
oneself tends to be morally corrupting.  This plays an important role in his theory of the 
radical evil to be found in human nature in which we are all too content to judge 
ourselves to have or lack worth in terms of how we measure up to other people, rather 
than in terms of how we measure up to the standard provided by the moral law itself.  But 
a failure to consider the moral law in all its purity and evaluate ourselves with respect to 
it alone does not allow the moral law to influence our motivations as it otherwise might.  
  Judging one's 
conduct in terms of whether or not it will lead to social opprobrium might be akin to 
surrendering or subordinating one's own judgment to that of others.  This would 
encourage mindless conformity and threaten the dignity we have as autonomous beings.   
                                                            
85 An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? in  Practical Philosophy, 8:35. 
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This can lead to moral complacency, at best, or to a corruption of our moral dispositions, 
at the worst.86
 
   
 We ought not to measure our worth by comparing ourselves with others,  
 but with the standard of the moral law.  To compare ourselves with others  
 is to use a fortuitous standard, which may lead to a very different estimate  
 of our worth.87
 
 
 Lastly, focusing too much of the faults of others might be corrupting in a further 
sense.  Not only is it a basis for an improper esteem for ourselves -- esteeming ourselves 
insofar as we are better than others, which can lead to arrogance and conceit, it also can 
lead to a lack of respect for others.  If we think we are better, we might look on others 
with contempt, rather than with the respect that the humanity within them demands of us.  
Or, "We may conclude that we are of lesser value than others.  This makes us hate them 
and produces envy and jealousy."88
 Nevertheless, we might think there is room for self-blame in Kant.  Instead of 
being liable to blame from others, perhaps the blame only comes from oneself and is 
directed at oneself?  There are two reasons to resist this response.  First, it isn't the case 
that Kant thinks of self-blame as necessarily the reaction we should have toward 
ourselves when we fail to live up to our moral duties.  The appropriate reaction, whether 
we have performed a wrong action or even when we recognize that we ourselves are 
  
                                                            
86 Reminders that in moral matters we should compare ourselves only with the moral law and not 
to others occur at Critique of Practical Reason, 5:76-77, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:435, 
6:480, Lectures on Ethics, pp. 126-29, 137; Religion, pp. 22, 27-31.  Also see Allen Wood, Kant's 
Ethical Thought (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 133-39. 
 
87 Lectures on Ethics, p. 137. 
 
88 Ibid. 
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“radically evil,” is not to beat ourselves up but to firmly resolve to do better in the future 
(and what better way to illustrate one's firm resolve than by doing what one can to help 
those one has wronged, if applicable?).   
 
 Now if one asks, What is the aesthetic character, the temperament, so to  
 speak, of virtue, whether courageous and hence joyous or fear-ridden and  
 dejected, an answer is hardly necessary.  This latter slavish frame of mind  
 can never occur without a hidden hatred of the law.  And a heart which is  
 happy in the performance of its duty (not merely complacent in the  
 recognition thereof) is a mark of genuineness in the virtuous disposition --  
 of genuineness even in piety, which does not consist in the self-inflicted  
 torment of a repentant sinner (a very ambiguous state of mind, which  
 ordinarily is nothing but inward regret at having infringed upon the rules of 
 prudence), but rather in the firm resolve to do better in the future.  This  
 resolve, then, encouraged by good progress, must needs beget a joyous  
 frame of mind, without which man is never certain of having really attained  
 a love for the good, i.e., of having incorporated it into his maxim.89
 
 
 Conscience should not lord over us like a tyrant; we do no hurt to our 
 conscience by proceeding on our way cheerfully; tormenting consciences 
 in the long run become dulled and ultimately cease to function.90
 
 
 Secondly, even though Kant also thought that conscience was an important 
incentive to act as morality requires, we need not think of conscience as a kind of 
internalized blame mechanism absorbed from those around us -- as something acquired 
by our upbringing on a continuum with legal and social sanctions.91
                                                            
89 Religion, p. 19n, original italics.  Also see 6:23-24; 6:60, Critique of Practical Reason 5:111-
13, 116, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:485. 
  Conscience is not 
the internalized other looking down at us, but instead is an inner judge that speaks when 
we have acted in a way inconsistent with our own (general) moral standards or have not 
 
90 Lectures on Ethics, pp. 134-35.  Also see p. 33. 
 
91 As Mill thought.  See especially Lectures on Ethics, p. 133-34. 
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taken due care in determining what our particular duties are.92
 
  It is not that we act in 
accordance with the dictates of conscience in order to get something else that we care 
about (such as being able to sleep at night or live with oneself -- when we really enjoy 
our sleep or our untroubled lives).  Instead, we will be pained, we won't be able to sleep 
at night, because we care about living in accordance with our consciences -- we care 
about living up to the standards we impose on ourselves, of being worthy in our own 
eyes, because we judge these standards to be ones that are worth living up to.   
 Happiness contains all (and also not more than) that which nature provides  
 us; but virtue contains what no one other than the human being can give  
 himself or take away from himself.  If someone wanted to retort that by  
 deviating from the latter a human being can at least bring upon himself  
 reproach and purely moral self-censure and hence dissatisfaction, so that  
 he can make himself unhappy that may certainly be granted.  But only a  
 virtuous man or one who is on his way to being virtuous is susceptible to this  
 purely moral dissatisfaction (not from disadvantageous results of his action  
 but from its unlawfulness itself).  His dissatisfaction is consequently not the  
 cause but only the effect of his being virtuous; and the motive for being  
 virtuous could not be derived from such unhappiness (if one wants to give  
 this name to the pain resulting from a misdeed).93
 
 
Furthermore, as the quote above from Kant's second Critique suggests, the moral 
incentive is radically distinct from the incentive we have to avoid blaming ourselves.  It is 
something "elevating".  It is a kind of "self-approbation."94
                                                            
92 This follows Thomas Hill's "Punishment, Conscience and Moral Worth," Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 36 (1997), p. 57.  Reprinted in Human Welfare and Moral Worth. 
  It seems to be something like 
this that Rawls had in mind when he claimed that Kant's ethics is an ethics of self-esteem 
with little role for blame. 
 
93 On the Common Saying:  That may be correct in theory but it is of no use in practice, 8:283n. 
 
94 Also see On the Common Saying, 8:287-88; Religion, pp. 44-45. 
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 [Unjust] actions therefore strike at our self-respect, our sense of our  
 own worth, and the experience of this loss is shame. We have acted  
 as though we belonged to a lower order, as though we were a creature  
 whose first principles are decided by natural contingencies.  Those who  
 think of Kant's moral doctrine as one of law and guilt badly  
 misunderstand him.  Kant's main aim is to deepen and justify Rousseau's  
 idea that liberty is acting in accordance with a law that we give ourselves.   
 And this leads not to a morality of austere command but to an ethic of  
 mutual respect and self-esteem.95
 
   
 In summary, Williams is right that moral philosophy should extend beyond the 
narrow, legalistic conception of moral obligation that is held by some which neglects the 
importance of character and how it is that the things we care deeply about which 
constitute our characters structure our deliberations and our actions.  But this does not yet 
give us reason to discount Kant's or a Kantian account of ethics.  Kantian morality or 
duty does not address only how we must act in our relations with other people, but also 
addresses what we as autonomous beings should care about and how these concerns 
should be reflected in one's deliberations and attitudes.   
 
VIII.)  A Partial Response to the Criticism 
 Given that Kant's conception of moral requirements is not the same as Williams' 
conception of moral requirements, is it a problem for Kant to think that the phenomenon 
of practical necessity is strictly a moral phenomenon?  According to Williams, the 
problems posed by practical necessities to Kant's moral philosophy include the following.  
First, practical necessities are not moral because they are grounded on personal features 
of agents -- on the commitments of particular persons that may be prior to and 
                                                            
95 A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA:  Belknap Press, 1999), p. 225. 
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independent of the claims of morality. Because the commitments which ground practical 
necessities may be prior to and independent of the claims of morality, it is possible for 
practical necessities to conflict with moral requirements.  In such cases it might then not 
be possible or unconditionally rational for fully functioning, fully responsible agents to 
do as morality requires 
 But, it isn't the case that in Kant's moral theory we can rigidly distinguish the 
personal, particular and non-moral from the impersonal, universal and moral.  Firstly, 
there are many cases in which moral principles simply articulate that certain 
considerations are morally relevant in the circumstances and underdetermine what it is 
that we should do.  In such cases the personal and the particular are what flesh out and 
make determinate which of our options is best.  We might then perform actions both 
because we simply want to and because such actions are morally good ways of acting.  
For instance, our personal, particular commitments and abilities are relevant to 
determining what we should do when it comes to fulfilling our imperfect duties to 
develop our talents.  We must do something, but only our preferences and abilities can 
give us reason to settle on one thing in particular.   
 Secondly, the ends that individuals set on the basis of their personal cares and 
commitments become morally important in virtue of their status as ends.  We are morally 
required to take the ends of others (and our own ends)96
                                                            
96 To take the ends of everyone but myself into account would fail to respect everyone.  But, 
because human beings are naturally inclined to take their own ends into account, it is misleading 
to say we have a duty, we must constrain ourselves, to take our own ends into account – unless 
we are suffering from depression and are not naturally inclined to do so. 
 into account when determining 
what it is we ought to do.  Because the ends of human beings have a certain value or 
moral status because they are valued by human beings, it is not possible to draw a clear 
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distinction between "moral considerations" and "personal considerations".  If this is so, 
the fact that practical necessities reveal aspects of an individual's character need not 
necessarily impugn their status as a kind of moral necessity for Kant.   
 However, this is not to say that the distinctions between Kant's conception of 
moral requirements and Williams' conception of moral requirements alone are enough to 
plausibly classify all instances of practical necessities as forms of moral necessities. Nor 
is it enough to make plausible that instances of practical necessities might never conflict 
with moral requirements.  In various works, Williams suggests there are three distinct 
kinds of cases which reveal that all practical necessities are improperly construed by Kant 
as arising from an agent's recognition that the action is morally required of her in the 
circumstances.  Instead, the agent's own commitments are what ground the necessity and 
even can do so with the agent's full recognition that there is an applicable moral 
considerations that requires her to do otherwise.  I will examine these cases one at a time 
beginning with those that are easy for Kant to account for as cases within morality and 
progressing to those that pose a greater challenge. 
 
1.)  Morally admirable actions that go "beyond duty" 
 The first kind of case is that of the heroic or supererogatory action in which an 
agent goes beyond what morality requires her to do.97
                                                            
97 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chapter 10. 
  It is often thought that there are 
limits to what can be legitimately demanded of agents for the sake of morality, though the 
nature of these limits, how to determine their location, and whether it would be good for 
agents to know there are such limits is far from clear.  For the sake of argument, however, 
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let's assume that we all agree that one person is not morally required to give up her life so 
that another person may live.  Let's also assume that because one person is not morally 
required to give up her life for another, she is also not required to act in ways that would 
greatly endanger her life in order to save another -- for instance, we might think that she 
is not required to run into a burning building in order to save the life of another.  
Nevertheless, it also seems like such actions morally are highly commendable, virtuous, 
and worthy of esteem. 
 Of course, many people in fact do perform such actions.  Many people also report 
they felt or judged they "had to" perform such actions.98  Williams suggests two features 
help to distinguish that the source of this "must" is not that the agent recognizes she is 
morally required to act in this way.  First, even though the agent thinks that she must, she 
would not judge that others are required to act as she does in the circumstances.  Second, 
such agents would not be blamed for failing to perform the action in question.  They have 
wronged no one; they have violated no one's rights.99
 However, Kant's conception of moral duty can also account for these features.  
The second of these features is easily dismissed as not revealing that such cares are not 
moral in nature.  As we have seen, when it comes to our ethical duties, and especially our 
imperfect duties, a failure to perform a given action that falls under the scope of duty 
   
                                                            
98 For some examples of moral exemplars (i.e. those that perform heroic or supererogatory 
actions) and the frequency with which they report they simply felt "had to" do as they did, that 
the situation "left them with no choice" see Kristen Monroe "Morality and a Sense of Self," "How 
Identity and Perspective Constrain Moral Choice," International Political Science Review 24(4) 
(2003), "The Ethical Perspective," Political Psychology 30(3) (2009), "John Donne's People:  
Explaining Differences Between Rational Actors and Altruists through Cognitive Frameworks," 
The Journal of Politics 53(2) (1991).   
 
99 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, pp. 188-89.   
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need not leave one liable to blame, especially blame from others, nor need it wrong 
anyone or violate anyone's rights.   
 The first feature will require more explanation.  On a Kantian conception of our 
duties, if an agent judges she "must" perform a given action, it need not follow that she 
judges that all other moral agents would also be required to act in that way as well.  As 
we have seen, given the imprecise nature of many of our duties, moral requirements can 
be personalized in various ways.  In many instances, what we ought to do isn't made 
determinately clear by moral requirements, but instead requires individual judgment in 
order to apply it to the context at hand.  Nevertheless, while indeterminate, moral 
requirements can at least guide how we are to make particular choices.  They can help us 
to see what is relevant to making a morally respectable decision, especially when it 
otherwise might be overlooked. 
 Not only might it be the case that judgment is needed in order to determine how 
various moral requirements apply to a given situation, it can also be the case that our own 
personal cares and concerns can make a difference to what conduct we demand of 
ourselves in a given situation.  For Kant, morality is a realization of an individual's 
freedom and autonomy.  It is not an imposition of the demands of others, but instead 
demanding certain conduct and attitudes of ourselves.  This means that there is room in a 
Kantian understanding of moral duty for a person to hold herself to account and require 
actions of herself that she would not expect from others and others may not demand of 
her.  Moreover, a person may commit herself to or care deeply about any number of more 
specific (morally permissible) projects or people (on the basis of her preferences, talents 
or abilities) and acting on the basis of such cares or projects is a way of fulfilling the 
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imperfect duties of developing her own talents or promoting the happiness of others.  In 
such cases, if an agent concludes that she "must" perform a given action on the basis of 
her personal cares and concerns, it need not follow that this "must" is distinct from a 
moral "must" in any substantive sense.  
 Furthermore, we might regard it as good for people to fulfill imperfect duties in 
ways consistent with their personal cares and commitments.  Given the magnitude of the 
task of morally improving ourselves and making our political and social institutions more 
perfectly just, we should regard the diversity of talents, interests, preferences and cares to 
be found in human beings as a fact worth celebrating.  If things were otherwise, we might 
have a duty to develop personal interests and cares (we might even have an indirect duty 
to do so now -- indirect because, like our inclination for happiness, we as human beings 
are naturally inclined to take such an interest).  In such cases, if we feel bound to act in a 
given matter on the basis of that which we care about deeply, it need not distort matters to 
say that she is indeed bound by a duty.  Although no one else could demand the action of 
her, she demands it of herself.  Because morality can be individualized in many ways, 
there is no one standard of moral excellence, but a plurality of ways to be a morally good 
person.100
 This can help us to make sense of the heroic instances of practical necessities 
which Williams rightfully regards as ones in which agents feel themselves to be 
constrained by their own commitments and convictions about what it would be good for 
her to do, but not what others might rightfully demand of her.  Given a person's cares, 
commitments, abilities and talents she might judge that she should -- she must-- help and 
   
                                                            
100 This is a point stressed by Baron, esp. chapter 2, p. 79; O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, 
pp. 181-83; Paul Guyer, "Kantian Perfectionism," in Perfecting Virtue, p. 87; Lara Denis, "A 
Kantian Conception of Human Flourishing," in Perfecting Virtue.   
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the way for her to help is to run into the burning building and grab a child.  Such a 
judgment need not imply that the others around her (in the same circumstances) must 
help as well.  They may not have the same abilities as her -- given ordinary, merely 
psychological or "pathological" limitations of human beings, their terror at the prospect 
of entering a burning building is understandable and excusable.  But, if someone is not 
equally terrified, she might reasonably judge she has no excuse.  Does this make her 
morally better than the others?  Are they worthy of blame?  Not necessarily.  It is not for 
her to judge.  It is to be left to each individual and her own conscience. 
 
2.)  When going "beyond duty" conflicts with "moral requirements" 
 Williams' next class of cases that seem to reveal that practical necessities are 
distinct from and not dependent on what is morally required of agents are those in which 
practical necessities conflict with what is ordinarily thought to be a moral requirement.  
For instance, if someone has made a promise to meet a friend, she is obliged to keep her 
promise.  Nevertheless, she might break her promise and fail to meet her friend because 
on the way to meet her friend, she passes a burning orphanage and concludes that she 
simply must help and then rushes in to save the children.  Williams thinks three things are 
clear.  First, that she really was obliged to keep her promise -- only this can explain why 
her friend is owed an explanation and an apology.  Second, that the woman on the way to 
meet her friend was not under a more stringent obligation to save the children -- we do on 
wrong others when we fail to save their lives at great peril to our own.  Third, that the 
woman in question does what is morally praiseworthy.  It is better for her to do 
something other than what morality requires of her.    
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 Such cases appear to be problematic for Kant for the following reasons.  First, 
Kant famously insisted that there could be no conflicts between our duties but only 
conflicting grounds of obligation.  If it is the case that the agent concludes that she 
"must" help and she concludes this on moral grounds, it seems that this could only be on 
account of her imperfect duty to aid others.  But then this imperfect duty appears to 
conflict with the perfect duty we have to keep our promises.  Furthermore, it seems that 
when an imperfect duty which has the form "sometimes, to some extent, do X" conflicts 
with a perfect duty which has the form "always Y", it is the perfect duty that "trumps".  
But, this seems to give us the wrong result in this case -- it seems she has much better 
moral reason to help the children if she is able to do so.   
 But again such cases are not particularly problematic for Kant's moral theory once 
it is properly understood.  It is true that a person's all-things-considered duty in a 
particular set of circumstances cannot conflict with another all-things-considered duty in 
the same set of circumstances.  This simply follows from the concept of "all-things-
considered duty".  Nevertheless, there can be conflicting "grounds of obligation" in which 
principles of duty come into conflict.  That is, the considerations that each principle of 
duty singles out as being morally relevant recommend mutually exclusive courses of 
action.  For instance the consideration, "I promised my friend I would teach her class in 
10 minutes and so I should continue on my way," might conflict with the consideration 
that, "The orphans need my help and so I should help."  In such instances, it need not be 
the case that because what singles out the need of the children as relevant to what it is I 
ought to do is a principle of imperfect duty, and what singles out "I promised" as relevant 
is a principle of imperfect duty, it is necessarily better for me to keep my promise.  This 
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would only be the case if principles of perfect duty held without exception.  There are 
good reasons to think that they do not.101
 In these circumstances, a person might reasonably judge that she simply must 
help. Given the dire need of the children, her ability to help them, as well as 
reasonableness of taking helping children escape from an inferno to be a principled 
exception to fulfilling a promise (i.e. not an illegitimate exception for herself made on the 
basis of "mere inclinations"), this "must" can reflect her all-things-considered judgment 
of what is morally required of her in these circumstances. 
  For instance, while it might not be permissible 
to make false promises, promises which we never intend to keep, it might not be 
impermissible to fail to fulfill promises on the basis of principled reasons, or on account 
of circumstances beyond one's control.  Furthermore, the fact that I may feel the need to 
apologize to my friend, or feel that an explanation is owed when I fail to do as I promised 
need not reflect that I have wronged her or done what was morally impermissible.  
Instead it reflects that I care about keeping my promises and that I did not promise 
without intending to keep my promise.  These are all attitudes I owe to my friend in 
virtue of my promising, even if I don't always owe fulfillment of my promises without 
exception in all possible circumstances. 
  
3.)  When "merely personal commitments" conflict with "moral requirements" 
 Because the cases of practical necessities above can easily be understood as cases 
of conflicts within morality, it is not implausible to understand them in Kantian terms as 
cases in which the "must" in question reflects what one morally ought to do as well as 
                                                            
101 This discussion follows Hill in "Meeting Needs and Doing Favors," esp. p. 209. 
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personal features of agents.  However, the previous chapter began with instances in 
which this "must" seems to reflect only personal features that are independent of and 
prior to our moral commitments.  Given her ideals regarding marriage, Elizabeth simply 
couldn't accept the offer of Mr. Collins.  The considerations that ordinarily would count 
in favor of marrying him -- he stands to inherit her father's estate, the help she would be 
to her family, the risk of refusing him and not getting any other offers, the wishes of her 
mother -- are excluded from consideration.  But, Elizabeth is not morally required to have 
any ideals regarding marriage.  Nor can such commitments plausibly be regarded as 
under the scope of our imperfect duties to promote the happiness of others or our own 
moral and natural perfection.102
 But, if this is what they are, then it seems that when pursuing such morally 
permissible ends conflicts with what is morally required of us, on Kant's picture we are 
required to abandon such ends.  Furthermore, it is unconditionally good and rational for 
us to do so.  But it seems that it might not be possible for us simply to give up the deep 
commitments that we endorse, nor does it necessarily seem good and rational for us to do 
so. 
  Instead, it seems at first blush that on a Kantian 
understanding these could only be seen as some of their freely selected, morally 
permissible, but not morally required ends. 
 Williams discusses such examples most explicitly in Shame and Necessity.103
                                                            
102 For a Kantian who claims they do, see Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 329.  This 
suggestion will be given further consideration in the following chapter. 
  
During a fit of goddess-induced madness, Sophocles’ title character Ajax slaughters his 
 
103 (Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 1993), pp. 73-78.  Although some of Williams’ 
other famous examples (Jim and George in “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” the fictional Gauguin 
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army’s sheep and cattle.  When Ajax comes to, he is deeply ashamed of himself.  He has 
betrayed his friends and comrades and destroyed their chance of victory.  His entire life 
was devoted to living in a manner befitting a heroic warrior and what he has done has 
made himself and his entire life appear utterly ridiculous.  It becomes increasingly clear 
to him that suicide is the only honorable course of action available to him – he simply 
can’t live with what he has done.  Williams makes clear that the “can’t” in question is not 
the result of taking himself to be morally obliged. 
 
 People do not have to think that they could not live in that situation; they  
 do not have to think any such thing, and this is a type of ethical thought as  
 far removed as may be from the concerns of obligation.  But they may  
 sensibly think it if their understanding of their lives and the significance  
 their lives possessed for other people is such that what they did destroyed  
 the only reason they had for going on.104
 
 
Given what Ajax cares most about in the world, but is not morally required to care about, 
he determines that he can’t continue to live in these circumstances; he must die.  But not 
only is the “must” in question not a moral must, it appears to conflict with a clear Kantian 
duty to preserve and promote one’s natural perfection, or to treat one’s rational nature 
always at the same time as an end.105
                                                                                                                                                                                 
in “Moral Luck,” and the “one thought too many” objection in “Persons, Character and 
Morality”) can also be understood as posing the same basic challenge.   
  Given that the relevant moral considerations all tell 
in favor of preserving his life, and given that only personal ends and commitments tell in 
 
104 p. 74. 
 
105  The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:422-23; Groundwork, 4:222, 4:429.  Although, it is interesting 
to note that Ajax does not wish to kill himself out of “self-love” but in order to preserve his 
honor, so the first argument against suicide in the Groundwork may not apply.  Furthermore, Kant 
had suggests a more nuanced view on the prohibitions against suicide in his Lectures on Ethics, 
especially when preserving one’s life can only be done at the expense of one’s honor.  He 
maintains that a woman should fight to the death against her rapist in order to preserve her 
“honor,” p. 156.  These matters will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.   
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favor of suicide, this seems a clear instance in which Ajax has an all-things-considered-
duty to refrain from suicide.  He should (it would be unconditionally good and rational 
for him) abandon his merely personal ends, do his duty and preserve his life.   
 The example of Elizabeth Bennet, with some modification, can also be used to 
illustrate this potential conflict between our deep commitments and moral requirements.  
In the novel Pride and Prejudice, Elizabeth is relieved of the pressure to accept Mr. 
Collins' offer on behalf of the good of her family.  Her father says that even if her mother 
will never speak to her again if she does not accept Mr. Collins, he will never speak to 
her again if she does. But, imagine things were otherwise. Imagine that instead, her father 
has a severe illness and that his death -- and the destitution of his family -- is imminent.  
Imagine as well, that he expresses to Elizabeth that his dying wish is that his family be 
provided for.  In the heat of the moment, this exacts from Elizabeth a solemn promise to 
do what lies within her power to prevent this, never imagining that Mr. Collins would 
make her an offer. But, soon after her father's death, Mr. Collins does.  Given that 
accepting Mr. Collins would fulfill her promise to her father, secure the material well-
being of her family, and is likely her only chance to do so, it seems -- according to Kant -
- Elizabeth should conclude that she is morally required to accept.  First, she owes it to 
her father to keep her promise.  She also has a duty to promote the ends of others and it is 
her mother’s expressed wish that her daughters marry well and as quickly as possible.  
Second, she has no moral duty to remain true to her own personal ideals, her 
discretionary ends, with respect to marriage.  It seems then she has an all-things-
considered obligation to take the available means to fulfill her promise and support her 
family.  It seems highly probable that this will be the only way in which will be able to do 
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so.  Therefore, she should abandon her merely personal ends in the circumstances and 
marry Mr. Collins – to do so would be unconditionally good and rational. 
 We might wish to grant that that there is, in these new circumstances, a choice for 
Elizabeth.  That is, what she was incapable of doing in other circumstances, in 
circumstances in which her personal ideals and commitments did not conflict with moral 
requirements, might very well be something she is capable of doing in these new 
circumstances.     
 Nevertheless, what seems off-putting here is the ease in which these conclusions 
are made.  Even if there is a choice in these circumstances, it need not be an easy choice.  
If Elizabeth or Ajax were ideal Kantian moral agents, they would be motivated in way 
described in section IV above. The recognition that an act is morally required would 
render irrelevant considerations about whether or not the performance of that action will 
promote one's own happiness.  The recognition of the action as morally required would 
and altogether humiliate self-conceit --judging ourselves and our lives to have real worth 
in any manner that precedes the moral law is “null and quite unwarranted.”106
 But we are not ideal Kantian moral agents.  It is not clear that it is necessarily 
possible, or good, or rational for us, the beings that we are, to act as if we were.  First, it 
  By 
humiliating self-conceit and restricting self-love to its proper bounds, the moral law is 
also the ground of a positive feeling of respect. That is, it reveals to the agent her own 
autonomy, which is a source of unconditional worth, and the ground of her true value.  
Whatever (false) grounds for self-respect that Elizabeth and Ajax have lost by doing their 
duty can be regained in esteem for having done their duty, having expressed their rational 
and autonomous nature. 
                                                            
106 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:73. 
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is not clear that our deepest commitments and convictions are ones we can simply change 
or abandon at will when they conflict with moral requirements.  In an ideal case, 
Elizabeth would abandon her personal commitment and can fully reconcile and console 
herself by the esteem for having done her duty and expressed her rational, autonomous 
nature.  Williams is right to think that this does not do justice to "the depth and necessity" 
of our dispositions.107
 Second, it is not obvious that it would necessarily be unconditionally good or 
admirable for us to abandon such commitments and do what duty requires.  What it is for 
Elizabeth to be committed to a personal ideal in a manner that could give rise to a 
practical necessity (at least in other circumstances) and which we would find to be an 
admirable feature of her character (at least in those circumstances), means that she would 
-- rightly -- experience doing as she is morally required to do as a profound loss, and the 
source of a loss of esteem for herself.  To accept Mr. Collins is for Elizabeth to spend the 
rest of her daily life in a degraded condition.  She will spend the rest of her life ashamed 
for herself and her family.  Furthermore, if she were to become accustomed to her new 
life as Mrs. Collins, it seems something good about her character has been lost; she has 
become shameless. 
  What it is for Elizabeth to care about who she marries in a way  
that could give rise to a practical necessity, at least in other circumstances, is just for her 
not to be susceptible to being moved in these ways -- to being moved as an ideal Kantian 
moral agent in these circumstances.   
 Third, it is not clear that it is necessarily rational for us to abandon our deep 
commitments when they conflict with moral requirements.  To use Kant’s term, our 
                                                            
107 "The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and the Ambitions of Ethics," Making Sense of 
Humanity, pp. 143-71. 
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deepest convictions and commitments are not of a kind that can be viewed as having only 
a "price" -- of being intersubstitutable or replaceable with other commitments.  These are 
the commitments we fully endorse and around which we have structured our lives.  They 
are the guides for and the standards that bear on, some of the most important choices we 
make in the course of our lives.  To give up on them later in one's life, then, would 
remove much of the meaning or purpose of one's life.  It would render many of a person's 
choices, many of the previous sacrifices a person has made on behalf of her (personal) 
ideals utterly pointless.  For instance, if Elizabeth had refused Mr. Darcy prior to her 
father's death, and prior to the offer of Mr. Collins, accepting Mr. Collins now makes her 
earlier refusal appear ridiculous and her condition now as Mrs. Collins even more 
degrading.  To accept would undermine what served to justify her earlier actions.  If Ajax 
refuses to do what he sees as the only honorable thing to do in the circumstances, all of 
his other actions performed out of honor, and respect for his comrades will be rendered 
foolish.  To preserve his life out of duty is to sacrifice what made his life have a purpose.   
 In order to accept that it would be unconditionally good and rational for an agent 
to do as morality requires, Kant needs to give a convincing argument.  It is to this 
argument that we will now turn.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Practical Necessities and Practical Reason 
 
 
I.)  Introduction 
 We saw in the previous chapter how Kant's conception of moral duty, and in 
particular his distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, could account for many of 
the cases of practical necessities which Bernard Williams thought posed a problem to 
Kant's moral theory.  These cases of practical necessities are ones in which agents 
conclude that they "must" act in a given manner, and this "must" does not reflect a 
recognition that one is under a moral requirement as Williams and many other 
contemporary philosophers understand moral requirements to be.  However, many of 
such cases arguably fall under Kant’s principles of imperfect duties such as the duty of 
beneficence.  Even though principles of imperfect duties leave indeterminate what is 
required of particular agents in what circumstances, personal commitments or ends can 
help to make a determinate action morally required in the circumstances.  In such cases, 
agents might judge that they are morally required to act in given ways even though others 
could not rightfully demand such an action from them.   
 But there are cases, such as the modified Elizabeth Bennet case and the case of 
Sophocles' Ajax, which might not be plausibly regarded as cases which fall under Kant’s 
principles of imperfect duties.  Insofar as considerations of Kantian duty apply to the 
situation, it appears they all lie on one side and point in favor of performing a given 
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action, such as accepting Mr. Collins or refraining from suicide.  The relevant moral 
considerations for Elizabeth in the circumstances appear to be fulfilling her promise to 
her father, and the happiness and wishes of her mother and sisters.  The only 
considerations opposed to her accepting Mr. Collins appear entirely personal and non-
moral in nature.  She happens to have the ideal of not marrying in the absence of 
affection, and she doesn't love Mr. Collins.  At face value, then, it seems Kant or a 
Kantian should see this case as presenting a clear opposition of moral duty and personal 
inclinations or preferences.1
 There are two worries that might arise from these cases.  First, in the case of Ajax, 
it seemed that there is an unconditional rational “must” that is not the Kantian “must” of 
duty.  Such cases seem to be a direct counterexample to Kant’s thesis that moral 
obligations, or moral duties are distinct because they are unconditional rational 
commands.  Moreover, in such an instance, it seems like this unconditional rational must 
is opposed to what Kant or a Kantian would say is Ajax’s moral duty to refrain from 
suicide.  It seems such a case illustrates that it is false that it is necessarily rational and 
always possible for an agent to do as morality requires of him.     
  And, because duty does not allow for exceptions on the 
basis of one's personal preferences or inclinations, Elizabeth morally should accept.   
 Secondly, in the modified case of Elizabeth, we might wish to grant that it is 
possible for her to accept Mr. Collins in these circumstances in which it appears that all 
moral considerations tell in favor of accepting him.  Even though in other circumstances 
she would have been incapable of accepting Mr. Collins’ offer, now that her family is in 
worse circumstances, now that she has given a promise to her father, it would not be 
                                                            
1 It should be noted that I assume throughout that the commitments, ideals, preferences, etc. in 
question are ones that are morally permissible in ordinary circumstances.  It is not in and of itself 
morally wrong to be committed to not marrying in the absence of affection.  
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“impossible for her to do otherwise than decline” his offer.  However, we might still be 
worried that on a Kantian view, it makes it seem as if it is obviously the case that it is 
rational and good for her to accept Mr. Collins and do her duty.  Once we have 
determined that all considerations of duty tell in favor of accepting Mr. Collins, it seems 
that any merely personal considerations are irrelevant to determining what it is good and 
rational for her to do.  They should be excluded from consideration, and if Elizabeth were 
an ideal moral agent, they would be.  But, this seems to neglect, as Williams says, “the 
depth and the necessity” of the dispositions.2
 Bernard Williams argues these mistaken views are the consequence of Kant's 
views on agency.  In cases like this in which one's deep (perhaps deepest) personal 
commitments are in conflict with universal, impartial moral requirements, it isn't 
necessarily rational to comply with moral requirements.  Kant was mistaken because 
Kant took our deepest personal commitments -- the deepest commitments of our "true 
selves" -- to be only those we have as rational agents and nothing more.  Furthermore, the 
reason that Kant was mistaken as to the grounds and nature of our deepest commitments 
  It is not simply Elizabeth’s mere 
inclinations that are opposed to marrying Mr. Collins, but some of her deepest 
commitments and convictions – the kind of commitment that in other circumstances 
could give rise to a practical necessity.  These are not the kinds of ends that we can 
simply abandon at will, nor is it clear that they should be excluded from consideration 
when they conflict with moral requirements.  What it is to have a commitment like this is 
precisely for that commitment to resist exclusion in this way.  What it is to have a 
character, is to fail to be an ideal Kantian moral agent.    
                                                            
2 Bernard Williams, “The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and the Ambitions of Ethics,” 
Making Sense of Humanity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 171. 
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was that he conflated the theoretical and practical deliberative perspectives.  While the 
theoretical standpoint is detached from one's desires in the quest to find true belief, 
beliefs that will converge with all other true beliefs, the practical standpoint is not 
detached from one's desires, nor is it committed to such harmony and convergence.  
Moreover, rational agents clearly have a rational interest in having true beliefs regardless 
of what they happen to desire, but it is not clear (as Kant supposed) that they have a 
rational interest in acting in accordance with the dictates of morality regardless of what 
they happen to desire.  Because the most basic foundation of Kant's moral theory was 
flawed in the ways that cases of practical necessities reveal, we have no reason to accept 
the upshot that we always have an unconditional, all-things-considered reason to do as 
morality requires.   
 In order to consider carefully whether these implications actually follow from 
these cases, I will begin with Kant’s own arguments.  Contrary to Williams’ criticisms, 
Kant's arguments do not begin with an abstract conception of human agency, nor a 
conflation of the commitments of theoretical and practical deliberators.  Instead, they 
begin with an examination of what is presupposed by the common, everyday 
understanding of what it is to take ourselves to be bound by duty.  Kant argues that this 
common conception of duty reveals that we commonly take duty to be a form of 
unconditional rational requirement whose authority is derived from a supreme rational 
principle – the Categorical Imperative.3
                                                            
3 I have adopted Thomas Hill's convention of capitalizing the "Categorical Imperative" when I 
use it to refer to the moral law or supreme principle of morality and not capitalizing "categorical 
imperative" when I use it to refer to the more specific moral principles derived from the supreme 
moral principle.  
  Only then (in the Groundwork) does Kant argue 
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that autonomous agents are necessarily committed to the Categorical Imperative, and that 
human beings are a form of autonomous agent.   
 A number of points will emerge from this discussion.  First, Williams is right that 
Kant might not achieve all he set out to achieve (a fact Kant seems to admit in the 
Critique of Practical Reason).  It seems while we understand many of our common sense 
judgments of what is morally required to be categorical imperatives, perhaps not all of 
them are.  Nor are moral requirements, as we commonly understand them to be, the only 
considerations that function as categorical imperatives in our reasoning.  But Williams 
draws the wrong conclusion from this.  He takes this to show that the basic foundations 
of Kant's moral theory are flawed and that Kant was wrong to take basic requirements of 
rationality to yield a theory of morality.  In light of this, Williams concludes that we 
should keep our common sense judgments of what is morally required of agents and 
reject Kant's foundations.  
 I think there is a different lesson to be drawn.  We might think that Kant does 
begin in the appropriate starting point, but his own starting point requires us to draw a 
slightly different picture of morality than the one prevalent in contemporary conceptions 
of morality, as well as the one Kant himself actually drew.  Cases of practical necessity 
reveal that sometimes, in some circumstances, an agent really might not have 
unconditional reason to do as common sense conceptions of morality or Kant's theory of 
morality might appear to require.  This need not reveal that we do not have unconditional 
reason to do as the best moral theory would require.  Instead, this reveals we must revise 
our judgments of what is morally required in these limited circumstances.  Furthermore, 
Kant’s moral theory contains the resources to do just this. 
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II.)  Williams' Criticisms   
 We have now reached the criticisms of Bernard Williams that strike at the heart of 
Kant's moral theory.  Williams argues that Kant's moral theory depends upon a 
conception of rational agency that is insupportable.  He claims that Kant's arguments for 
the rationality of moral conduct depend upon a conception of rational agency in which 
features unique to theoretical deliberation are taken to be features of practical deliberation 
as well.   
 First, Williams states that Kant’s moral philosophy requires strong assumptions 
that we cannot accept.  Kant, according to Williams, assumes an abstract picture of 
rational agency – a picture of the moral self as “characterless”4 -- and from it provides 
"general and formal principles to regulate the shape of relations between rational 
agents."5
  
 
 Kant started from what in his view rational agents essentially were.  He  
 thought that the moral agent was, in a sense, a rational agent and no more,  
 and he presented as essential to his account of morality a particular  
 metaphysical conception of the agent, according to which the self of moral  
 agency is what he called a 'noumenal' self, outside time and causality, and  
 thus distinct from the  concrete, empirically determined person that one  
 usually takes oneself to be.  This transcendental idea of the self, Kant  
 believed, will be uncovered if we reflect on the requirements of  
 freedom . . . 6
 
 
The challenge for Kant, according to Williams, is to vindicate this starting point by 
giving an account for why it is that any agent -- even the moral skeptic -- must commit 
                                                            
4 Shame and Necessity (Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 1993), p. 100.  
 
5 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 54. 
 
6  Ibid., p. 64. 
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herself to it.  It might be the case that if I were a purely rational agent, I would follow 
certain rational laws.  But, I am not a purely rational agent, free from all empirical 
desires.  It is not clear why I should commit myself to following those laws. 
 
 The argument needs to tell us what it is about rational agents that requires  
 them to form this conception of themselves as, so to speak, abstract  
 citizens.  It might be thought that the question answers itself because,  
 simply as rational agents, there is nothing else for them to be, and there is  
 no difference among them.  But to arrive at the model in this way would be  
 utterly unpersuasive.  We are concerned with what any given person,  
 however powerful or effective he may be, should reasonably do as a  
 rational agent, and this is not the same thing as what he would reasonably  
 do if he were a rational agent and no more.  Indeed, that equation is  
 unintelligible, since there is no way of being a rational agent and no more.7
 
   
 Williams then claims that Kant's attempt to explain why any rational agent is 
committed to this starting point follows from her status as a rational agent and the 
deliberative standpoint she holds as such a rational agent.  It must be possible for her to 
reflect upon her agency, to stand back from her desires and view them simply as the 
desires of such an agent -- not as her desires.  That is, she must be able to take an 
impartial standpoint and to see herself as making rules that harmonize the interests of all 
rational agents.8
                                                            
7 Ibid., p. 63.  Also see pp. 65, 189. 
  But, continues Williams, this is to confuse the distinction between 
theoretical and practical deliberation.  According to Williams, theoretical deliberation is 
impersonal, impartial, and disinterested.  When we deliberate about factual matters, we 
are capable of standing back from our own personal desires and interests.  Theoretical 
deliberation is only incidentally someone's deliberation -- it is not essentially first-
 
8 Ibid., p. 66. 
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personal.9  Furthermore, when we engage in theoretical deliberation we do commit 
ourselves to coming to an agreement with others -- all true beliefs must fit together 
harmoniously.10
 According to Williams, Kant thought that these features were simply features of 
any deliberative standpoint, when in fact they are unique to theoretical deliberation.  
There is no such thing as an impartial, practical deliberative standpoint.  The practical 
deliberative standpoint is provided by the preferences, desires, projects, and 
commitments that constitute one's character.
   
11  It is personal, partial and interested -- it is 
only because I have these particular desires, projects and commitments that I have reason 
to act in a given manner in these circumstances.12
 
  Engaging in practical deliberation, 
therefore, does not commit us to coming to an agreement with others, nor to harmonizing 
our actions or ends of those with others.   
 It is different with deliberation for action.  Practical deliberation is in every  
 case first-personal, and the first person is not derivative or naturally  
 replaced by anyone.  The action I decide on will be mine, and . . . its being  
 mine means not just that it will be arrived at by this deliberation, but that it  
 will involve changes in the world of which I shall be empirically the cause,  
 and of which these desires and this deliberation itself will be, in some part,  
 the cause.  It is true that I can stand back from my desires and reflect on  
 them, and this possibility can indeed be seen as part of the rational  
 freedom at which any rational agent aims.  This goes somewhat beyond 
                                                            
9 Ibid., p. 66-67. 
 
10 Ibid., p. 68. 
 
11 "Moral Luck," Moral Luck (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 34-35. 
 
12 This is also the main criticism of Kantian ethics that others believe the experience of practical 
necessities and incapacities reveals.  See, for instance, Peter Winch "The Universalizability of 
Moral Judgments," Ethics and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 151-70 and 
Raimond Gaita, “Modalities,” chapter 7 in Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception, 2nd Ed.  
(Routledge, 2004), pp. 96-113.   
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  the considerations about freedom and intentionality acknowledged earlier  
 in the discussion, but it still does not give the required result in relation to 
 morality.  The I of the reflective practical deliberation is not required to  
 take on the result of anyone else's properly conducted deliberation as a  
 datum, nor be committed from the outset to a harmony of everyone's  
 deliberations -- that is to say, to making a rule from a standpoint of  
 equality.  Reflective deliberation about the truth indeed brings in a  
 standpoint that is impartial and seeks harmony, but this is because it seeks  
 truth, not because it is reflective deliberation, and those features will not  
 be shared by deliberation about what to do simply because it too is  
 reflective.  The I that stands back in rational reflection from my desires is  
 still the I that has those desires and will, empirically and concretely, act; and 
 it is not, simply by standing back in reflection, converted into a being  
 whose fundamental interest lies in the harmony of all interests.  It cannot, 
 just by taking this step, acquire the motivations of justice.13
 
  
 Williams makes much the same point against utilitarian theories in "The Point of 
View of Universe:  Sidgwick and the Ambitions of Ethics."   
 
 My scientific theory, if I have one, is, as a scientific theory (as opposed to  
 a personal achievement, or a possible means to entry in the Royal Society),  
 only incidentally mine: if it is true, then anyone else's theory will to that  
 extent be the same thing.  But my life, my action, is irreducibly mine, and  
 to require that it is at best a derivative conclusion that it should be lived  
 from the perspective that happens to be mine is an extraordinary  
 misunderstanding.  Yet it is that idea that is implicitly contained in the  
 model of the point of view of the universe.14
 
    
 The picture Williams seems to have in mind is a model of practical deliberation in 
which what I have most reason to do depends not on any desires that are mine in 
particular, but only on what could held in common with all other rational agents.  That is, 
what I should do in the circumstances is just what any rational agent ought to do in these 
                                                            
13 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, pp. 68-69.   
 
14 p. 170. Also see "Persons, Character and Morality," in Moral Luck. "[S]omewhere . . . one 
reaches the necessity that such things as deep attachments to other persons will express 
themselves in the world in ways which cannot at the same time embody the impartial view, and 
that they also run the risk of offending against it," p. 18.   
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circumstances.  The only reason for me to do it is simply because I am a rational agent in 
these circumstances and this is simply what is required of any rational agent in the 
circumstances if her actions are to harmonize with those of others (as they will if we all 
deliberate correctly and carry out the required actions).  Moreover, if I come to a different 
conclusion than another rational agent as to what is to be done in these circumstances, 
one of us must have gone wrong somewhere in the course of our deliberations.  We must 
go back and re-deliberate until we reach an agreement. 
 Williams, of course, thinks that this detachment from our desires in practical 
deliberation is unattainable.15  There is no possible standpoint of evaluation that is the 
same for everyone, no guarantee that if we deliberate correctly we will reach the same 
conclusions as to what we ought to do. This, Williams thinks, poses a problem not only 
for Kant's moral theory but any moral theory, that is, any theory that attempts to 
systematically address the question of how anyone morally ought to act.  All moral 
theories require agents to take an "abstract and impersonal view" which conflicts with the 
"depth and necessity" of the dispositions that are valuable in the world of practice.16
                                                            
15 He also claims that Kant recognized this as well, in “Moral Luck.” "In so far as there is a clear 
distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives, and in so far as morality consists of 
imperatives, it consists of categorical imperatives.  The point is that the fact that an imperative is 
(in this sense) categorical provides no reason at all for obeying it.  Nor need Kant think it does: 
the authority of the Categorical Imperative is supposed (mysteriously enough) to derive not just 
from its being (in this sense) categorical, but from its being categorical and self-addressed by the 
agent as a rational being,"  pp. 20-21n1. 
  
Instead of an impartial standpoint of evaluation, there are only the standpoints of 
evaluation that depend on the deep commitments or dispositions that constitute our 
characters, commitments that go beyond those entailed by rational agency alone.  We can 
 
16 "The Point of View of the Universe," p. 171. 
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only "see the world" from the point of view made possible by these dispositions.17  There 
are three important points to be made about these commitments.  First, these 
commitments are ones that we discover that we have rather than decide to have.18  It is 
only because we have these that we have reason to decide one way rather than another.  
Second, to take a distant and detached stance towards certain of one's commitments risks 
depriving them of the value and authority they have for our lives.  Such a stance would 
not necessarily be (psychologically) good for us even if it were always possible.  It would 
also not be ethically good as these dispositions are central to the practice of acting in 
ethically admirable ways.19
 But because we have no reason to think that rational, practical deliberators all are 
committed to harmonizing their actions with others -- as impartial  morality requires of us 
-- what we have most practical reason to do and what it would be morally good for us to 
do cannot align in the way that Kant thought they were.  The commitments that provide 
the foundations of our characters are important (and wonderful) aspects of our lives and 
are central to what gives us reasons for acting and even reasons for living.  Because these 
are what -- from the agents' own point of view -- is most important, we cannot take it for 
granted that in the event they conflict with the impartial demands of morality, it is 
  Because practical deliberations and the reasons that issue 
from them are always particular, we cannot expect sincere, and even ethically admirable 
people to come to agreement, to see ethical matters in the same light.   
                                                            
17 Ibid., p. 164. 
 
18 See especially "Morality and the Emotions," Problems of the Self (New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), p. 227, and "Moral Incapacity,” Making Sense of Humanity, pp. 46-55. 
 
19 Williams defines the virtues as dispositions of character to choose or reject actions because 
they are of a certain ethically relevant kind (disloyal, cowardly, etc.).  Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy, pp. 8-9. 
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necessarily rational for impartial morality to win.  The only practical point of view there 
can be is one that is embedded in the deep desires that constitute one's character, desires 
that cannot be "merely contingent" features of one's practical deliberation that could, in 
theory, be set aside as irrelevant to what one has most reason to do.  It is only because 
Kant pictures moral agents in abstraction from their characters that he is able to conclude 
it is necessarily rational for us to act as the Categorical Imperative requires and therefore 
that it must be possible for us to do so. 
 
III.)  The Ways in Which These Criticisms are Fair 
 This criticism is aimed at Kant's ethical theory in particular for two very good 
reasons.  First, Kant does (at times) enjoin us to take an impartial, universal perspective 
in our moral deliberations, and he often claims that when we take this perspective we take 
the perspective of our “true selves.”20  Unlike consequentialist theories where it is 
possible to separate a theory of right action from a procedure for determining how to act, 
Kant's Categorical Imperative is, in the Groundwork, presented as both.21
                                                            
20 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Practical Philosophy. Mary J. Gregor, trans and ed. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4:457, 4:461.  Hereafter Groundwork. 
  What it is 
morally permissible or impermissible for us to do is whatever it is we arrive at in the 
 
21 Although some have interpreted Kant's later works as revealing that the procedure of applying 
the Categorical Imperative is not intended to be used to arrive at particular judgments on what to 
do in particular situations, but as a procedure for determining what our duties in general are -- it is 
a procedure for arriving at other moral principles.  Mary Gregor's Laws of Freedom: A Study of 
Kant's Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the "Metaphysik der Sitten" (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1963) has been influential in this respect. 
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course of a properly conducted rational deliberation.  This deliberative procedure requires 
us to take up "the point of view . . . of every other rational being."22
 Secondly, in another vein, there are frequent passages throughout the Groundwork 
that suggest Kant thinks we would be better if we lacked our habitual desires or 
inclinations altogether as holy wills, if there are any, lack them.   
   
 
 But the inclinations themselves, as sources of needs, are so far from having  
 an absolute worth, so as to make one wish to have them, that it must  
 instead be the universal wish of every rational being to be altogether free of 
 them.23
 
 
Similar passages also occur in the Critique of Practical Reason.   
 
 Aesthetic contentment (improperly so called), which rests on satisfaction of  
 the inclinations, however refined they may be made out to be, can never be  
 adequate to what is thought about contentment.  For the inclinations change,  
 grow with the indulgence one allows them, and always leave behind a still  
 greater void than one had thought to fill.  Hence they are always  
 burdensome to a rational being, and though he cannot lay them aside, they  
 wrest from him the wish to be rid of them.  Even an inclination to what  
 conforms with duty (e.g. beneficence) can indeed greatly facilitate the 
 effectiveness of moral maxims but cannot produce any.  For in these  
 everything must be directed to the representation of the law as  
 determining ground if the action is not to contain merely legality but also 
 morality.  Inclination is blind and servile, whether it is kindly or not; and  
 when morality is in question, reason must not play the part of mere  
 guardian to inclination but, disregarding it altogether, must attend solely  
 to its own interest as pure practical reason.  Even this feeling of  
 compassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes consideration of what is  
 duty and becomes the  determining ground, is itself burdensome to right- 
 thinking persons, brings their  considered maxims into confusion, and  
 produces the wish to be freed from them and subject to lawgiving reason  
 alone.24
                                                            
22 Groundwork, 4:338. 
   
 
23 Ibid., 4:428. 
 
24 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:118 in Practical Philosophy.  Also see 5:119.  
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 Kant also occasionally gives the impression that actions with moral worth – 
actions performed simply because the agent recognizes them to be morally required even 
when her sensuous inclinations prompt her otherwise-- are motivated by no empirically 
discernible desire whatsoever.  This is suggested in passages in the Groundwork, as well 
as in the Critique of Practical Reason.   
 
 So it is that the human being claims for himself a will which lets nothing  
 be put to his account that belongs merely to his desires and inclinations,  
 and on the contrary thinks as possible by means of it -- indeed as  
 necessary -- actions that can be done only by disregarding all desires and  
 sensible incitements.  The causality of such action lies in him as  
 intelligence and in the laws of effects and actions in accordance with  
 principles of an intelligible world, of which he knows nothing more than  
 that in it reason alone, and indeed pure reason independent of sensibility,  
 gives the law, and, in addition, that since it is there, as intelligence only  
 that he is his proper self (as a human being he is only the appearance of  
 himself), those laws apply to him immediately and categorically, so that  
 what inclinations and impulses (hence the whole nature of the world of  
 sense) incite him to cannot infringe upon the laws of his volition as  
 intelligence; indeed, he does not hold himself accountable for the former  
 or ascribe them to his proper self, that is, to his will, though he does ascribe  
 to it the indulgence he would show them if he allowed them to influence his 
 maxims to the detriment of the rational laws of his will.25
 
 
 What is essential to any moral worth of actions is that the moral law  
 determine the will immediately.  If the determination of the will takes  
 place conformably with the moral law but only by means of a feeling,  
 of whatever kind, that has to be presupposed in order for the law to  
 become a sufficient determining ground of the will, so that the action  
 is not done for the sake of the law, then the action will contain legality  
 indeed but not morality.26
 
 
                                                            
25 Groundwork, 4:457-58. 
 
26 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:71. 
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 Together this paints a picture in which it seems clear that Kant thought desires or 
inclinations hinder our ability to deliberate and -- especially -- act properly.  It then seems 
that it must follow that the ideal agent is one who is wholly freed from such hindrances, 
one that is without desires (or embodiment) altogether.  And, perhaps, that an ideal 
instance of practical deliberation is one in which one's own inclinations play no 
privileged role, are excluded in such a manner that it could be anyone's practical 
deliberations.   
 Contemporary Kantians and commentators on Kant also occasionally write in 
ways that encourage seeing an ideal Kantian practical deliberator in this way -- as one 
who has abstracted from any "merely personal" considerations and has embraced an 
impartial, moral point of view from which she legislates for any and all rational beings. 
Thomas Pogge provides a representative snippet:   
 
 [The Categorical Imperative's] ingenuity consists in that it facilitates a  
 decision by transforming it from one concerning oneself in a concrete  
 situation (where it might be quite difficult to avoid bad faith and  
 dishonesty) to one concerning the world at large.  Here the categorical  
 imperative is, as it were, a general procedure for constructing morally  
 relevant thought experiments. . . In this way the categorical imperative  
 amplifies my conscience by screening out any personal considerations  
 that might affect my choice of maxims but are irrelevant to my decisions  
 about how through legislation to specify a realm of ends.27
 
 
Paul Guyer describes one of the formulations of the Categorical Imperative, the Principle 
of Autonomy, and the interest we have in acting morally as the interest we have in 
conceiving of ourselves as universal legislators.  He goes on to say,  
 
                                                            
27 “The Categorical Imperative,” in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays, 
Paul Guyer, ed. (Lanham, MD:  Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 206.   
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 …the idea of oneself as a universal legislator rather than as a mere subject  
 of universal laws imposed from without allows one to conceive of oneself  
 as having an identity that is fulfilled by universal legislating. . . . Thus, the  
 idea of oneself as a universal legislator essential to [the Principle of  
 Autonomy] introduces a self-conception that is a condition of the possibility  
 of being motivated to act on a categorical rather than merely hypothetical 
 imperative.28
 
   
Given these ways of discussing the matter it is hard to be unsympathetic to Williams' 
criticisms.  These passages suggest the goal of Kant’s ethics, the point of using the 
Categorical Imperative in our deliberations about what it is unconditionally good and 
rational for us to do, is to remove us from our particular point of view and elevate us to a 
universal, objective point of view.  I am supposed to consider not what it is rational for 
me to do, given the person that I am, but what is rational for any person to do from any 
point of view.29
 While I think Williams is right to object to a view that leads to these implications, 
I do not agree with the contention that these implications are unavoidable for Kant’s 
moral theory or a contemporary Kantian moral theory.  First, it is false that Kant’s moral 
theory begins with an abstract conception of rational agency rooted what his theory of 
transcendental freedom requires.  For starters, Kant repeatedly reminds us that 
  Yet it is far from clear how what it is rational from any point of view 
makes a difference to what it is rational for me to do.  It is not just anyone who needs to 
act, but me.  I am not in the business of universally legislating anything, nor does it seem 
I necessarily have an interest in doing such a thing.   
                                                            
28 “The Possibility of the Categorical Imperative,” in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: 
Critical Essays, pp. 236-37. 
 
29 This mirrors Rawls' distinction between what is subjectively and what is objectively valid 
according to Kant.  See Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 2000), p. 167. 
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transcendental freedom is "inexplicable" and "incomprehensible."30 It seems that such an 
"incomprehensible" thing is an inapt way of beginning an argument.  Although Kant 
thinks his theory of morality leads us to a position that is reconcilable with the views 
expounded in the Critique of Pure Reason, we need not embrace all of his more radical 
claims in order to accept the basic insights of his moral theory.31
 Instead, Kant begins his grounding of morality with an analysis of what is 
presupposed by our ordinary, common sense knowledge of morality --  in particular our 
formal conceptions of good will and duty.
   
32  The goal of this analysis is to reveal the 
fundamental principle such concepts presuppose.  What is most important for our 
purposes and his overall argument is that both concepts contain the notion of moral and 
rational constraint.33
                                                            
30 Groundwork, 4:455. 
 A person with a good will is committed to doing what she judges to 
be right even if she does not feel like it, even if her path is laid with obstacles, and even if 
the consequences that follow are not agreeable to her. A person with a good will does 
what is right as a matter of duty – regardless of whether or not it happens to promote her 
own happiness and without any further motivating aim.  Kant also argues that our 
ordinary conception of duty and the way in which we view our duties to be necessary 
reveals that we take duty to be an unconditional, categorical rational imperative rather 
than a conditional hypothetical rational imperative and, furthermore, that such categorical 
 
31 For a more detailed argument see Thomas Hill, “Kantian Analysis:  From Duty to Autonomy,” 
Human Welfare and Moral Worth (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 35-36. 
 
32 For a similar defense of these points, see Thomas Hill and Arnulf Zweig, “Editors’ 
Introduction,” Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
2002), pp. 47-48. 
 
33  This follows Lewis White Beck’s reading in A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical 
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 84.      
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imperatives are derived from a supreme principle of rationality – the Categorical 
Imperative.  
 The next two sections have the following goals.  First, although Kant thought that 
his conception of categorical imperatives as a distinct kind of rational requirement and 
our common sense conceptions of moral requirements were one and the same,34
 My hope in the next section is first to make clear what is distinctive about 
categorical imperatives as requirements of practical rationality.  Once this rational 
distinction is made clear, I think two things follow.  First, I hope to show that a better 
understanding of Kant’s own distinction between categorical and hypothetical rational 
norms reveals that the cases of practical necessities that so interested Bernard Williams 
seem to be cases in which agents take themselves to be bound by a categorical rather than 
a hypothetical imperative.  Secondly, while this result may seem surprising, it can be 
readily explained.  Once we see what makes categorical imperatives distinctive as 
requirements of rationality, we will have a better grasp of the pre-theoretical conception 
 we 
would do well not to approach categorical imperatives with this equation in mind. 
Chapter 2 made clear that Kant’s conception of moral requirements and our own might be 
different in important ways.  These different assumptions about the nature of moral 
requirements might cloud our understanding of the formal distinction between two kinds 
of rational norms – hypothetical and categorical rational norms.  What has value, what is 
good, for Kant just is whatever it is that it is rational for us to pursue.  Getting clear on 
the basic distinction between two ways in which it might be rational for agents to act can 
lead to a better understanding of Kant’s theory of moral value. 
                                                            
34 For instance in Lectures on Ethics, Louis Infield, trans. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1963) Kant states that there are three classes of imperatives: technical, prudential (both 
of which are hypothetical) and moral, p. 4.   
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of moral value that Kant had in mind as well as its connection to our autonomy as agents. 
This conception of moral value has much in common with the honor-based conceptions 
of the ethical that so intrigued Bernard Williams. 
 
IV.)  Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives 
 First, I will summarize the ways in which Kant describes the distinction between 
categorical and hypothetical imperatives.  Then I will discuss some of the ways in which 
we the distinction is often depicted and why they might mislead.  Then I will characterize 
my own understanding of the distinction, highlighting the ways in which the two 
imperatives function in practical deliberation. 
 Imperatives in general are objective principles of reason as addressed to finite or 
imperfectly rational agents who may or may not act as they have reason to do.35  
Objective principles of reason are those principles that any rational person would follow 
if she had no other competing incentives.  They state how a being would act if she were 
fully rational.  Human beings, however, are only finite rational agents – they are 
imperfectly rational and may fail to do what would be rational for them to do. Objective 
principles of reason, as addressed to imperfectly rational agents, are oughts or musts.  
“They say that to do or to omit something would be good” to a being who does not 
automatically do what it would be good for her to do.36
 Imperatives may represent an action as rational and good in one of two ways – 
either as good as a means to something further, or as a good in itself without reference to 
   
                                                            
35 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:20; Groundwork, 4:414. 
 
36 Groundwork, 4:413; also see The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:222. 
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another end.37 Categorical imperatives represent the actions themselves as 
unconditionally good and rational.  Hypothetical imperatives represent the actions as 
good and rational to perform only indirectly, on the condition that it brings about an end 
that one happens to want. They are material, empirical principles in which one will only 
be prompted to act if one happens to desire the empirical inducement, to see it as a good 
thing to bring about, and this may vary from person to person.38
 
 The example used to 
illustrate a hypothetical imperative in the Critique of Practical Reason is to tell someone 
“he must work and save in his youth in order not to want in his old age.”   
 The will is directed to something else which it is presupposed that he  
 desires, and as to this desire, it must be left to the agent himself  
 whether he foresees other resources than means acquired by himself,  
 or does not hope to live to old age, or thinks that in case of future  
 need he can make do with little.  Reason, from which alone can arise  
 any rule that is to contain necessity, does indeed put necessity even  
 into this precept (for otherwise it would not be an imperative), though  
 it is only a subjectively conditioned necessity and cannot be  
 presupposed in the same degree in all subjects.39
 
   
 Categorical imperatives, in contrast, hold regardless of one’s empirical desires. 
The example used to illustrate a categorical imperative is,  
 
 Now tell someone that he ought never to make a lying promise; this is  
                                                            
37 Ibid., 4:414; also see The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:222. 
 
38 As will be discussed in more detail alone, even though the necessary, natural end for all human 
beings (as finite beings) is for their own happiness or welfare, conceptions of one’s happiness are 
subjective and vary from person to person. 
 
39 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:20.  Throughout the Critique of Practical Reason Kant also 
repeatedly suggests that all empirical incentives are ones of self-love or one’s own happiness.  
“The direct opposite of the principle of morality is the principle of one’s own happiness made the 
determining ground of the will,” 5:25; also see 5:22, 5:34. 
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 a rule that has to do only with his will, regardless of whether the  
 purposes the human being may have can be thereby attained; the mere  
 volition is that which is to be determined completely a priori by this rule.  
 If, now, it is found that this rule is practically correct, then it is a law  
 because it is a categorical imperative.  Thus, practical laws refer only to  
 the will, without regard to what is attained by its causality, and one may 
 abstract from this letter (as belonging to the world of sense) so as to have  
 them pure.40
 
 
 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant makes a further distinction 
between two kinds of hypothetical imperatives and contrasts both of these with 
categorical imperatives.41
 Secondly there are assertoric imperatives which represent an action as being good 
or rationally necessary as a means to a naturally necessary end of all finite beings – their 
own happiness.  Happiness is conceived of by Kant in various ways, but all agree in that 
he sees happiness as something subjective, relative from person to person, and an 
indeterminate goal that reason does little to help make determinate.  He sometimes 
  First there are imperatives of skill, which represent an action 
as being good or rationally necessary as a means to some optional end.  Kant calls these 
“problematic” imperatives in the Groundwork and in his Lectures on Ethics.  These take 
the form, “If you would like to build a camp fire you must first find wood.”  Finding 
wood is represented as good or rationally necessary insofar as it required in order to bring 
about one’s contingent end.   
                                                            
40 Ibid., 5:21.  
 
41 He also discusses the same three distinct kinds of imperatives in Lectures on Ethics. Kant 
simplifies matters in The Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason and says 
that all imperatives are simply conditional and technical – mere rules of skill -- (they require one 
to represent an end one desires to bring about that can be attained by the action), or unconditional 
and moral – where one determines that the action is in and of itself good to do, regardless of what 
the action brings about. 
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depicts happiness as welfare or well-being,42 other times as a maximum of well-being in 
one’s present and one’s future,43 lasting satisfaction with one’s state or the lasting 
agreeableness of one’s life,44 and the satisfaction of all of one’s needs and inclinations.45
 
  
Because the object of assertoric imperatives, happiness, is indeterminate, because 
conceptions of happiness can reasonably vary from person to person, and because the 
means of reaching this object are uncertain and variable, Kant does not think assertoric 
imperatives issue in strict commands.  Instead they merely recommend various actions – 
the give us “counsels of prudence” as to what is good as a (likely) means to one’s 
happiness.  
 Giving counsel does involve necessity, which, however, can hold only  
 under a subjective and contingent condition, whether this or that man  
 counts this or that in his happiness; the categorical imperative, on the  
 contrary, is limited by no condition and, as absolutely although practically 
 necessary, can be called quite strictly a command.46
 
 
 A few clarifications about Kant’s distinction should be made.  One common, if 
misleading way, of distinguishing between categorical and hypothetical imperatives is by 
                                                            
42 Groundwork, 4:395; The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:389. 
 
43 Groundwork, 4:399. 
 
44 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:339, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:22. 
 
45 For a more thorough discussion of Kant’s conception of happiness, see Thomas Hill’s 
“Happiness and Human Flourishing,” in Human Welfare and Moral Worth, pp. 168-69 to which 
this brief discussion is indebted. 
 
46  Groundwork, 4:416; also see Critique of Practical Reason, 5:25-26.  
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reference to an agent's desires.47
 Desires might refer to the narrow sense of desire, Begierde, which Kant typically 
uses to refer to the desires we experience as natural, embodied beings. Our "inclinations" 
are a type of Begierde – the habitual desires or cravings that we have as natural, 
embodied beings.
  It is often said that a hypothetical imperative represents 
an action as rationally required or good as a means to getting what one desires.  A 
categorical imperative then represents an action as rationally required or good in and of 
itself, regardless of one's desires.  However, this way of making the distinction can easily 
mislead.   
48  Kant also occasionally suggests that all such inclinations are rooted 
in self-love or self-interest.49
 However, "desires" might be meant in a broader sense and refer to any and all 
incentives for action or motivational states.  Kant typically uses the word Begehr when 
  If this is what is meant by "desires" than this way of 
distinguishing between hypothetical and categorical imperatives is apt.  Hypothetical 
imperatives might then be understood to be principles that represent actions as good to 
perform insofar as they are means to what we desire merely as natural, embodied beings 
(most especially our desires for our own happiness or our own advantage).  Categorical 
imperatives are principles that represent actions as good independently of what we desire 
merely as natural, embodied beings (most especially our desires for our own happiness or 
our own advantage).  
                                                            
47 For example, this is the distinction used by Williams in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 
189, Philippa Foot in “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” Philosophical Review 
81 (1972),  pp. 305-16.   
 
48 See The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:212-213.  Richard McCarty has a helpful discussion in 
Kant’s Theory of Action (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 11-12. 
 
49 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:25, 5:22, 5:34. 
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referring to desires in this broader sense.   Kant clearly thought there were felt incentives 
to act as categorical imperatives demand of us.  He dedicates a chapter in the Critique of 
Practical Reason to explaining what these are and how it is they determine the will, and 
discusses the effects the moral law has on our minds at length in The Metaphysics of 
Morals.50
 There is another common way of distinguishing between categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives in terms of the relevance of the strength of one’s desires.  A 
categorical imperative might be thought to be what we must do even if is not what we 
most strongly desire to do.  This might be true if what we mean by “most strongly desire” 
is “most inclined,” and furthermore we understand “inclined” in the narrow sense that 
Kant does – as only referring to the needs and interests we have as sensuous beings.  
Nevertheless, this distinction is also likely to mislead.  If we understand “desire” in terms 
of any kind of felt incentive or impetus to perform an action, Kant might be thought to  
believe that all incentives vary in terms of their strength to move us to act, and that we 
are in fact moved by our strongest incentive.
 We cannot then understand the distinction between hypothetical and 
categorical imperatives to distinguish between actions which we have or lack an incentive 
to perform – all actions are caused by desires in this sense. 
51  According to Kant, we can only judge 
that the thought of duty alone is what moves us to act by way of the obstacles in the way 
of duty (i.e. our sensuous desires) that are overcome.52
                                                            
50 Ibid., 5:71-89; The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:399-403.  
  In fact, part of Kant’s insistence 
of using an a priori method in moral philosophy is that the more purely we understand 
  
51 Richard McCarty argues for this view in Kant’s Theory of Action, esp. pp. 80-82. 
 
52 Groundwork, 4:397. 
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the moral law independently of anything empirical, the more powerfully it serves as an 
incentive. 
  
 It is now clear that those determining grounds of the will which alone  
 make maxims properly moral and give them a moral worth – the immediate  
 representation of the law and the objectively necessary observance of it as  
 duty – must be represented as the proper incentives to action, since  
 otherwise legality of actions would be produced but not morality of  
 dispositions.  But it is not so clear, and on the contrary must at first glance  
 seem to everyone quite improbable, that even subjectively that presentation  
 of pure virtue can have more power over the human mind and can provide  
 a far stronger incentive to effect  even that legality of actions and to bring  
 forth stronger resolutions to prefer the law to every other consideration,  
 from pure respect for it, than all the deceptive allurements of enjoyment and, 
 in general, everything that may be counted as happiness, or even all threats  
 of pain and troubles can produce.  But it really is so, and if human nature  
 were not so constituted, no way of representing the law by circumlocutions  
 and by means of recommending it would ever bring forth morality of 
 disposition.53
  
 
This is supported by his account of how it is that the moral law does move us to act as 
described in chapter 2 – the more purely the moral law is represented the more it 
humiliates our merely sensuous incentives and provides its own positive incentive.54  
Furthermore, his depiction of frailty in his discussion of the degrees of the propensity to 
evil found in human nature suggests we are moved by which incentive is strongest.55
                                                            
53 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:151-52.  Also See Groundwork, 4:410-11 and 4:411n; The 
Metaphysics of Morals, 6:217. 
  It 
seems then that there is good reason to allow room for even Kant to think that we act on 
our strongest incentive – whether this incentive has a sensuous or an intellectual origin.   
 
54 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:71-89. 
 
55 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 25.  
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 In summary, when it comes to our desires the distinction between hypothetical 
and categorical imperatives rests on the distinction between our rationally contingent, 
sense-based desires, which are most often represented as our desires for our own 
happiness, advantage, or to avoid things we fear, and our not rationally contingent, not 
sense-based desires, especially our desires for things other than our own happiness, or our 
own advantage or to avoid things we fear, both of which might possibly come in differing 
strengths.   
 Another common confusion regarding categorical and hypothetical imperatives 
stems from Kant’s lack of clarity in distinguishing between particular categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives and the abstract principles of rationality from which particular 
hypothetical and categorical imperatives and the rationality authority they bear are mere 
derivatives.  Particular categorical and hypothetical imperatives require access to 
particular empirical facts and might be limited in scope – they do not apply to all rational 
agents period, but to all rational agents in a particular set of circumstances, and (in the 
case of hypothetical imperatives) with these particular discretionary ends.  The rational 
principles behind them (which for the sake of convenience will be referred to as the 
Hypothetical Imperative and the Categorical Imperative56
 The rational principle behind particular hypothetical imperatives – the 
Hypothetical Imperative – is suggested by Kant’s statement, “Whoever wills the end also 
wills (insofar as reason has decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary 
) apply unconditionally to all 
finite rational agents in all circumstances.   
                                                            
56 Again, this follows the convention of Thomas Hill.  The discussion that follows is much 
indebted to him, especially “The Hypothetical Imperative,” in Dignity and Practical Reason in 
Kant’s Ethics (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1992) and the Editors’ Introduction to 
Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, especially pp. 53-59. 
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means to it that are within his power.”57
 It is well-known that Kant thought the rational principle behind particular 
categorical imperatives was the supreme principle of morality – the Categorical 
Imperative.  His arguments for why the various formulations of the Categorical 
Imperative are presupposed by individual categorical imperatives, how the various 
formulations are related and yet equivalent to one another, and if not equivalent which 
are central and which peripheral, are often brief, cryptic, and the subject of endless 
commentary and debate. While it is very controversial whether the Categorical 
Imperative as Kant formulates it (and, if the formulations are not equivalent, which is 
central) is what underlies our common sense understanding of what it is to be 
unconditionally rationally bound, we might think we can state this much without 
controversy.  At the very least, the principle that underlies particular categorical 
imperatives states that some actions are good or rationally required regardless of whether 
they serve our merely discretionary ends or contribute to our own happiness.  Only a 
  We might also add – “or gives up the end.”  
This seems tacitly implied as all of the ends in question are discretionary or subjective 
and may in require actions that conflict with our other discretionary ends or actions that 
are unconditionally rationally necessary.  It is not irrational for us to abandon a 
discretionary purpose if we decide that the pursuit of it would be unwise or too costly. I 
can decide to abandon my end of building a fire, if I discover the means of doing so 
require too much effort on my part, or would require me to cut down a 200-year-old live 
oak.  I can always revise my views on what will make me happy as well.  I might have 
thought that unlimited ice cream would make me happy, but then learn what unlimited 
consumption will do to my arteries and prospects of developing type-2 diabetes.   
                                                            
57 Groundwork, 4:417. 
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categorical imperative is a true command or law (rather than a “rule of skill” or a 
“counsel of prudence”); it “bring[s] with it the concept of an unconditional and objective 
and hence universally valid necessity, and commands are laws that must be obeyed, that 
is, must be followed even against inclination.”58  The particular commands that issue 
from this unconditional principle of rationality represent actions as good rather than 
simply agreeable.59
 Lastly, a discussion of categorical and hypothetical imperatives would be 
woefully incomplete without an account of their distinctive roles in our deliberations. Our 
everyday experience of categorical imperatives reveals that they have a rational authority 
in our deliberations that merely hypothetical imperatives lack.  This authority can be seen 
in the way that categorical imperatives override hypothetical imperatives in the event of 
conflict.   
 
 Although there are two distinct principles of rationality that underlie hypothetical 
and categorical imperatives, they cannot give rise to rationally conflicting commands 
because hypothetical imperatives leave us with options.  They command us to either take 
the means necessary to our ends, or give up our ends.  In the case of rules of skill, it is 
consistent with the demands of rationality for us to abandon our purpose if it conflicts 
with an unconditional rational requirement.  In the case of counsels of prudence, although 
we as finite beings cannot abandon our natural end of happiness, we can pursue it in a 
different manner or at a different time. 
                                                            
58 Ibid., 4:416.  Also see The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:379-80.  A more abstract statement of 
what a Categorical Imperative is than the formulations given in the Groundwork occurs at 6:216.   
 
59 Groundwork, 4:413.  
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 On the other hand, categorical imperatives -- when they apply -- are inescapable.  
They do not leave us the option of simply abandoning or temporarily suspending our 
pursuit of the end.  They leave us with no option.  In particular, categorical imperatives, 
unlike hypothetical imperatives, render considerations of what is in our interests 
irrelevant to determining what it is that we have reason to do.  They override or exclude 
considerations of self-love, considerations which would be relevant in different 
circumstances, from making a difference to what is rational for us to do in these 
circumstances.60
 
  In cases in which we feel bound or necessitated to perform a given 
action, such "mere desires" or "opposing inclinations" grounded in self-love or self-
interest are unimportant.  Kant himself uses this way of describing why it is that 
categorical commands have an authority that hypothetical counsels or rules lack.   
 For an object as the effect of my proposed action I can indeed have  
 inclination but never respect, just because it is merely an effect and  
 not an activity of a will.  In the same way I cannot have respect for  
 inclination as such, whether it is mine or that of another, I can at  
 most in the first case approve it and in the second sometimes even  
 love it, that is regard it as favorable to my own advantage.  Only  
 what is connected with my will merely as ground and never as effect,  
 what does not serve my inclination but outweighs it or at least  
 excludes it altogether from making a choice -- hence the mere law  
 for itself -- can be an object of respect and so a command.61
 
  
 In summary, the basic distinction between categorical and hypothetical 
imperatives rests on what one must do in order to achieve an end that one finds agreeable, 
pleasant, to one’s own advantage, or to avoid what one fears, and what one must do as a 
                                                            
60 Groundwork, 4:401n.  The phenomenon of feeling constrained is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 2, section IV.  
 
61 Groundwork, 4:400; also see Critique of Practical Reason, 5:80. 
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matter of principle, where whether or not one happens to find the results agreeable or in 
one’s interests is simply beside the point.  Kant makes this point clearly in the 
Groundwork.  
 
 That  there were practical propositions that command categorically could 
 not itself be proved, any more than it can be proved here in this chapter.  
 But one thing might have been done -- namely, to show that in willing  
 something just out of duty the renunciation of all interest is the specific  
 mark distinguishing a categorical from a hypothetical imperative.62
  
 
V.)  Practical Necessities and Categorical Imperatives 
 Bernard Williams thought the cases in question, like those of Ajax and the 
modified case of Elizabeth, cannot plausibly be understood as Kant and Kantians must 
understand them.  Because they are not “musts” that are the result of the agent 
determining that she is morally required to perform the action, Williams maintains that a 
Kantian should conclude that they are merely hypothetically rather than categorically 
required.  Nevertheless, Williams’ objection continues, such a view fails to do justice to 
the depth and necessity of our deep commitments, some of which can coherently be 
understood to render certain actions unconditionally rationally necessary, and which, in 
the event of a conflict with a moral requirement, reveal that we do not always clearly, 
necessarily have unconditional reason to do as we are morally required to do.  In this 
section, I will argue that there is room for Kant or a Kantian to agree with Williams that 
the cases in question in fact are more plausibly regarded as ones that are categorically, 
unconditionally rationally necessary rather than merely hypothetically necessary.  
Furthermore, I will argue that seeing them as categorically rationally necessary sheds 
                                                            
62   Groundwork, 4:431-32.  This translation is Arnulf Zweig's.  (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 2002).   
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light on the basic value distinction that underlies the distinction between these two forms 
of rational requirement.  In the next section, I will discuss the relationship between these 
kinds of categorical necessities and moral requirements.   
 First, why does Williams think that a Kantian must view cases in which an agent 
concludes that he must perform a given action, like that of Sophocles’ Ajax, as expressing 
a merely hypothetical and conditional “must?”  Sophocles’ Ajax expresses such a “must” 
when, after destroying the herds of his army in a fit of goddess-induced madness, he 
concludes suicide is his only honorable option.  He can’t live knowing that he has 
destroyed the chances of victory for his friends and comrades.  He had dedicated his life 
to living in a manner befitting a heroic warrior, but has made his life ridiculous.   Before 
killing himself, he states, “Now I am going where my way must go.”63
 
  Such expressions 
of necessity are common in the in the literature of the ancient world.  But, asks Williams,  
 What necessity are they expressing?  It is an important question, and it  
 is easy to go the wrong way towards answering it.  The influence of  
 modern morality and Kantian ideas encourages one to ask first whether  
 this is the ‘must’ of duty, the categorical imperative of morality.  The  
 answer to that comes readily: the courses of action that some of these  
 characters are taking, and the reasons they give for them, are enough to  
 show that this is not what is at issue.  But if that is so, then all that is left  
 on the Kantian story is that this should be what Kant called a  
 ‘hypothetical’ imperative:  a ‘must’ that is relative merely to what the  
 agent wants to do, as when one says, ‘I must go now,’ meaning by it no  
 more than that he must go if he is to do whatever it is he intends to do. 
  . . . So long as it has not yet reached the unique categorical demand of  
 morality itself, ‘I must do this’ can never mean more than ‘this course of  
 action is necessary if I am to have what I want or to avoid what I fear.64
                                                            
63 Quoted by Williams in Shame and Necessity, p. 75.   
 
 
64 Ibid., pp. 75-76; also see Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chapter 10 and “Practical 
Necessity.” Williams appears to be making reference to the Groundwork, 4:401n where Kant 
distinguishes the rational feeling of respect for the law from objects of inclination and fear as 
grounds for action. 
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 Initially it might seem that Williams’ diagnosis of what a Kantian must think of 
these cases is correct.  This appearance is especially strong if we understand the principle 
underlying particular categorical imperatives to be the supreme principle of morality as 
formulated by Kant as well as assume that the principles Kant derives from it – especially 
the principles forbidding suicide – truly follow.  Surely, it seems, Ajax does not think that 
he, on Kantian grounds, is morally required to kill himself.  If all and only categorical 
imperatives are moral imperatives, and all imperatives are either categorical or 
hypothetical, then it simply follows that the “must” expressed is a non-moral and 
hypothetical “must.”    
 But, let us for the moment try to understand these cases without considerations of 
moral requirements as they are commonly conceived, or as Kant conceived of them, in 
the forefront of our minds.  Let us consider them simply as cases which express either 
unconditional or conditional rational requirements.  Is killing himself what Ajax “must” 
do in order to achieve a discretionary, rationally optional end, or to promote his own 
happiness or interests?  If so, it is only conditionally rationally necessary.  Or, is it what 
he “must” do regardless of considerations as to his advantage, or what would promote his 
rationally contingent, discretionary ends?  If so it is unconditionally rationally necessary.  
 It does not seem to be the case that these cases truly fit the mold of conditional, 
hypothetical “musts.”  If they did, they must either fall under a “counsel of prudence” or 
a “rule of skill.”  First, such cases certainly don’t seem to fit the mold of counsels of 
prudence – It does not seem that the “must” represents an action as necessary in order to 
promote one’s own interests or further one’s own well-being.   Ajax does not act in 
pursuit of his own sensuous pleasures.  He does not see what he must do as agreeable or 
129 
 
as leading to the promotion of his own welfare.  If any action fails to promote one’s own 
preservation or well-being, it seems suicide does precisely that.  Moreover, unlike the 
cases of suicide that Kant takes to be clearly irrational – destroying one’s life for the sake 
of self-love65
  While more controversial, these do not seem to be cases which naturally fall 
under rules of skill, either.  The “musts” in question do not seem to express what one 
must do in order to achieve one’s discretionary, contingent ends, or one we must do in 
order to achieve this or that discretionary purpose.  First, it isn’t clear that Ajax is trying 
to achieve some further good by committing suicide.  It is simply what his principles and 
commitments require of him in the circumstances, period.  He need not look to a further 
good or to the results of his actions and wish to bring them about in order to conclude 
what it is that he should do. Second, these principles and commitments do not seem to be 
contingent in the appropriate sense.  Our contingent, merely discretionary ends are those 
that we can rationally give up if we determine that the costs of pursuing them would be 
too high, that it is not worth the price we must pay in order to achieve them.
 – the end of this action is not plausibly represented as what one wishes to 
do out of self-love.  Ajax can certainly be expressing his resolve to die in order to 
preserve his honor while at the same time not wanting to die at all.  He might be scared to 
die.  He might wish it were possible for him to remain alive while preserving his honor.  
These are cases in which agents are willing to renounce their own interests or well-being 
on the basis of a principle. Their reasons for acting are not to promote their own 
happiness or secure their own advantage. 
66
                                                            
65 Groundwork, 4:422. 
  I might 
decide that building a campfire on a cool night is not worth the price sacrificing the life 
 
66  See Kant’s distinction between “dignity” and “price” in Groundwork, 4:434-35. 
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of a 200-year-old live oak.  On a much colder night, I might decide that saving the life of 
the 200-year-old live oak is not worth the price of sacrificing my own.  Yet matters seem 
rather different in the case of Ajax.  These comparisons and calculations, in the eyes of 
Ajax, are inappropriate.  He does not judge preserving his honor is good on the condition 
that it does not require him to give up his life, or that his life is too high a price.  
Preserving his honor has a value, to him, that is above all price.        
 If these commitments are not the merely discretionary, freely selected ends we 
can abandon or change at will when we determine that the costs of pursuing them would 
be too high, is this fact alone enough to make them rationally necessary in the appropriate 
sense? 
 There are two ways of thinking about whether or not ends in question are or are 
not rationally necessary.  First, we might think that ends are rationally necessary if they 
are the ends that must be adopted by a rational being in virtue of her rationality.  By ends, 
I mean objects that it would be good --that we have reason -- to bring about or must 
respect.  What these ends might be, and whether there are any is controversial.  Of 
course, Kant does think there are ends that fit this description, and derives them from his 
understanding of the Categorical Imperative that is presupposed by particular categorical 
imperatives.  He thinks the ends that fit this description are the humanity or autonomy in 
each rational being, the full respect of which requires us not only to never act against it, 
but also to promote our own natural and moral perfection as well as to help other 
autonomous beings pursue their freely selected and morally permissible ends.67
                                                            
67 Groundwork, 4:428; The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:385; also see  Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical 
Thought, pp. 325-26. 
  The ends 
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of Ajax (or Elizabeth) do not seem to be rationally necessary in this sense.  They are not 
ends that the Categorical Imperative requires any rational agent to adopt.68
 On the other hand, we might think that ends are “rationally necessary” not in the 
sense that these are ends any individual must adopt in order to be rational, but in the 
sense that it would be irrational for a particular individual to give them up – perhaps 
because they are central to his life, and are ends he fully endorses.  Furthermore, such 
ends would be irrational to abandon or give up even if they require an individual to 
sacrifice his happiness or to do what is less than agreeable to him.  Such an individual 
need not have such ends simply as a rational being.  But, they are necessary to him as 
now this rational being.  First, to abandon them now, at this point in time, would render 
much of his life up until now incoherent.  Ajax has dedicated his life to being a heroic 
warrior, to being a faithful comrade, to living in accordance with a code of honor.  To 
continue to live when the only means of doing so is dishonorable would make his entire 
life a waste, it would make all of his actions and sacrifices performed for the sake of 
honor pointless.  Second given their centrality to his evaluational system, he will not find 
adequate reasons for dismissing them.  In fact, questioning them would lead him to a 
rediscovery of his reasons for endorsing them.  Such ends then are rationally necessary – 
they are ones that an individual cannot reasonably give up and that he has reasons to 
maintain.   
   
 Which of these understandings of rationally necessary underlies the intuitive 
rational distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives?  There are a 
                                                            
68 Although some, like Allen Wood, might argue that they are ways of promoting their own 
natural and moral perfection.  See Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 329.  I think there might be merit in 
thinking of these cases as ones in which our personal commitments might be ways of making 
determinate our indeterminate duties to promote our own perfection as human and moral beings.  
If this is true, then not only are these “musts” at issue categorical, they are also moral.  
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number of issues here, not all of which can be solved.  I would like to make a couple of 
points, however.  First, at the stage of the argument in the Groundwork where Kant 
introduces the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, Kant is 
discussing “popular moral philosophy.”  His discussion of hypothetical imperatives there 
clearly focuses on skillful choice of means to one’s ends – using reason in a purely 
instrumental way in order to achieve something agreeable or something one happens to 
want. But then the relevant contrast within “popular moral philosophy” to such 
hypothetical imperatives seems to be with actions we simply judge to be good, whether 
or not they produce desirable results.  We do not need to think that there are any 
rationally necessary ends in the first, strict sense in order to grasp this basic distinction.  It 
is simply the common sense judgment that sometimes it is rational to do what it is not 
pleasant, or not agreeable, or even hard and scary to do – even if it might never be to our 
advantage or get us what we want.   
 Furthermore, this basic distinction between two ways in which we commonly 
think that actions might be reasonable to perform corresponds to a common sense 
distinction between two ways of valuing.69  This should come as no surprise because 
Kant understands what is valuable, or what is good, in terms of what it is that we have 
reason to do.  First, we might value things because we find them pleasant and agreeable, 
or because they contribute to our own advantage.  Second, we might esteem, honor, 
respect and be in awe of them.70
                                                            
69 This discussion is indebted to Elizabeth Anderson’s “Emotions in Kant’s Later Moral 
Philosophy: Honour and the Phenomenology of Moral Value,”  in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 125-45. 
  Kant sees the latter as the basic phenomenal quality of 
 
70 See for example The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:437.   
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moral value.  He thought common sense revealed it to be rational and possible, at times, 
to sacrifice the former value (the “merely agreeable”) to the latter (“the dignified”).  
  
 It is the shamefulness of vice, not its harmfulness (to the agent himself),  
 that must be emphasized above all.  For unless the dignity of virtue is  
 exalted above everything else in actions, the concept of duty itself  
 vanishes and dissolves into mere pragmatic precepts, since a human  
 being’s consciousness of his own nobility disappears and he is for sale  
 and can be bought for a price that the seductive inclinations offer  
 him.71
  
 
 For that a man should be able to possess a thing (i.e., honor) and make  
 it an end to be valued more than life itself, and because of it renounce  
 all self-interest, surely bespeaks a certain nobility in his natural  
 disposition.72
 
 
Kant also thinks that these two basic ways of valuing are best understood in opposition to 
one another.  Dignity is to be found in our ability to tear ourselves away from our 
sensible attachments.73  Acting in ways that increase our own individual happiness has no 
moral content and is not worthy of esteem.74
 If the distinction between these two ways of valuing is what underlies the basic 
common sense distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives – and I think 
there are good grounds for thinking it is – then we have good grounds for thinking that in 
the case of Ajax, the “must” in question is indeed a categorical must.  It is what he must 
do even if it is not pleasant, even if he does not want to die, even if he is scared.  Such an 
 
                                                            
71 Ibid., 6:483; also see 6:380n. 
 
72 Religion, p. 28. 
 
73 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:152. 
 
74 Groundwork, 4:398. 
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action might be honorable, dignified, and estimable even if it does not produce agreeable 
results.  Similar points can be said about the modified Elizabeth example as well.  She 
might conclude, given her commitments she cannot abandon because she fully endorses 
them, she must refuse Mr. Collins – even if it means an uncertain future for her family, 
even if it means she must work doubly hard to fulfill her promise to her father.  She 
simply can’t accept.    
 While perhaps surprising that these cases fit Kant’s pre-theoretical conception of 
moral value, in fact this conclusion is in line with much of Kant’s thought.  First, even 
though Kant may not be fully committed to the view that the only springs of human 
motivation are morality and self-love, he certainly gives every impression that self-love 
and morality are some of the primary human motivations and it is this opposition that he 
most often discusses.  The cases of practical necessities are ones in which agents are 
willing to sacrifice their own interests or well-being for the sake of their principles.  
Secondly when it comes to the question of the rationality of moral conduct, and how 
categorical imperatives can be possible for finite rational beings like us, it seems the 
specter of rational egoism is ever ready to rear its head.  For many, both now and then, 
the question ‘Why be moral?’ is a question of whether or why it is rational to act in ways 
other than promoting our own interests.  And Kant, rightfully I think, took himself to 
have an entirely different strategy of answering this question as well as found grounds for 
dissatisfaction in previous moral theories (like those of Hume or Hobbes) who, it might 
be thought, ceded the point to the egoist.  They were only able to argue that it is – or 
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could be -- in our (enlightened) self-interest to do as morality requires, not that we ever 
have good reason to do what is not in our own self-interest.75
 
 
 I have a letter from the late excellent Sulzer in which he asks me what  
 the cause might be that the teachings of virtue, however much they  
 contain that is convincing to reason, accomplish so little.  By trying to  
 prepare a complete answer I delayed too long.  However, my answer is  
 simply that the teachers themselves have not brought their concepts to  
 purity, but since they want to do too well by hunting everywhere for  
 motives to moral goodness, in trying to make their medicine really  
 strong they spoil it.  For the most ordinary observation shows that if we  
 represent, on the one hand, an action of integrity done with steadfast  
 soul, apart from every view to advantage of any kind in this world or  
 another and even under the greatest temptations of need or allurement,  
 it leaves far behind and eclipses any similar act that was affected in the  
 least by an extraneous incentive; it elevates the soul and awakens a wish  
 to be able to act in a like manner oneself.76
  
 
 To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing other than to present  
 morality stripped of any admixture of the sensible and of any spurious  
 adornments of reward or self-love. By means of the least effort of his  
 reason everyone can easily become aware of how much virtue then  
 eclipses everything else that appears charming to the inclinations,  
 provided his reason is not altogether spoiled for abstraction.77
  
 
When Kant confronts the difficulty of the possibility of a categorical imperative, it is easy 
to invoke his worries about the possibility of transcendental freedom, and surely he has 
this in mind as well.  But it is worth carefully attending to the literal characterizations of 
his worries about the possibility of morality.  They depict the more mundane worry that 
people are universally selfish and that even the outward appearance of moral conduct is 
                                                            
75 The same might be said for the heteronomous moral theories Kant considers at Groundwork 
4:441-45.   
 
76  Ibid., 4:411n. 
 
77  Ibid., 4:426n. 
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motivated from self-love; and that reason is used “only to look after the interests of the 
inclinations.”   
 
 From love of humankind I am willing to admit that even most of our  
 actions are in conformity with duty; but if we look more closely at the  
 intentions and aspirations in them we everywhere come upon the  
 dear self which is always turning up; and it is on this that their  
 purpose is based, not on the strict command of duty, which would  
 often require self-denial.78
  
 
 I think this coincidence between cases of practical necessities arrived at on 
considerations of what honor and personal integrity require of us in the circumstances 
regardless of what is in our own self-interest, or whatever else we may happen to want 
reveals the extent to which Kant’s own pre-theoretical assumptions about the nature of 
moral life have much in common with Williams’ own conception of the ethical life 
beyond the narrow understanding of moral obligation.   
 Moreover, I think this also shows the degree to which Kant’s ethics, and 
contemporary Kantian theories, can be seen as sensitive to the value of acting with 
personal integrity.  We cannot really understand what it is that Kant finds appealing about 
acting from duty, acting in ways which express our autonomy, unless we recognize the 
value of acting for the sake of one’s principles, or commitments or ideals even if has 
much to lose by doing so.  Acting with personal integrity is one way in which we can 
express our rational nature as agents that is unlike our ability to set consistent, merely 
discretionary ends and determine the best means of reaching them.  In order to see how 
these are distinct from one another, it helps to consider our imperfect duty to promote the 
happiness of others. We have similar reasons to promote the happiness of others as we do 
                                                            
78  Ibid., 4:407. 
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our own happiness, but have no direct duty to promote our own happiness because we are 
naturally inclined to do so.  However, we are not simply naturally inclined to act with 
personal integrity, but instead must constrain ourselves to so act.  Acting with personal 
integrity can express our autonomy.  Because acting with integrity is unlike our pursuit of 
our merely discretionary ends, we have every reason to think that the ways in which it 
interacts with what we commonly understand to be moral obligations is different.   
  But, it seems in the cases at issue, what agents stand to lose is not simply their 
own happiness or advantage, but their own good wills.  It seems that acting on the basis 
of their personal commitments, even if rationally necessary for them to do so, requires 
them to do what is morally wrong.  I think we have good reason to be sympathetic to 
Williams’ point that it might not be rational to for an individual to abandon a 
commitment central to her life when it conflicts with what is ordinarily taken to be a 
moral requirement.  But, I do not think we should conclude that what follows is that 
moral requirements are not rationally overriding.  Instead, these cases suggest that our 
common sense views of what is morally required in the circumstances are mistaken 
because they fail to make room for individual differences of character.  However, a 
Kantian moral theory is fully capable of recognizing how individual differences of 
character can make a difference to what we morally ought to do.  Furthermore, we should 
think this an improvement over crude conceptions of moral requirements that do not. 
   
VI.)  Practical Necessities and Moral Requirements Revisited 
 We saw in section IV that hypothetical and categorical imperatives cannot 
rationally conflict.  Hypothetical imperatives leave us with rational options.  They advise 
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us to either take the necessary means to our discretionary ends, or to abandon our ends.  
In the event that their advice conflicts with what is unconditionally, categorically 
rationally required, we can abandon our discretionary end.    
 But then we saw in section V that there is a way of distinguishing between two 
kinds of categorical imperatives with respect to two different kinds of rationally 
necessary ends.  Some ends are rationally necessary because they are the ends that must 
be adopted or respected by a rational agent in virtue of her rationality.  These are the 
humanity or autonomy in each rational being, the full respect of which requires us to 
promote our own perfection as well as to help others achieve their (morally) permissible, 
discretionary ends.  It might also initially appear that imperatives with these ends are the 
clearly moral ones, so I will call these “moral categorical imperatives.”79
 We might then wonder why it is that it seems like personal categorical 
imperatives can potentially conflict with what we ordinarily take to be moral 
requirements.  Kant famously thought that moral requirements as we ordinarily think of 
them are categorical imperatives.  If they truly are, then how are these apparent conflicts 
possible?  Bernard Williams thought that the potentiality for conflict between our deep 
commitments and what are ordinarily taken to be moral requirements helped to reveal 
what is a matter of common sense – moral requirements, as ordinarily conceived, are not 
  Other ends are 
rationally necessary not because they are ends that any individual must adopt in order to 
be rational, but because they are rationally necessary for this particular individual.  I will 
call imperatives with these rationally necessary ends “personal categorical imperatives.”  
If these imperatives are both truly categorical, then it is not true that they could rationally 
conflict.   
                                                            
79 But see note 67. 
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in fact rationally overriding, and not truly categorical.  The only truly categorical 
imperatives arise on account of the deep commitments that constitute our characters.  I 
think Williams was right to think that Kant was mistaken that all (or most) of our 
common sense judgments about what is morally required are categorical.  Nor are moral 
requirements, as commonly conceived, the only considerations which function as 
categorical imperatives in our reasoning.  Nevertheless, I do not think we should 
conclude, as did Williams that moral requirements are not rationally overriding.  This 
reaction seems to me to rely on a needlessly crude conception of moral requirements.  
Instead, personal categorical imperatives reveal why it is that moral requirements should 
be sensitive to the relevance of personal commitments to what it is we morally should do.  
Furthermore, there is room on a Kantian view to allow for legitimate exceptions to what, 
ordinarily, might be morally required, but is not if an agent has unconditional reason to 
do otherwise.  Such exceptions are not made on unprincipled grounds – for the sake of 
one’s mere inclinations.   
 In order to illustrate, I will use the example of Ajax.  It is clear that Kant thought 
we have a duty to refrain from suicide.  One of Kant’s examples used in defense of the 
first two formulations of the Categorical Imperative, is our duty to refrain from suicide.80  
However, while it is true that Kant thought the supreme moral principle (the Categorical 
Imperative) applies to all agents at all times, the specific moral duties derived from it 
need not.81
                                                            
80 Groundwork, 4:422, 4:429.  Also see The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:422-23. 
  The casuistical questions that follow Kant’s discussion of our perfect duty to 
refrain from killing ourselves demonstrate that there may in fact be legitimate exceptions 
 
81 See Hill “Meeting Needs and Doing Favors,” esp. p. 209. 
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to this general prohibition.82
 Let’s look at Kant’s two examples in the Groundwork which describe why it is 
that the agent in question proposes to act in a morally impermissible manner.  When 
discussing the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of the Universal Law of 
Nature, the principle on which the suicidal man proposes to act is, “from self-love I make 
it my principle to shorten my life when its longer duration threatens more troubles than it 
promises agreeableness.”
  The question is then whether or not Ajax’s circumstances, 
circumstances in which he judges he has unconditional reason to fail to act as duty 
requires of him, might be one of these legitimate exceptions.  Does the duty apply in 
circumstances in which an agent judges he has unconditional reason to do otherwise? 
83
                                                            
82 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:423-24. 
  When discussing the Formula of Humanity, Kant says, “If he 
destroys himself in order to escape from a trying condition he makes use of a person 
merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life.”  In both of 
these cases, killing oneself is seen as a mere means to something further that the agent 
regards as good.  Killing oneself is a means to promote one’s end of self-love, or to 
maintain a tolerable, enjoyable existence while one lives.  I think that it is clear that 
killing someone else because we think doing so will make our own lives more enjoyable, 
or because it will promote our own interests is obviously morally impermissible.  To do 
so fails to treat them with the minimum respect we owe to them simply as persons – in 
particular, it fails to respect their humanity.  But, if there is a minimum of respect owed to 
other persons simply because they are persons, and if I too am a person, killing myself for 
this reason fails to treat myself with the minimum amount of respect I owe to myself.  It 
too is impermissible, according to Kant.    
 
83 Groundwork, 4:422. 
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 But, as discussed above, neither of these descriptions is an apt characterization of 
Ajax and his reasons for wishing to die.  He doesn’t wish to die in order to promote his 
self-love or his interests.  He does not propose to sacrifice what is of unconditional worth 
– his own humanity or autonomy – for the sake of what has merely conditional value – an 
agreeable existence.  He proposes to die because there is something that is worth more to 
him than preserving his own life, or promoting his own welfare.  As Kant repeatedly 
reminds us, it is not life itself that has an unconditional value.  So it seems there may be 
cases in which suicide is justifiable. 
 
 A man might find himself so placed that he can continue living only  
 under circumstances which deprive life of all value; in which he can  
 no longer live conformably to virtue and prudence, so that he must  
 from noble motives put an end to his life.  The advocates of this  
 view quote in support of it the example of Cato . . . He thought it  
 was necessary for him to die.  He thought if he could not go on living  
 as Cato, he could not go on living at all. It must certainly be admitted  
 that in a case such as this, where suicide is a virtue, appearances  
 are in its favour.84
 
 
It does seem that there might be legitimate exceptions to our duties.85
                                                            
84 Lectures on Ethics, p. 149. 
  Furthermore, Ajax 
might have one.  He might not be morally required to preserve his life when to do so 
would destroy his reason for living.  We might not think he is morally required to value 
things in this way, but given that he does, it might be morally permissible for him to kill 
himself.  It does not violate the usual grounds we have to refrain from ending our own 
lives and the lives of others.  
 
85 We might disagree with Kant about the frequency of such exceptions.  While allowing that 
Cato might be a legitimate exception to the prohibition against suicide, Kant claims, “It is the 
only example of its kind and there has been no similar case since,” ibid.  
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 Let’s turn now to the case of Elizabeth.  There are two grounds of obligation at 
issue – a duty to keep her promises, and a duty to promote the welfare of others.  
Elizabeth made a promise to her dying father to look after her family after his death.  It is 
clear from Kant’s writings that he thought a lying promise one of the most deplorable of 
moral offenses.  It is one of the clearest cases of treating a person’s capacity to set her 
own ends and to determine for herself what is in her own interests as a tool to be 
manipulated for one’s own benefit.  But while impermissible to make promises we never 
intend to keep, it might not be impermissible to fail to fulfill sincerely made promises on 
the basis of principled reasons.86
 Is she nevertheless required in these circumstances to accept Mr. Collins’ offer in 
order to promote the welfare of her family?  As discussed in chapter 2, promoting the 
welfare or happiness of others is an imperfect, wide duty.  We are required to adopt the 
  The question is, does Elizabeth have principled reasons 
to fail to fulfill her promise in these circumstances?  First, to refuse Mr. Collins’ offer is 
not to fail to fulfill her promise to her father entirely.  It is possible, though unlikely that 
she can fulfill it in some other way.  Should we, nevertheless think she is morally 
required to fulfill her promise in this way and go against not simply her mere inclinations 
but her own deep commitments and principles?  I do not think she is strictly required to 
do so.  Given that there are other potential ways of fulfilling her promise to her father, 
and no other way of living in accordance with her own commitments, we might think it 
permissible for Elizabeth not to take these available means of fulfilling her promise.  
Given the circumstances, it is not clear that it is necessarily rational for her to keep her 
promise in this particular way.     
                                                            
86 As discussed in chapter 2, section VIII. 
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happiness of others as an end, but this need not require particular actions of us – so long 
as we are genuinely committed to promoting the happiness of others as a life-long project 
and we in fact do promote the happiness of others on other occasions.  Nevertheless, we 
also saw in chapter 2 how having the happiness of others as an end might require 
particular actions of us in a given set of circumstances – to act in a contrary way is to 
reveal that one does not take the happiness of others to matter at all and so is morally 
impermissible. Is this such an instance?  
 It would only be such an instance if one has no good reason at all to refrain from 
helping, such as when promoting the welfare of others requires very little sacrifice, and 
when the help is desperately needed.  It is clear that in this scenario, the help is needed 
quite badly.  It is not true that promoting their welfare requires little sacrifice on behalf of 
Elizabeth, nor even simply the abandonment of her freely chosen, discretionary ends.  In 
a case such as this, promoting the welfare of others would require her to live, for the rest 
of her foreseeable life, in a matter opposed to her ideals and principles (ideals and 
principles for the sake of which she was willing to sacrifice one’s own advantage).  We 
might then think that she is not required to promote the welfare of her family in this way.  
It might be permissible for her to do so, but her deep commitments and principles 
certainly are not irrelevant to determining what it is that she should do.   
 We have seen that there is room within Kant’s framework to account for 
unconditional rational necessities that need not be understood as moral necessities.  
Furthermore, in the event that these unconditional rational requirements conflict with 
what, in ordinary circumstances, would otherwise be one’s duty, we have seen that such 
commitments can provide legitimate grounds for permitting agents to refrain from acting 
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in ways that might otherwise be morally required of them.   It also seems this is what a 
moral theory needs to do if it is to fully respect the ways in which acting with personal 
integrity reflects the powers of human agents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this dissertation, I hope to have shown how it is that a Kantian moral theory has 
room to be sensitive to the rational and moral importance of a person’s character -- her 
morally permissible personal projects and preferences as well as her deep commitments.  
By deep commitments, I mean the commitments she cannot change because she can see 
no good reason to change them -- she sincerely, fully endorses them, and will often (but 
not always) have structured her life around them, especially when they are commitments 
to people she loves, or they are her life-guiding ideals and projects.  They are 
commitments for the sake of which she could (rationally, it seems) sacrifice her own 
interests, perhaps even her own life.   
 In order to illustrate this, I defended a Kantian view against one of the most 
influential critics of Kant, Bernard Williams.  According to Williams’ reading of Kant, 
one of Kant’s central theses was that an action is unconditionally rational for an agent to 
perform if and only if that action is morally required of her.  Any other actions can only 
be conditionally rational for an agent to perform – they are rational for her to do only on 
the condition they do not conflict with what is morally required of her.  Kant called the 
phenomenon of recognizing oneself to be bound by a moral requirement, and thereby 
taking oneself to be unconditionally rationally necessitated and compelled to act in 
accordance with it, practical necessitation.   
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 Williams then presents his own cases of practical necessitation as a 
counterexample to his reading of Kant.  Practical necessities, on Williams’ view, are 
actions that are unconditionally rationally required of an agent given central features of 
her character – in particular her deep commitments.  In some of these cases of practical 
necessities, it is not true that the agent is responding to what she sees to be, nor what we 
recognize to be, a moral requirement.  Therefore, Kant was wrong to think the only kinds 
of unconditional rational necessities were those that depend upon what is morally 
required of an agent.  Furthermore, sometimes practical necessities conflict with what is 
morally required of an agent.  Therefore, Kant was wrong to think that if an action is 
morally required of an agent, it is unconditionally rationally necessary for her to do it.  
Kant’s mistaken views of practical necessitation, according to Williams, were the result 
of failing to recognize that we cannot ever understand what a person has reason to do in 
abstraction from the particular features of her character. 
 I hope to have provided a convincing, Kantian response to challenge.  The general 
theme of my response is that Kant’s conception of what it is for an action to be morally 
required of an agent not the same as Williams’.  Most importantly, a Kantian conception 
of moral duty, in contrast to Williams’ conception of moral requirements, is sensitive to 
individual differences of character, both with respect to one’s freely chosen, discretionary 
ends and with respect to one’s deep commitments, which it is misleading to describe as 
“freely chosen” or “merely discretionary.”  Personal features of agents can make a 
difference to our Kantian duties in many ways, two of which are especially relevant to 
Williams’ criticisms.   
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 First, as argued in chapter 2, there are many cases in which Kantian moral 
principles simply articulate that certain considerations are morally relevant in the 
circumstances, yet underdetermine what it is that we should do.  For instance, our 
imperfect duties morally require us to adopt certain policies, but not necessarily to 
perform particular actions.  In such instances where moral considerations by themselves 
do not determine what it is that we should do, the personal and particular can make 
determinate which of our options are better to do than others, or even that we simply must 
act in a given manner.  Such a “must” can be a moral “must” for Kant, even if others 
could not demand the action of the agent nor blame her for failing to perform it as they 
would need to be able to do if the action were morally required in Williams’ sense. 
Therefore, it is possible for many – if not most --cases of practical necessities to be cases 
in which agents sincerely judge it to be a moral duty for them to act as they do.   
 Personal features of agents, in particular our deep commitments, can make 
another important difference to our Kantian duties.  It is well-known that in Kant’s ethics, 
the morally permissible, freely selected ends of individuals morally make a difference to 
how we should treat one another.  A failure to take either into account at all in our 
treatment of a person shows a lack of respect for the individual as another person who is 
fully capable of determining for herself what she wants and what sort of life she would 
like to lead.  Furthermore, any attempt by me to manipulate you into setting ends as I 
think you should (perhaps because I think it would be good for you, but – more likely, as 
Kant sees things – because I think it would be good for me) shows a fundamental lack of 
respect for your own rational agency and your capacity to freely set ends.  
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 But there is room for a Kantian to think that our deep, character constituting 
commitments can make a difference to our moral duties that is distinct from the role 
played by our merely discretionary ends.  There are reasons for thinking that the actions 
that are rationally necessary with respect to our deepest commitments are unlike the 
actions that are rationally necessary with respect to our merely discretionary ends.  
Actions that are necessary only with respect to our merely discretionary ends are only 
conditionally rationally necessary – they are necessary only on condition we do not 
abandon the end and furthermore, the end is one that we could rationally give up. 
However, it seems possible that our deepest commitments could make some actions 
unconditionally rationally necessary – not only are necessary not only with respect to the 
end, but the end itself is not one we could rationally abandon.  Unlike the kinds of 
unconditionally rationally necessary ends that Kant most often discusses however, they 
are ends that it would be irrational for her to give up not simply because she is a rational 
person, but because she is this rational person.  It seems that such rationally necessary 
ends are distinct from the morally necessary end (our humanity or autonomy in each 
rational being, the full respect of which requires us to promote our own natural and moral 
perfection and the happiness of others) envisioned by Kant.  In other words, there are 
good reasons for thinking that it is false that if an action is unconditionally rationally 
required for an agent, it must be morally required of her.  It is true that not every 
rationally unconditional “must” is a moral “must”. 
 Nevertheless, we need not think that we should reject the view that every moral 
“must” is a rationally unconditional “must” on account of this.  Contrary to Williams’ 
contention, there are good reasons for maintaining that if a moral requirement applies to 
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an agent in the circumstances, it is unconditionally rationally necessary for her to comply.  
Actions that are unconditionally rationally necessary for agents to perform on account of 
a person’s deep commitments reflect a person’s agency – even her autonomy -- in a 
manner that actions prompted by one’s mere inclinations do not.  They are what an agent 
must do, even if she must sacrifice her own interests, even if she must sacrifice her 
merely discretionary ends.  Because they reflect our agency in a different way than 
actions prompted by our merely discretionary ends, we have every reason to think that 
the way they should interact with moral requirements will also be different.  Instead of 
thinking that moral requirements apply to situations without regard to these differences, 
we should think that sometimes our deep commitments can make a relevant difference to 
what we are morally required to do. Deep commitments may, occasionally, give agents 
moral permission to refrain from doing (or to do) what might otherwise be morally 
required (or impermissible).  These are not illegitimate exceptions made on the basis of 
one’s mere inclinations, but principled exceptions based on what one must do 
independently of considerations of advantage or self-love.  We morally should not 
demand of agents, nor should agents demand of themselves, that they act in ways that 
would not merely make their lives disagreeable or unpleasant to them, but that would 
deprive their lives of value, or make themselves contemptible in their own eyes.   
 
 
150 
 
References 
 
Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Theory of Freedom.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 
 1990. 
 
Anderson, Elizabeth. “Emotions in Kant’s Later Moral Philosophy: Honour and the 
 Phenomenology of Moral Value.” Kant’s Ethics of Virtue.  Monika Betzler, ed. 
 Berlin:  Walter de Gruyter, 2008, pp. 125-45.   
 
Anscombe, G.E.M.   "Modern Moral Philosophy."  Philosophy 33(124) (1958), p. 1-19. 
 
Austen, Jane.  Mansfield Park.  New York:  Bantam Books, 1983. 
 
 Pride and Prejudice. Cambridge, Massachusetts:  The Riverside Press, 1956.   
 
Baron, Marcia W. Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
 University Press, 1995.   
 
 "Virtue Ethics in Relation to Kantian Ethics."  Perfecting Virtue.  Lawrence Jost 
 and JulianWuerth, eds.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2011,  pp. 8-37. 
 
Beck, Lewis White. A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.  
 Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1960. 
 
Bratman, Michael. "Anchors for Deliberation." Intentionality, Deliberation, Autonomy. 
 Christoph Lumer and Santo Nannini, eds.  Burlington:  Ashgate, 2007, pp. 187-
 208. 
 
  "A Thoughtful and Reasonable Stability."  Taking Ourselves Seriously and 
 Getting it Right. Debra Satz, ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,  2006, 
 pp. 77-90. 
 
Denis, Lara. "A Kantian Conception of Human Flourishing."  Perfecting Virtue, 
 Lawrence Jost and  Julian Wuerth, eds. New York: Cambridge University  Press, 
 2011, pp. 164-93. 
 
Foot, Philippa. “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.”  Philosophical 
 Review, 81 (1972), pp. 305-16.  
 
 Natural Goodness.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 2003. 
 
Frankfurt, Harry. The Importance of What We Care About. New York. Cambridge 
 University Press, 1998. 
  
 Necessity, Volition, and Love.  New York.  Cambridge University Press, 1999.   
 
 Reasons of Love. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.   
151 
 
 
 "Response to David Velleman." The Contours of Agency: Essays on 
 Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, eds. Cambridge, 
 MA: The MIT Press, 2002, pp. 124-28.   
  
 "Response to Gary Watson." The Contours of Agency:  Essays on  Themes from 
 Harry Frankfurt.  Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, eds.  Cambridge, MA:  The MIT 
 Press, 2002, pp. 160-64. 
 
 Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right.  Debra Satz, ed. Stanford, CA:  
 Stanford University Press, 2006. 
   
Gaita, Raimond.  Good and Evil:  An Absolute Conception, 2nd Ed.  Routledge, 2004. 
 
Gregor, Mary. Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant's Method of Applying the 
 Categorical Imperative in the "Metaphysik der Sitten." Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
 1963.  
 
Guyer, Paul. "Kantian Perfectionism." Perfecting Virtue.  Lawrence Jost and Julian 
 Wuerth, eds.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 194-214.   
 
 “The Possibility of the Categorical Imperative.”  Kant’s Groundwork of the 
 Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays. Paul Guyer, ed. Lanham, MD:  
 Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1998, pp. 215-46. 
 
Hertzberg, Lars. "On Moral Necessity."  Value and Understanding. Raimond Gaita, ed.  
 New York:  Routledge, 1990, pp. 102-17. 
 
Hill, Thomas E., Jr.  Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Ethics. Ithaca, NY:  Cornell 
 University Press, 1992.   
 
 Human Welfare and Moral Worth.  New York:  Oxford University  Press, 2002. 
 
 "Punishment, Conscience and Moral Worth." Southern Journal of Philosophy, 36 
 (1997), pp. 51-71. 
 
Hill, Thomas E. Jr. and Arnulf Zweig.  “Editors’ Introduction.”  Groundwork for  the 
 Metaphysics of Morals.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 19-108. 
 
Jaworska, Agneizska. "Caring and Internality." Philosophy and Phenomenological 
 Research, 74(3)  (2002), pp. 529-69.     
 
Kant, Immanuel. An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?  Practical 
 Philosophy. Mary J. Gregor, trans and ed. New York:  Cambridge University 
 Press, 1996, pp. 12-22 
 
152 
 
 Critique of Practical Reason. Practical Philosophy. Mary J. Gregor, trans. and ed. 
 New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 134-271.   
 
 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.  Practical Philosophy. Mary J. 
 Gregor, trans. and ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 38-108. 
 
 Lectures on Ethics.  Louis Infield, trans.  Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett Publishing 
 Company, 1963.   
 
 The Metaphysics of Morals.  Practical Philosophy. Mary J.  Gregor, trans and ed. 
 New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 354-603.   
 
 On the Common Saying: that may be correct in theory but it is of no use in 
 practice. Practical Philosophy. Mary J. Gregor, trans. and ed. New York:  
 Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 277-309. 
 
 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. Theodore M. Greene and  
 Hoyt H. Hudson, trans. New York: Harper & Row, 1960. 
 
McCarty, Richard. Kant’s Theory of Action.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism, 2nd Ed. George Sher, ed. Indianapolis, IN: 
 Hackett Publishing Company, 2001. 
 
Monroe, Kristen. "The Ethical Perspective." Political Psychology, 30(3) (2009), pp. 419-
 44. 
 
 "How Identity and Perspective Constrain Moral Choice." International 
 Political Science Review, 24(4) (2003), pp. 405-25. 
 
 John Donne's People:  Explaining Differences Between Rational Actors and 
 Altruists through Cognitive Frameworks." The Journal of Politics, 53(2) (1991), 
 pp. 394-433. 
 
 "Morality and a Sense of Self:  The Importance of Identity and Categorization 
 in Moral Action." American Journal of Political Science, 45(3) (2001), pp. 491-
 507. 
 
O'Neill, Onora. Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy.  
 New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.  
 
 Towards Justice and Virtue.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Paton, H.J. The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy. New 
 York: Hutchinson's University Library, 1971.  
 
153 
 
Pogge, Thomas.“The Categorical Imperative.”  Kant’s Groundwork of the  Metaphysics 
 of Morals: Critical Essays.  Paul Guyer, ed.  Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
 Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998, pp. 189-213. 
 
Rawls, John. Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: 
 Harvard University Press, 2000. 
 
 A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999. 
 
Shoemaker, David. "Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability:  Toward a Wider 
 Theory of Moral Responsibility."  Ethics, 121 (2011), pp. 602-32. 
 
Seidman, Jeffrey. "Caring and Incapacity."  Philosophical Studies, 147 (2010), pp.301-
 22. 
 
 "Caring and the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation." 
 Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 3(1) (2008). 
 
Urmson, J.O. "Saints and Heroes." Essays in Modern Philosophy. A.I. Meldon. ed. 
 University of Washington Press, 1958, pp. 198-216. 
 
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd Ed.  New York:  Basic Books, 2000. 
 
Watson, Gary. "Volitional Necessity." The Contours of Agency: Essays on 
 Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, eds.  Cambridge, 
 MA:  The MIT Press, 2002,  pp. 129-159. 
 
Williams, Bernard. "A Critique of Utilitarianism." Utilitarianism: For and Against.    
 New York:   Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 77-150. 
 
 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
 1985. 
 
 Making Sense of Humanity. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
 Moral Luck.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
 
 Shame and Necessity.  Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 1993. 
 
 Problems of the Self.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1973.  
 
Winch, Peter. Ethics and Action.  London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.  
 
Wood, Allen. "Kant and Agent-Oriented Ethics."  Perfecting Virtue. Lawrence Jost and 
 Julian Wuerth, eds.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 58-91. 
 
154 
 
 Kant's Ethical Thought.  New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
